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There is an urgent need to develop sustainable solutions to the epochal environmental problems that 
the world at large and Africa in particular are currently facing. The current environmental philosophy 
does not seem to be able to resolve satisfactorily all the environmental crises of our world, as they 
have been largely influenced by Western oriented perspectives on one hand that are laden with 
dualistic and anthropocentric view of the world, and are ethics based on the other hand, and as such 
focuses less on human beings’ relationship with Nature. To the extent that attempts were made by 
scholars to advance an African orientation in environmental philosophy, these attempts have been 
bedridden with over-reliance on ethics. Relying mainly on ethics as the philosophical framework for 
addressing environmental issues, it neglects the epistemological dimensions of the African 
intellectual thoughts. To this end, minimal results has been achieved in the quest for panacea to 
environmental crisis, especially in Africa. This study, thus, advances an African outlook in 
environmental philosophy that would be both participatory and interdisciplinary in the quest for more 
meaningful and pragmatic problem-solving frameworks in environmentalism. The research seeks to 
further improve in the development of an African oriented Environmental Philosophy by committing 
to the exploration of an African epistemic outlook for environmentalism. This exploration is hinged 
on the epistemic stance abstracted from indigenous knowledge systems of African people in general 
and the Yoruba and Igbo people of the Western part of Nigeria, in West Africa, in particular. 
Accordingly, the research queries the tendency of the current discourse of environmental philosophy 
to over rely on ethics. The study further argues for a shift in the conceptual framework, approaches 
and methods employable in confronting the environmental challenges besetting the world today. It 
opines that we construct African environmental philosophy from the idea of “African Epistemic 
Order” (AEO). It argues that an environmental philosophy that is African in orientation, must have a 
conceptual understanding of the ontological and relational holism pervading the African epistemic 
order. Such an understanding will enhance the reordering and healing of the damaged human’s 
relationship with the natural environment (Nature). This study, therefore, provides building blocks 
for an environmental philosophy that is both African in making, global in practice and affirming 






Abstract in isiZulu 
Kukhona isidingo esiphuthumayo sokuthola izixazululo eziqhubekela phambili ngesikhathi 
sezinkinga zendalo umhlaba wonkana, kanye ne-Afrika imbala ezibhekene nazo okwamanje. 
Okwamanje amafilosofi endalo abonakala engakwazi ukuxazulula izinkinga zendalo zomhlaba wethu 
ngokwanele. Lokhu kungoba kunomthelela omkhulu wemibono yamazwe aseNtshonalanga 
(enomthelela omkhulu wombono we-dualistic and anthropocentric ngomhlaba) kanti ngakolunye 
uhlangothi, kanti futhi ngenxa yokuthi aphansi kwenqubo yama-ethics ngakolunye uhlangothi. Kanti-
ke ngenxa yalokhu, kugxilwa kakhulu ebudlelwaneni phakathi kwabantu kanye nemvelo (okusho 
indalo yangokwemvelo). Ngisho noma imizamo yenziwe zifundiswa ukuqhubela phambili umbono 
wefilosofi yendalo, le mizamo ikhathazwe kakhulu ukuncika kwezama-ethics. Lolu cwaningo 
luqhubela phambili umbono ngesilosofi yesi-Afrika ngokwendalo, ezokwenza ukuthi kube nokubili, 
ukubamba iqhaza kanye nokuxhumana kwemikhakha ehlukene ekuthungatheni kwayo uhlaka 
lokuxazulula izinkinga olubambekayo ngokwendalo. Ucwaningo lufuna ukuthuthukisa iFilosofi yesi-
Afrika ngokwendalo ngokuzimisela ukuthungatha umthombo nombono wolwazi ngokwendalo. 
Lokhu kuthungatha kuncike kwisimo sezomthombo wolwazi otholakala kwizinqubo zesintu zabantu 
base-Afrika ngokunabile, kanti ikakhulukazi ngabantu bamaYoruba kanye nama-Igbo kwingxenye 
eseNtshonalanga neNigeria, eNtshonalanga Afrika ikakhulukazi. Lolu cwaningo, ngakho-ke 
luyisakhelo sefilosofi yendalo, engesi-Afrika ikakhulukazi, kodwa ebheka kumazwe omhlaba 
ngokwenza, kanye nokuqinisekisa mayelana Nemvelo. 
 
Abstract in Sesotho 
Ho na le tlhoko e potlakileng ya ho ntlafatsa ditharollo tse tsitsitseng tsa mathata a nako a tikoloho 
ao lefatshe ka bophara, haholo-holo Afrika, a tobaneng le ona hajwale. Difilosofi tsa hajwale tsa 
tikoloho ha ho bonahale di ka kgona ho rarolla mathata ohle a tikoloho a lefatshe la rona ka mokgwa 
o kgotsofatsang. Lebaka ke hore di anngwe haholo ke dikgopolo tsa Bophirima (di le boima jwalo, 
ka lehlakore le le leng le nang le pono e habedi le le nkang botho bo le bohlokwa ho boteng ba 
lefatshe) ka lehlakoreng le leng hobane di thehilwe hodima melao ya boitshwaro. Kahoo, ha di 
shebane haholo le kamano dipakeng tsa batho le tlhaho (ke hore, tikoloho ya tlhaho). Le ha boiteko 
bo entswe ke ditsebi ho ntshetsa pele tlwaelo ya Maafrika ho filosofi ya tikoloho, boiteko bona le 
bona bo na le boitshetleho bo fetelletseng ho boitshwaro. Phuputso ena e ntshetsa pele pono ya 
Seafrika filosofing ya tikoloho eo e ka bang ya tshebedisano le ya ho kopana ha dithuto tse fapaneng 
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molemong wa ho batla meralo e nang le moelelo le ho rarolla mathata bothateng ba tikoloho. Patlisiso 
ena e  batla ho ntlafatsa ntshetsopele ya Filosofi ya Tikoloho e sekametseng Afrika ka ho itlama ho 
fuputsa pono ya tsebo ya Afrika bakeng sa tikoloho. Patlisiso ena e ipapisitse le boemo ba tsebo bo 
nkilweng ditsamaisong tsa tsebo ya matswallwa tsa batho ba Maafrika ka kakaretso le batho ba 
Yoruba le ba Igbo ba karolo e ka Bophirima ya Nigeria, Afrika Bophirima ka ho kgetheha. Phuputso 
ena, ka hona, e fana ka motheo bakeng sa filosofi ya tikoloho eo e leng ya Seafrika ka botlalo, e 
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General introduction to the study 
 
1.1. Background to the study 
This study advances the critical role that African epistemology (AE) could play in the quest for 
solutions to everyday problems of the world, with the focus on the environmental crisis. The global 
world is facing environmental challenges ranging from resource depletion, increasing 
desertification, soil erosion, ozone layer depletion, climate change as well as declining terrestrial 
and aquatic biodiversity. Solutions have been and continue to be proffered, but the problems seem 
unabated. As a result, there is a dire need to develop more sustainable solutions to these epochal 
environmental problems and challenges. The imperativeness of such sustainable solutions, even 
with regard to Africa, is better appreciated in the view of Munyaradzi Maware (2014:xiv) that “we 
are at a time in Africa when the talk on environmental crisis…is high on the agenda of the 
continent”. The quest for solutions thus becomes imperative for the continent in the face of the 
unpleasant results of the environmental crisis, for which many nations are embarking on a “new 
green economy” (Jackson and Victor 2013)– an economy where environmental value forms the 
ideological core. The need thus appears crucial for Africa to be more heard in combating the 
epochal challenge of environmental degradation. Hence, the aim of this study is to examine the 
viability of an African epistemic framework for the African orientation in environmental 
philosophy. 
 
African environmental philosophy (AEP) will be seen in this study as the philosophical 
examination of the environmental challenges of the contemporary world from an African 
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perspective. In other words, the study makes an intellectual exploration of the relationship between 
African Philosophy and environmentalism1. A pertinent question to consider here is; why there is 
a need for African environmental philosophy if the environmental crisis is a global phenomenon? 
Against such query must come the reasoning line that environmental specificities make 
environmental challenges felt more particularly in some parts of the world than in others. Chigbo 
Joseph Ekwealo argues that the theories or conceptual frameworks advance for environmental 
problems are often determined by the ideologies and worldviews of the affected people (2011:8). 
This is in coherence with Bunyan Bryant’s view that “countries of colour and low income [e.g., 
Africa] are disproportionately impacted by environmental crises of the world” (2011:12). This 
research sees the quest for an African orientation in Environmental philosophy in the light of the 
intellectual task raised by Ojomo (2010 and 2011). The challenge for the contemporary African 
scholar in Ojomo’s view is the task of constructing an “adequate African environmental 
philosophy” (2010:60-62). She noted that the construction of an environmental (philosophy) that 
is African in making for the environmental challenges of Africa is “most fundamental for 
contemporary African Philosophers because of the importance of the African Environmental 
experiences” (Ojomo 2010:62). This research is thus aimed at developing an effective theoretical 
response that can inform practice to the global challenge of the environmental crisis from African 
parlance2, through the exploration of the Indigenous African epistemic worldview.  
 
 
1 Environmentalism could be viewed as that intellectual platform upon which environmental issues, problems, 
challenges, concepts, movements and discourse are debated and practiced. It stands for the series of activities ranging 
from academic to political, economic, social or cultural that are directed towards protecting the quality and continuity 
of life through prevention of pollution, natural resources conservation, land use control methods and polices, animal 
liberation, and social ecology to mention but a few. See J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (2009,  111–13).  
2 The term ‘African parlance’ will be employed in this study to identify with ideas, concept or worldviews that are 
of African origin, of African expression or demonstrates the articulation of thoughts in a manner common to the 
people of the African continent. 
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The thesis’s usage of the phrase ‘African Epistemic Order’ (AEO) presupposes that there is a 
unifying point arising out of the various epistemic worldviews of Africans. As rightly opined by 
Bell, “Africa, does not have a single culture that is to be understood, it is a large, diverse and 
sometimes enigmatic continent with a diversity of cultures” (2002:X). However, this research 
argues alongside Kaphagawani and Malherbe (2002) that an African Epistemology [AEO] is 
employed in the generic sense as when we use the phrase ‘African Philosophy’ (2002: 220). The 
authors further noted that the usage of any term as a suffix to ‘African’ in the generic sense “does 
not deny that there are significant variations among the many cultures in Africa” (2002:220). In 
other words, though Africa is characterised by diversity of culture and practices, there are however 
common themes to be found within most African worldviews (Behrens 2014: 65). Put in another 
form, to say that an idea or term is homogeneously African (as in African Philosophy, African 
thinking, African epistemology, African Science etc.) is rooted in the unified vision of culture in 
the continent Martin Nkemnkia (1999:8). The unified understanding of cultural orientation in the 
African continent accounts for the undesirability to isolate any socio-cultural practice, say, 
religion, as such practices permeates all aspect of the Africans’ life despite the existence of varying 
sets of beliefs and practices by different segments of the continent (Mbiti 1969:1). It thus becomes 
understandable that by virtue of the unified expression of thoughts common to various cultures of 
the continent, the usage of the term ‘African’ to identify a worldview, culture, idea or concepts 
from the continent, is homogeneously employed (Nkemnkia 1999:9-10). Thus, in line with 
Thaddeus Metz (2007a:332-333) certain practices and ideas are recurrent themes that are common 




By using the term African epistemology or AEO, this study relies on the method in which essential 
thoughts are abstracted from the common or everyday practice to formulate concepts and ideas. 
Thus, identifying any view, idea or concept as ‘African’ is based on the strand of sub-Saharan 
thought common to many of the varying cultures in the African continent (Metz 2012a:389). This 
implies that there are some commonalities in the various African cultures, which are not prevalent 
or observable in Western culture, which permit the generic usage of the term ‘African’. This 
method also enables us to identify particular African epistemic worldviews common to most 
African cultures and also informed by a strand of intellectual thought common to African culture. 
However, an objection could be raised against homogenising a concept or practice for Africa 
through observable facts from some sections of the continent as insufficient to characterise the 
whole continent. To such a query, it should be noted that geographical labels be it Asian, Western 
or African are “not exclusive to, exhaustive of, or fixed in the relevant locale” (Metz 2015:1176). 
In other words, to apply a term to a geographical location is a means of identifying features that 
persist over a long period and are recurrent in a locale such that such features are less prevalent 
elsewhere. Thus, the use of the term ‘African’ as prefix – [African (prefix) Epistemology (suffix)] 
– to any concept in this study, despite the limitation of examining all cultures or segments in the 
continent, is an identification function conventional to intellectual literatures bordering on 
geographical labels or classification. 
 
Examining the nature, scope and character of the epistemic stance that is prominent in the African 
worldview will thus be done by exploring the indigenous knowledge systems of various African 
cultures particularly of the Yoruba and Igbo people of the western part of Nigeria, in West Africa. 
In other words, the research’s focus is contextualized within the ontological and relational holism 
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pervading the epistemic worldview of Africans. The goal is to explicate, from the epistemic views 
of these African cultures, ideas that would be appropriate for the reconstruction of an African 
environmental philosophy. Hence, the term ‘Indigenous African Epistemic Order’ will be 
employed in this study to mean an empirico-rational3 way of perceiving and reacting to the world 
in a manner that is indigenous to the African cultural worldview. As such, the term ‘epistemic 
order’ will represent a people’s doctrine concerning the nature of knowledge. It will be employed 
to denote the process or manner by which “an African comes to know or claims to know that 
something is the case” (Kaphagawani & Malherbe, 2002: 220). ‘African Epistemic Order’ will 
denote the knowing process that is not only peculiar to the indigenous African people, but which 
also encapsulates the nature of epistemic realities in contemporary African culture. Such 
contemporary or current epistemic development from an African parlance, it must be noted, is 
rooted in indigenous epistemic worldviews. Thus, AEO includes what it means to know; 
justification of knowledge claims; the how’s of knowledge acquisition; the determinants of the 
validity of knowledge and the dissemination of knowledge claims in the African cultural setting. 
However, this research will not be oblivious of other indigenous systems of knowledge acquisition 
and justification from indigenous communities outside Africa. Such recognition is with the 
understanding that “there are different approaches and perspectives [that cultures employ to] 
understand the world around us” (Jimoh and Thomas 2015:117). As argued by (Jimoh 2018:7), 
IKS is an appraisal of the sense of rationality by which a people make meaning out of reality and 
thereby foster a harmonious interaction among themselves. This shows that IKS is a knowing 
process that is unique to a particular society. The research chooses to focus mainly on the IKS of 
 
3 The empirico-rational stance of African epistemology is more espoused in the fifth chapter to revealing the 
interconnections of the subject and object of perception in knowledge claim. The inherent viability of this 
interconnection is further explicated in the sixth chapter for an application to environmental discourse. 
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the African which is known in academic parlance as African Indigenous Knowledge Systems 
(AIKS). The reason for the focus on the AIKS is not to give room for unwarranted comparative 
analysis of epistemic worldviews of diverse geographical locations. Focusing on the epistemic 
system that is indigenously African is to explicate the African epistemic process as an alternative 
framework for further development of an African orientation in environmental philosophy.   
 
The need for an alternative framework for the task of constructing an adequate African 
environmental philosophy is taken to be imperative in this study due to the identifiable gaps in 
existing studies. Scholars have advanced ideas with respect to philosophical discourse on the 
environmental crisis from the African point of view. This attempt was pioneered by Odera Oruka’s 
“Ecophilosophy and the Parental Earth Ethics: On the Complex Web of Being” (1994); Kwasi 
Wiredu’s “Philosophy, Humankind and the Environment” (1994); Segun Ogungbemi in his “An 
African Perspective on the Environmental Crisis” (1994), (2001); and Godfrey Tangwa’s “Some 
African Reflections on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics” (2004). Others in the field include 
Workineh Kelbessa (2005:17–34.), (2014:31-61), (2018); Munyaradzi, Murove (2004:195-215); 
Thaddeus Metz (2010), (2013), (2017a), (2017b); Philomena Ojomo (2010:43-63), (2011); Kevin, 
Behrens (2010:465-484), (2014:63-82); Chigbo Joseph Ekwealo (2011); Munamato, Chemhuru 
(2016:41-51), (2017b); Roland Olufemi Badru (2018) and Olusegun Steven Samuel and Ademola 
Kazeem Fayemi (2019), (2020) to mention but a few. Whilst these scholars have advanced a form 
of an African orientation in environmental philosophy, this research aims to develop on their ideas 
and to show that they fall short, because of their over-reliance on ethics and the neglect or under-




Querying the over-reliance on ethics in the application of philosophy to environmentalism is 
important to this study as it reveals the significance of the need for calling for a change in the 
philosophical approaches and methods of engaging with environmental issues. For my study, such 
a query necessitates the view of environmental philosophy as a field of study that surpasses the 
application of ethics in environmentalism. This view is hinged on the argument that environmental 
philosophy covers an enormous range of studies, with ethics being just a part of it. Also, this view 
is in consonance with J. Baird Callicott’s argument that environmental ethics should be taken as 
one in the pool of various applied philosophies to environmental issues (1984:299). Thus, from 
this view of environmental philosophy comes the part-whole relationship between environmental 
ethics and environmental philosophy that informs the query of over-reliance on ethics in the field 
of environmental philosophy. This part-whole relationship between environmental ethics and 
environmental philosophy informs Michael Zimmerman’s view that environmental philosophy 
cannot be reduced to environmental ethics (1998:viii); as well as Colyvan (2006:97–99) that it is 
a dangerous conceptual mistake to think that philosophical concerns in environmentalism only fall 
within the purview of ethics.  
 
Furthermore, on arguing for a beyond the ethical perspectives in environmental philosophy, the 
present researcher advances an epistemological approach to the question of environmentalism. 
One major concern in this epistemological stream of inquiry into environmentalism is identifying 
what is problematic with the present assumptions concerning human knowledge about the 
relationship (or lack thereof) between humans and the natural world. This is in the bid to move 
towards considering how human beings ought to conceive of such knowledge. Thus, we are lead 
in this research to an idea of environmental epistemology which according to Scarfe, is “both 
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descriptive as well as prescriptive” (2008:98). From various studies from the African perspectives 
in environmental philosophy, the need for an epistemological consideration has been noted by a 
number of scholars. Ekwealo (2011:10–11) implicitly noted the need for an epistemological 
dimension as he argued that the functionality of African Environmental Philosophy is a consistent 
and coherent global ethical platform that is mainly achievable through the consideration of African 
Environmental Philosophy which is rooted in the ontology of complementary dualism. Also, Badru 
(2018:198–202) noted that epistemological perspectives for African Environmental Philosophy 
proffer a coherent framework for advancing sustainable environmental democracy. Arguing for 
the development of a functional environmental policy in Africa, Workineh Kelbessa (2018:309–
323) calls for the imperativeness of paying attention to epistemological dimensions of African 
intellectual thought for a grasp of the attitudes, values and emergent environmental concerns.  
 
However, these studies did not commit to the exploration of the epistemic outlook for 
environmentalism. My study fills this specific lacuna. Arguing in accord with Bryant (2011:7), 
this research will put forth that epistemology provides the foundation for a culture’s worldview, 
which in turn determines the mental constructs that people use in understanding reality. This means 
that a culture’s epistemology provides the foundation for the culture’s experience and 
understanding of reality. Arguing further, Bryant holds that “epistemology as a value laden- social 
construct informs our pedagogy, our scientific inquiry and our truth; and by implication, our ethics, 
morality and modality for adjudging right and wrong” (2011:8). Thus, to talk of an environmental 
philosophy that is African in orientation, is to have a conceptual understanding of the epistemic 
order of the African culture for engaging nature. This is to enable us to arrive at a framework for 




The “African Epistemic Order” (AEO) in this research work, is consequently employed as an 
alternative framework for engaging environmentalism. It is a framework that operates differently 
from the dualistic and dichotomous construal of reality inherent in traditional Western 
epistemology, which has been found by this study to be at the root of the unethical human-nature 
relationship that engenders the misuse of nature, and hence, perennial environmental crises. I 
argues in this study that the African epistemic process offers an understanding of knowledge in 
which there is a unification of the subject and object of perception/knowledge. This understanding 
engenders a sound recognition of the object of knowledge as significant in the scheme of 
knowledge acquisition. Such recognitions, I further argue, has a way of enhancing our 
understanding of the natural environment, our relationship with and usage of nature, and engenders 
sound ethical guidelines for an environmental consideration. Epistemology as a theory of 
knowledge aims to “inform and explicate practice – to determine how people can know and act 
within the specific symbolic, cultural and social structures and institutions they inhabit” (Code 
1995:190).  Thus, it could be held that epistemology is about the how and what of the claims we 
make concerning the facts of our existential experiences. Seeing epistemology from the prism of 
existential experience entails a critique of Western traditional epistemology, where epistemology 
is presented from the prism of abstract knowledge (1995:204). This epistemic detachment of the 
subject from the object of knowledge has also been identified by Christopher Preston (2003:3–10) 
as “disconnecting place and mind”. For Preston (2003:5), the philosophers that have shaped 
Western intellectual positions on the epistemological front detach the subject from the object of 
knowledge. By so doing, these scholars, as noted by Preston, “are guilty of neglecting the 
nonhuman world when they offer critical analyses of why thoughts and beliefs take the particular 
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shape they do” (2003:xi). It should be noted that, an epistemic process fashioned on the prism of 
an isolated subject of knowledge is bound to be exclusive of the object of knowledge.  
 
The adoption of AEO as an alternative perspective underlines the significance of usage of many 
varied solutions for the challenges of environmentalism. Thus, the usage of Western epistemology 
as a sole perspective on knowledge, notwithstanding its weaknesses, is inadequate. But plurality 
of knowledges accounts for the meaningfulness of the epistemic practices from any segment of 
humanity: Western, Southern or Eastern. On the viability of the plural nature of knowledge, 
Olademo (2009); Maldonado-Torres (2012:1–10); and Grosfoguel (2011; 2012:88–104 and 2013), 
have queried the universalising agenda of the Western epistemic process as the ideal for all other 
cultures of the world. These scholars, to mention but a few, have argued for ‘pluriversal 
epistemology’. In the idea of pluriversality, there is an inherent recognition and affirmation of 
equality in all cultures of the world. The idea of pluriversality engenders contestation of equal 
thought processes for enrichment, advancement and development of knowledge forms. Thus, for 
Grosfoguel (2012:91-102), to think pluriversal is “by engaging histories and knowledges in 
different parts of the world… [to produce] critical decolonial knowledge that is rigorous, 
comprehensive, with a worldly scope that is non-provincial”. To further put the argument on 
pluriversality in clearer perspectives, Mignolo’s argument becomes essential: 
… [P]luriversality [is] sensing the world as pluriversally constructed. Or if you 
wish, pluriversality becomes the decolonial way of dealing with forms of 
knowledge and meaning exceeding the limited regulations of epistemology and 
hermeneutics… Pluriversality as a universal project is aimed not at changing the 
world (ontology) but at changing the beliefs and the understanding of the world 
(gnoseology), which will lead to changing our (all) praxis of living in the world… 
Consequently, pluriversality as a universal project means that the universe cannot 
have one single owner. Pluri – and multiverses are convivial, dialogical or plu-
rilogical exists independently of the state and corporations (Mignolo 2018:x–xii). 
11 
 
One appreciable fact from the foregoing is the grounds for conversation that pluriversality opens 
up among different cultures of the world. Intellectual dialogue is achieved out of mutual 
understanding and respect. This allows for the viability of knowledge forms and processes from 
any segment of the world, including the AIKS. 
 
The significance of intercultural engagements for sustainable knowledge has also been emphasised 
by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018:78) as he argues for an ‘ecology of knowledge’ and 
‘intercultural translation’. For him, both are essential for enhancing cognitive justice. He argues 
thus: 
 
The ecologies of knowledges are collective cognitive constructions led by the 
principles of horizontality (different knowledges recognise the differences between 
themselves in a non-hierarchical way) and reciprocity (differently incomplete 
knowledges strengthen themselves by developing relations of complementarity 
among one another) (2018:78). 
 
The practicability of intercultural dialogue thus, opens up the frontiers for discussing alternative 
viewpoints from other cultures, which are equally authentic and significant contributors in the 
scheme of knowledge. Hence, the position of this study to explore AEO for the discourse on 
environmentalism. The present author is of the view that AEO has the potential to unlock an 
understanding of the human’s place in the scheme of existence as a being that is part of nature. 
Such understanding, it will be argued has the possibility of engendering sound, harmonious, and 






1.2. Rationale for the study 
The challenge for this research is to show how the indigenous African Epistemic Order provides 
grounds for an environmental philosophy that is African in making and global in practice. The 
pragmatic quest of this study’s attempt is essential in view of Wiredu’s work, Are There Cultural 
Universals? (1998), wherein he shows the significance of Africa’s intercultural communication 
with other cultures of the world. The study seeks to, among other things, pursue this pragmatic 
quest by examining how Indigenous African epistemic worldviews could contribute towards 
addressing the epochal challenges of environmental degradation. The research will thus be 
presenting AEO as an epistemic alternative that could enrich humans’ knowledge concerning the 
environment, as well as our attitude and method of usage and valuation to the environment. This 
kind of epistemological framework, the research will show, is conducive and appropriate for the 
establishment of a contemporary African environmental philosophy. This is because AEO proffers 
grounds for the mentality, relationship, and ethics that is not endangering to nature, but constitutes 
nature and the whole gamut of the environment—in which humans also participate—as a 
harmonious part of the ‘organism’ called earth. 
 
The importance of this position is to buttress—as done by various scholars including Cheney and 
Weston (1999), Gordon (2002), Preston (2003), Scarfe (2008), Kawall (2010), Oyekunle (2011), 
Bryant (2011) and Shepard (2012) – that a continual concentration mainly on ethics and studies of 
morality in the quest for the panacea to the epochal environmental crisis, is a mere attempt to 
undermine the vastness of the challenges of environmentalism and a sheer intellectual 
understatement. It is strongly believed therefore, that this epistemic approach for an African 




1. give a robust upliftment to various intellectual approaches of relational orientation hitherto 
advanced in the field of African environmental philosophy;  
2. proffer a framework upon which African environmental philosophy could be holistically 
discussed;  
3. make available an alternative pathway towards the development of ‘other’ environmental 
philosophical worldviews outside those of the Western orientation;  
4. increase knowledge in the application of Indigenous African epistemology to 
environmental issues. 
 
Though it could be argued that the views advanced herein are swimming against the tide of the 
known traditional intellectual heritage in Western environmental philosophy, I however take 
refuge in the words of Albert Einstein (1954:157) that “… [h]umanity is going to need a 
substantially new way of thinking if it is to survive”. As a matter of fact, our species as a whole is 
ready and waiting for just such an idea to come along and encourage rampant environmentalism 
as a way of protecting something that humans are not only part of, but profoundly intermingled 
with: the environment. 
 
1.3. Statement of the problem 
There is a tremendous need to develop sustainable solutions to the current environmental problems 
and challenges. The current environmental philosophy and ethics – which are Western oriented – 
fails to properly accounts for the epistemic grasps of the outlook, stance, tenets, attitudes, and 
principles of indigenous environmental concerns. The quest is thus for an African outlook in 
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environmental philosophy that would be both participatory and interdisciplinary in the quest for 
more meaningful and pragmatic problem-solving frameworks. This study seeks to further improve 
in the development of an African oriented environmental philosophy, but which hinges on some 
indigenous African theories of knowledge. The research argues for  a sustainable solution to the 
environmental problems of our world as it is based on epistemological theories that do not separate 
and therefore place into antagonism the knowing subject and the known object. The study develops 
a view of the human person and the natural environment in which the two are seen as an integral 
part of one another, and as a result the human person may adopt a respectable approach towards 
the natural environment instead of an objectifying and exploitative approach. 
 
1.4. The significance of the study 
The purpose of this study is to add to the scantly existing literature in the area of developing an 
epistemic framework for investigating the African understanding of the contemporary 
environmental crisis. This is done with the intent to attempt a reconstruction of the existing African 
views in environmental philosophy from the parlance of African indigenous epistemic orders. In 
other words, the thesis fills the gap of the neglect and under exploration of African epistemology 
in the construction of an African environmental philosophy that is in line with African intellectual 
heritage. 
 
1.5. Aims and objectives 
This thesis aims to explore the Indigenous African epistemology in order to bring to the fore some 
of its salient features that can help resolve the issues and challenges of environmentalism. This is 
with the intent of showing that the Indigenous African epistemic thought process proffers a reliable 
ground for the reconstruction of an African orientation in environmental philosophy. The research 
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seeks to address the urgent need to push for alternative approaches that will be firmly rooted in the 
Indigenous African Epistemic Order  
 
The research’s objective is to show that an African environmental postulation that has its bedrock 
on the value-laden stance (normative) and social constructivism (descriptive) of the Indigenous 
African epistemic order, would give a viable reconstruction of environmental ethics that is 
coherent with ‘African ontology’ (Tangwa 2004). The research will also show that an explication 
of the Indigenous African epistemic worldview could proffer grounds for the knowledge needed 
to entrench “reason, experiences and will for the practicability of the idea of [an] ‘ethic of nature 
relatedness’” (Ogungbemi 1997: 109). The present author is of the view that a reconstructed 
orientation for African environmental philosophy”, fashioned from the light of the Indigenous 
African epistemic order, would: 
 
(1) help build a better understanding of the place of humans on earth as a part of nature, 
and not as a superior species apart from nature; 
(2) reveal the relevance and importance of other nonhuman members of the earth 
organism; 
(3) foster a harmonious interrelationship between humans and nature that is hinged on 
a symbiotic principle of existence;  
(4) aid evaluation of the series of environmental act and crises of our contemporary 
world, thereby engendering nature conservation by putting the science and policy 
of the use and disuse of the natural environment on the right footing; and  
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(5) give a holistic approach in seeking panacea to the pervasive problem of the 
environmental crises. 
 
1.6. Methodology  
The study employs philosophical methods of critical analysis, conceptual clarification, analytic 
reflection, as well as rational engagement with existing theories on African environmental 
philosophy. This is to enhance an impartial examination and articulate appraisal of differing 
concepts and theories; unearth the methodological gaps in some of the attempts for advancing an 
African orientation in environmental philosophy; and thus make the epistemological perspective 
in environmental philosophy a desideratum. Also, the research employs – in a bid to re-interpret 
texts and some cultural practices of indigenous African people – the hermeneutical method. 
Logical reconstruction of existing ideas is done to aid the creation of utilised concepts. In essence, 
as a purely qualitative research, the work adopts an intellectual querying method and critical 
analytical approach, within the quest for a practical model which is needed for African 
environmental philosophy to thrive, both as an academic theory and as a viable tool for policy 
makers, environmental activists, and humanity at large.  
 
1.7. Chapter overview 
The thesis is arranged into seven chapters.   
 
1.7.1. Chapter One: General introduction  
This chapter will feature the introduction to the thesis of the research. An examination of issues 
that lead to the background of the thesis is done to enlighten readers about the thrust of the study 
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and its importance. The essence of such an examination is to make sense of the ‘quasi-theoretical’ 
base for the study through analytical reflection. With a detailed enunciation of the Statement of 
the Problem, Purpose of the Study, Research Questions, Definition of Key Terms, the chapter 
brings to the fore the relevance of the research to audience. The introductory chapter also includes 
an overview of all the chapters of the study, ending with a summary that encapsulate the position 
of the thesis. 
 
1.7.2. Chapter Two: Contemporary challenges to environmentalism 
The thrust of the second chapter is the discussion of the development and progress of 
environmental philosophy. The discussion considers the contemporary challenges to the discipline 
of environmental philosophy. A conceptual analysis of the environment as a dynamic system 
which guarantees the life of both human and nonhuman beings will be undertaken. Thereafter, an 
attempt is made to problematise the idea of environmentalism. Conceptualising environmentalism 
allows for an examination of the human activities with the environment. It is argued that human-
environmental contact has grave consequences for the perennial crisis of our contemporary world: 
deforestation and desertification, Ozone layer depletion, Global-warming, Atmospheric 
contamination, and climate change. The effects of these anthropogenic degradation of the 
environment form the fulcrum of the environmental crisis troubling the world. Further, an 
overview of environmental philosophy is undertaken to develop a foundational understanding of 
environmental philosophy.  
   




The Third Chapter of the study focuses on the critique of what I regard as the foundation of the 
environmental crisis. The chapter is concerned with problematising the epistemic foundation of 
the environmental crisis through a critique of the Western intellectual tradition. This chapter argues 
that the current environmental crisis ravaging the world is a consequence of the subject/object, 
mind/matter dichotomy dominant in the traditional Western intellectual heritage. The chapter 
unveils the fact that anthropocentric environmentalism is structured upon the religious, 
epistemological and technological framework of the traditional Western culture. In this chapter, 
attempts will be made to critique the standard epistemic standpoints provided by the traditional 
Western epistemological framework with its roots in Cartesian duality. To this end, the Western 
epistemic framework – especially as institutionalised by the Cartesian intellectual project – will be 
explored in conjunction with how such frameworks dovetail into the Enlightenment foundation for 
science and technology. It is noted that this dualistic epistemic framework permeates the emerging 
and enduring intellectual thoughts of the traditional Western orientation.   
 
The chapter deconstructs the intellectual tradition of the West which favours reason, as that which 
is eternal and indestructible, over and above the external world. A critique is done on the Cartesian 
epistemic thought as the major prototype of the traditional Western intellectual heritage. The 
Cartesian idea, it is argued, inhibits the understanding of the holistic and complete 
interconnectedness of the human with all other nonhuman members of the earth. 
 
1.7.4. Chapter Four: A critique of the current African orientation in environmental 
philosophy 
The fourth chapter is preoccupied with the examination of some of the current efforts at 
conceptualising African environmental philosophy. The critique is done in lieu of the distinction 
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raised in the second chapter of this study between environmental ethics and environmental 
philosophy. Thus, the crux of the exposition in this chapter is based on the presupposition that 
African environmental philosophy is a genre of African philosophy. As a study situated in the field 
of African Philosophy, the chapter will attempt to carve out a working definition of African 
Philosophy. Conceptualising African Philosophy is important for this study to place the research 
understanding of what African epistemology, and consequently African environmental philosophy 
is, in proper perspective. African environmental philosophy is thus considered in this chapter as a 
rational and critical discourse on environmentalism from the African parlance. The chapter 
proceeds to problematise some of the current attempts at providing solutions to the environmental 
crisis from the standpoint of African Philosophy. The exploration of these attempts shows that they 
fall short because of their over-reliance on ethics, and the under-exploration of the African 
epistemic process in their approaches. 
 
1.7.5. Chapter Five: The nature of the “African Epistemic Order” (AEO) 
The fifth chapter of this study centres on the idea of the “African Epistemic Order”. With the need 
for an epistemologically-enhanced environmental framework being raised from the lacuna 
observable in the various orientations in African environmental philosophy examined in the 
previous chapter, the need to enunciate the epistemic process that the framework centres on arises. 
This is in the bid to strengthen the position of this study, namely that indigenous African epistemic 
ideologies could be explored for a better comprehension of the human-nature relationship. To 
achieve this, the chapter will be arguing for an ‘epistemic order’ of African orientation that is 
devoid of ethnocentric tendencies and uncritical nativism. Such epistemic presentation, it is argued 
has the tendency to engender practical explanation of the possibility to contextualise objective 
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existential realities of life. The “African Epistemic Order” will thus represent the African method 
and doctrine regarding the nature of knowledge. Having enunciated the idea of African epistemic 
order, the next discussion is to attempt to explicate this epistemic process for an environmental 
discussion. Such an explication will be in sync with the position of this research work that the 
African epistemic order has the viability to engender an African orientation in environmental 
philosophy.  
 
1.7.6. Chapter Six: Towards an African environmental philosophy 
The focus of the sixth chapter is the explication of the potency of the Indigenous African epistemic 
order for the resolution of environmental crises. In espousing AEO, the chapter shows that the two 
agents of epistemic valuation are complementary and interrelates functionally. In other words, both 
the subject of perception (humans) and the object of perception (environment) will be shown to be 
bound together in a unitary ontological worldview. The chapter will conclude by arguing for a 
modest role, for ethics in African environmental philosophy. Attempts are thus made to show that 
an epistemologically inclined ethical view is possible due to the normative and descriptive nature 
of AEO. 
 
1.7.7. Chapter Seven: Findings and general conclusion 
This chapter features a summary of the study and a detailed conclusion, in which attempts are 
made to show the pragmatic stance of an African environmental philosophy hinged on African 
epistemic thought-processes. Such attempts aim at showcasing the applicability of the framework 
of an African epistemic oriented environmental view in bridging the gap between theory and 
praxis. This is achieved by enunciating the workability of the proposed epistemic framework to 
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environmental policy making, environmental justice, and the balancing between the quest for 
development and concerns for the natural environment in Africa. 
1.8. Summary 
This study is aimed at unveiling the viability of African epistemology to serve as a framework for 
engaging with contemporary existential challenges, with a focus on the environmental crisis. This 
is in consideration of one of the research objectives: bridging the gap between philosophical theory 
and praxis. The study argues that anthropocentric epistemic process contributed mainly to the 
environmental degradation damaging the world today. Western traditional epistemology structured 
on the abstract faceless subject that is detached from the epistemic object, accounts for what Bryant 
calls a “partiality of knowledge” (2011:213). Such knowledge forms misguide the advancement 
of science and the misappropriation of technology, which often results in dangerous pollutants in 
our atmosphere, epistemic injustices, hazardous waste dumping, and general misuse of the 
environment (Bryant 2011:214). Exploring how we know in the indigenous African way, may 
enhance solutions to existential challenges of life. In the face of the environmental challenges 
ravaging the world today, an alternative knowing process that will be conceptually viable and 
ecologically accountable becomes imperative. The alternative, the study argues, is made possible 
in the African Epistemic Order. An examination of environmental crises from the prism of African 
epistemology denotes and emphasises the abasement of over reliance on ethics in the discourse of 
environmental philosophy. Recognising environmental crises as a crisis of epistemology, 
presupposes the following issues that forms the focus of this study: 
 
1. The dogma of detaching the epistemic subject from the epistemic object is a ground for 
anthropogenic causes of environmental degradation. 
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2. There is the need for an alternative epistemic framework that recognises the 
complementarity of the operational stance of the epistemic subject and epistemic object. 
This is provided for in the AEO. 
3. By recognising the epistemic significance of the physical world, object of knowledge or 
nature in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, the AEO appears fitting for a 
contemporary environmental philosophical discourse. 
4. The epistemic framework of AEO cognitively grounds an ethical agent in an ecologically 
enhanced position to relate with nature. 
5. Knowing how to relate with nature engenders the ethical proprieties needed for a human-
nature relationship that is environmentally informed. 
 
Although the ideas put forward in this thesis are by no means all-encompassing and conclusive, 
they nevertheless aim to serve as the basis for future research on African environmental philosophy 













Contemporary challenges to environmentalism 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The contemporary world is faced with environmental crisis of an unprecedented scale ranging 
from resource depletion, increasing desertification, soil erosion, ozone layer depletion, and 
declining terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity. The challenges posed by this crisis have become like 
recurrent and perennial in modern society. This chapter thus begins by examining the idea and 
problem of environmentalism, and the ensuing contemporary challenges grappled with by scholars 
in the field of environmental philosophy. It further discusses the human-nature relationship which 
plays out in humans’ engagement with nature. A critical panoramic view is subsequently made on 
the perspectives of Western environmental philosophy.  
 
The chapter also identifies some of the intellectual challenges being faced by contemporary 
environmental philosophical discourse. The challenges to be identified include: the quest for 
alternative approaches in the study of environmental philosophy; overcoming anthropocentrism; 
and environmental socio-politics, among others as. The examinations of these areas of study in 
environmental philosophy is geared towards unveiling corollary issues surrounding the 
development of environmental philosophy as a study that surpasses only ethical consideration. 
Engaging with these contemporary intellectual challenges is apt for this research, as it helps to 





2.2. Environmentalism conceptualised 
Studies4 have revealed that an attempt at conceptualising the term “environment” is difficult. The 
reasons are not far-fetched. (1) the concept is broad and multifarious. Thus, it includes 
sociological, economic, political, aesthetic, philosophical, medical, and cultural dimensions. (2) a 
critical look at the concept ‘environment’ reveals it as an enormous and vast subject that spans 
from the microbial actions of an organism to the size of the world’s population.  
 
Etymologically, the concept has been traced to the French word “viron” meaning a circle, a round 
or the world around (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:309). In addition, Agagu (2004:8–9) noted that, 
the concept of ‘environment’ conveys the idea of “external conditions and influences affecting the 
life of an organism or entire societies, or the physical and biotic infrastructure supporting 
populations of all kinds”. Furthermore, environment could be viewed as the physical and material 
bases of all life. Little wonder then that Omotor opines that the “environment is all the interacting 
factors that surround, influence, and direct the growth and behaviour of individual beings, groups, 
species and communities” (2000:147). However, a more enlarged scope of the concept 
‘environment’, is provided by Tairu. For him, to talk or write of the environment is to refer to the 
“combination of natural objects (living and non-living), objects made by human beings, the 
interrelationships between these and various circumstances which surrounds people on earth” 
(Tairu 1998:13). Whereas Sanda, from a sociological perspective, conceived ‘environment’ as a 
“system within which living organisms interact with the physical elements” (1988:88). One could 
 
4 See Sebastian Moffatt & Niklaus Kohler’s (2008) formulation of a broad perspective of the environment, especially 
as that to which is to be “understood as a complex social-ecological system” that involves the interaction, on a series 
of levels and scales,  of diverse multiple-related metabolisms (2008:253). Also, in Magnus Boström and Debra J. 
Davidson (2018) who enunciate the difficulty of explaining concept: ‘environment’.  It is averred that the 
concept requires a transdisciplinary stance for a sound explanation. Only on this note would, the authors argus, 
the “biases and blinders” of the science; explanatory power; social; cultural or geopolitical considerations in 
the attempt to conceptualize environment, be avoided (2018:15).  
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thus infer that the environment is the accumulation of both internal and external influences and 
conditions that have effects, in one way or the other, on the living conditions of an organism.  
 
From the foregoing, it may be observed that the concept ‘environment’ goes beyond a static 
configuration of the earth’s surface: the atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere or the biosphere5. 
Rather, the environment connotes a dynamic system that guarantees the life of both human and 
nonhuman beings. At the same time, it is a place where living organisms flourish, where cultures 
develop, and societies are forged. Conceptualising the environment in this manner reveals how 
significant the environment is to the physical, social, economic, political, spiritual, etc, well-being 
of all the constituent members of the environment. It further shows the illogicality of relying on a 
‘one-method fits all’ approach in the field of environmental philosophy. Thus, as a place that 
enhances the development and flourishing of people, culture, and society; engaging in ideas that 
are indigenous to a particular culture or society in addressing their environmental challenges 
becomes imperative. This further explains the position of this study, to look beyond the ethical 
framework in environmental discourses, for an exploration of the African epistemological process.  
 
Consistent with this description, the participants of the 2017 conference on the theme, 
Environmental Impact Assessment of South Africa, conceptualised environment as “the physical 
ecosystem (biotic and a-biotic elements), social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, psychological, and 
political dimensions in their various interactions and interrelationships” (Gerber et al, 2017:67). 
Hence, reference to ‘environmentalism’ has to do with the natural condition in which people, 
 
5 These terms are used to designate the various elements of the environment; the liquid realm or elements of the 
environment such as lakes, rivers, streams, seas; the solid elements, i.e. ground, the rocks and soils; and the habitable 
part of the earth in which living organism are present. 
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animals, plants, living or non-living organisms, as well as nature in general live, and are connected 
with the environment. In other words, environmentalism could be viewed as that intellectual 
platform upon which environmental issues, problems, challenges, concepts, movements, and 
discourse are debated and practiced. Environmentalism, therefore, stands for the series of activities 
ranging from academic to political, economic, social, or cultural that are directed towards 
protecting the quality and continuity of life through prevention of pollution, natural resource 
conservation, land use control methods and policies, animal liberation, and social ecology, to 
mention but a few (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:111). 
 
Organised environmentalism, in keeping with the delimitation set above, began with the 
conservation movement in the late nineteenth century, wherein scholars argued for the 
establishment of state and national parks and forests, wildlife refuges, and national monuments 
intended to preserve noteworthy natural features (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:110–112). After 
World War II, increasing encroachment on wilderness land evoked the continued resistance of 
conservationists, who succeeded in blocking a number of projects in the 1950s and 1960s. Among 
these was the proposed Bridge Canyon Dam that would have backed up the waters of the Colorado 
River into the Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona, United States of America (Hargrove 
1989:ix). Consequently, the public was becoming aware that the conservation of wilderness and 
wildlife was but one aspect of protecting an endangered environment. Thus, growing concerns 
arose about the unethical disposal of waste, about disposal, dwindling energy resources, radiation, 
air and water pollution, and pesticide poisoning: particularly as described in Rachel Carson’s 
influential Silent Spring, 1962 (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:185–86). The concern for these and 
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other environmental problems engaged a broadening number of sympathisers and gave rise to what 
became known as the “new environmentalism” (Merchant 2002:24).  
 
The new environmentalism had a broader goal: “to preserve life on the planet” (Merchant, 
2002:45). ‘Environmentalism’, therefore, can be associated with any movement, idea, conception, 
discipline and worldview advocating for the conservation, preservation and the management of 
resources geared towards the preservation of life on the planet. It also promotes the protection (and 
restoration, when necessary) of the natural environment through intellectual discourse, advocacy 
for and changes in public policy and enlightenment for change in individual behaviours (2002:85–
86). Environmentalism as a movement, as argued by Andrew Light covers broad areas of 
institutional oppression (2002). Examples of such oppressions, he noted, dovetail on – but are not 
limited to – the issues and areas of “consumption of ecosystems and natural resources into waste, 
dumping waste into disadvantaged communities, air pollution, water pollution, weak 
infrastructure, exposure of organic life to toxins, monoculture, and various other focuses” 
(2002:32–35).  
 
2.3. Humanity and the environment 
Most of all what we see upon the face of the earth today could be credited to the ingenuity of the 
human race. The history of human development has impact on the environment. As Woodhouse 
(2009:522) rightly noted, transformation of the physical environment has been an integral part of 
the development of human history since human emergence. Human interaction with the 
environment and other nonhuman nature could, thus, be seen as a necessary and creative activity 
needed for the emancipation and welfare of humanity. In body and in mind, in thought and in 
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action, the human person is the explorer, the discoverer, and the creative destroyer in nature. The 
ability of imagination, reason, intellect, empathy, emotional subtlety and toughness makes it 
possible for humans not to just accept or live in the environment as it is but to change it to suit its 
own desires. To this end, it could be noted that the versatility and uniqueness displayed by 
humanity had made humans not only focal figures in the landscape of the earth, but as essential 
parts of the ecosystem. 
 
Given the explorative and exploitative nature of the human race, “no other living things have 
assaulted the environment as humans” have done (Mbakwe 1982:67).  Historically, the human 
ancestral lineage depended on the environment for survival (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:67). In 
other words, s/he obtained food by hunting game, fishing and gathering wild fruits, seeds and roots. 
In fact, it will not be an understatement to assert that the social, economic, religious, cultural, and 
political lives of humans depend primarily on the environment, particularly upon the land 
(Mumford 2009:63–65). Mumford however noted that the story, in contemporary times is different 
(2009:66). With the advent of technology, humans are no longer simple: s/he makes unprecedented 
noise, exhibits unsurpassed uncleanliness via the humongous and indiscriminate disposal of 
hazardous waste and enjoys all sorts of modern technologies that are environmentally unfriendly 
(2009:66). Indeed, the enormous power of modern technology is constantly placing strains on the 
environment and breaking vital links in the web of biological and physical processes that sustain 
the ecological systems in which humans live (Katz 2016:22–23).  
 
It could, thus, be held that the contemporary scientific and technological world operates largely 
with a cutting edge mentality of use (Dusek 2008:8). The “frontier mentality” is a human-centred 
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view that enhances the unbridled use of nature and the nonhuman environment to fulfil human 
needs (Mumford 1999:88). This attitude shows little regard for the consequences of the various 
exploitative actions characterising the feat of scientific technologisation. The frontier mentality 
also violates the guidelines for using natural resources especially as enunciated in the principles of 
justice governing property appropriation, as argued by the British Empiricist, John Locke (1690). 
For Locke, the only justification for the ownership, appropriation or usage of the natural resources 
is if there is enough and in good condition for others ([1690] 1980). Articulating what has come 
to be known as the ‘Lockean Proviso’, Locke opines that: 
 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The 
labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it 
in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state 
[that] nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable 
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined 
to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others ([1690] 
1980:27) 
 
For Locke therefore, the usage of the natural is by all reason of appropriateness ought to be guided 
by the dictum: leaving for others enough and as good. The Lockean provisos could be queried for 
lack of conceptual clarification on the terms employed in the ‘Proviso’. For instance, John T. 
Sanders, has question the vagueness of the provisos’ key terms: ‘enough’ ‘as good’ and ‘others’. 
These terms, undefined by Locke in the treaties, left the proviso open to a wide range of 
constructions (Sanders 1987:377–79). Also, the Lockean Provisos seems restrictive in its 
application. This is obvious, as the proponent employs the proviso mainly to apply to appropriated 
natural resources. The Proviso accounts for the usage and protection as it were, of owned resources. 
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This is in exclusion of unappropriated natural resources. What happens to the wildlife, the forest, 
and other untapped nonhuman part of nature? How are they supposed to be catered for, conserved 
and managed, even in the idea of enough and as good for other?  
 
However, the Lockean proviso, could pass for an in-genuine arbiter on the management of the 
built environment. In that vein, it would be a guide to enhancing the consideration of the distant 
people and future generations (others) in the usage and management of built environment-like 
hydraulic infrastructures, power dams, bridges, hospitals and lots more. This consideration will 
thus be a guide at avoiding the consequences of the frontier mentality in leaving natural resources 
enough and as good. To act otherwise, is to engage in the unbridled use of the nonhuman 
environment; a key act of the human-centred use of nature. Noted is the fact that this human-
centred attitude has been part of human thinking for much of the history of humanity (Woodhouse 
2009:520). The driving force for this worldview is the quest to develop and achieve the 
sustainability of human welfare. 
 
Of importance to note is the fact that humans’ assault on the environment is not a recent 
phenomenon. For example, in the section of the Critias concerning Atlantis (111b–d), as noted 
by Carone (2001:122), Plato described, with disgust, the deforestation of Attica and the resultant 
soil erosion and drying of springs. Carone expressly presented the grave situation of the Attica 
forest after the excessive human act of timber felling for ship making, provision of food and 
materials for the support of the massive armies of Atlantis.  These activities led to deforestation 
of the Attica forest, massive erosion and drought. In describing what was left of the forest, it was 
noted that “what now remains compared with what then existed is like the skeleton of a sick 
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man… all the fat and soft soil having wasted away, and only the bare framework… of the land 
being left” (Carone 2001:122–124). It was noted that Plato clearly blames humans for the 
destruction of forests, noting that the cut timber still existed as beams in large buildings, leaving 
only “food for bees” (2001:30) (flowering herbs and shrubs) on the hillsides. One could thus aver 
that, this attitude of misuse of nature not only happens at the contemporary world, but that 
elements of misuse of nature abound even in the pre-industrial age. This points to the fact that 
anthropocentric attitude in the nature-human relationship, is a variant of ways and manners to 
disrupt, distort and utterly destroy nature and the nonhuman environment. It must be noted here 
that the natural environment is of crucial importance for social, economic and biological 
sustainability. For the continued existence of life on earth, nature proffers resources for food, 
energy, recreation, medicines, and other resources for industrial products. The diversity of nature 
not only offers humans vast power of choice for their current needs and desires, but it also 
becomes the source of solutions for the future needs and challenges of humankind. The ability of 
the natural environment to emerge, maintain existence via self-sustaining means of biodiversity 
and evolutionary cycle, informs to a great extent the inherent capacity of nature to support the 
existence of all organisms.  
 
However human interaction with nature puts undue pressure of high magnitude on the natural 
environment in terms of inefficient usage, as well as in disrupting nature and natural landscapes. 
In other words, humans’ engagements with nature involve a series of activities that are human-
centred and, to a great extent, cause the loss and the destruction of the natural environment. 
Through various activities like agriculture; energy creation and consumption; transportation; 
industrialisation; tourism and recreation; science and technological innovations; humans interact 
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with nature in such a way that they endanger the very nature that sustains their lives. This research 
thus explores how some, if not all, of these environmental challenges emanating from human 
engagement with nature could be addressed from an African epistemological point of view. 
 
In the subsequent section, I will examine the panoramic stance of human activities with nature and 
the ensuing consequences of such engagements, especially as they relate to the contemporary 
period. 
 
2.4. Implications of human engagement with the environment 
Following the calculation of a quintessential environmental philosopher, Holmes Rolston III, the 
year 2021 is about twenty-one years into what he termed the “unique century” (2012:1). With 
myriads of environmental crises scourging the world today, one could say that the uniqueness of 
the century is reflective of the tremendous surge in the adverse effect of human unbridled use of 
the natural environment. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) sang the chorus of the “concern for the environment and the welfare 
of the earth” (UNFCCC 2015:1–32). In the proposal by the president of the UNFCCC for the 
Adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement, it was noted that the concern of the United Nations focuses 
on: 
 
• Recognising that climate change represents an urgent and potentially 
irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries, and their participation in an effective  and  
appropriate  international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of 
global greenhouse gas emissions; 
• Recognising that deep reductions in global emissions will be required in order 
to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasising the need 
for urgency in addressing climate change; 
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• Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind… 
(UNFCCC 2015:1–2) 
 
What is obtainable therein, is the severe consequences of environmental degradation that is 
resultant from the rampant use of nature through various activities of humans. So grave are human 
activities on the environment that Rolston noted that humans could “jeopardise the planet’s future” 
(Rolston 2012:2). I present below some of the perennial crisis of the environment in the 21st century 
that are consequent upon the human’s use and misuse of nonhuman nature, which takes the forms 
that I will articulate below. 
 
2.4.1. Deforestation and desertification 
Deforestation is forest clearing on a large scale for agricultural development, urban growth, 
industrial expansion, and general pressure from increased populations. On the other hand, 
desertification in the view of The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); a body of 
the United Nations created for providing scientific information on the reality of the anthropogenic 
cause of environmental crisis, is the process where the lands are reduced to a desert-like condition 
(IPCC 2007:67).  Deforestation has reduced the diversity and stability of the world’s forests. As a 
matter of fact, the critical data and scientific findings on the climate crisis observe that 
deforestation is one of the major drivers of climate change (WMO 2019:5).  
 
In consideration of Africa alone, it is observed that,  
 
… large-scale clearing of forests, the burning of biomass, and charcoal burning 
have led to the depletion of forests in Africa and have contributed to global 
climate change [as] seventy-six percent of the African population relies on solid 




At this excessive rate of resource consumption, one could better imagine the gradual extinction of 
hundreds of species of plants and animals because of the destruction of forests and other habitats 
that Africa has at present. For instance, Dimah noted in the case of Nigeria that, constant 
deforestation has caused the extinction of plants and animals (2001:15).  
 
A desert is most often defined as an area where annual rainfall is between 10 and 20 inches. More 
specifically, semi-arid deserts receive less than 23.6 inches of rain annually, arid deserts less than 
7.8 inches, and hyper-arid deserts less than 0.98 inches (Gudorf 2009:214). Desertification is thus 
the “land degradation that is caused by climatic variation and human activities” over a period of 
time (2009:214). In other words, desertification could be termed as the destruction of dry land 
ecosystems, resulting into the reduction and loss of productivity. Desertification is often caused   
by   natural    phenomenon   or    human    made    activities.   Human-made desertification includes: 
overgrazing; over cultivation; bush burning and general environmental misuse. These are actions 
fuelled by selfish the human-centred use of nature. On this, Christine Gudorf (2009:216) noted 
that “since the agricultural revolution of 8000 BCE, humans have been governed by an agricultural 
mindset that dismisses as unimportant any land not usable for farming”. Such unbridled usage of 
land is putting strain on dry land, enhancing loss of nutrients in the soil and increasing the desert 
regions of the world.  As warned by Heinz Kimmerle (2006), “increasing desertification is a threat 
not only to the earth’s human population, but also to its overall biodiversity” (2006:253). Some of 
the effects of desertification are the loss of vegetation, soil erosion, drought, famine, landslides. In 
addition, effects of the anthropocentric (a concept which I shall discuss in detail later) use of this 
non-renewable (land) resource have caused low productivity in agricultural products and can also 
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be attributed to the shortage of arable plants in our societies today. Cattle rearing, commercial 
plantation and logging also, to a great extent, contribute to the causes of deforestation. 
 
2.4.2. Ozone layer depletion 
The ozone layer is found at a height of about 20-30km above the earth surface and it provides a 
protective layer that prevents the penetration of the sun’s ultra-violet rays (IPCC 2007:82). The 
report further argues that: 
 
Ozone, the tri-atomic form of oxygen, is a gaseous atmospheric constituent. In 
the troposphere, [The lowest part of the atmosphere from the surface to about 10 
km in altitude where clouds and weather phenomena occur] ozone is created both 
naturally and by photochemical reactions involving gases resulting from human 
activities (2007:85). 
 
The ozone layer is a thin part of the atmosphere that shields the Earth’s surface from the damaging 
solar radiation which is harmful to plants, animals, humans and the ecosystem (Hourdequin 
2009:132). The depletion of the ozone is “the thinning of the ozone in the upper atmosphere” 
(2009:131). The pollution of the atmosphere through the release of chlorofluorocarbons gases 
produces from the huge engines and factories of modern industrial usages, causes the depletion of 
the ozone layer (the protective coverage from ultraviolet rays), and this results in environmental 
degradation. It should be noted that such exposure to high ultraviolet rays is inimical to skin and 
could result into various degrees of skin diseases. This is in line with Judith Andre’s (2009:216) 
observation that “as the ozone layer thins, skin cancer increases, and so do cataracts”. Also, low 
productivity in agriculture is caused by ultra-violet rays. Additionally, increases in ultraviolet 
radiation affects water bodies, disturbs aquatic life which supports the food chain, and causes death 
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and loss of aquatic animals. The IPCC 20186 report noted that the continuous deletion of the ozone 
layer has a way of increasing the overall ozone-related mortality. The report argues that: 
There is high confidence that ozone-related mortality could increase if precursor 
emissions remain the same, and that higher temperatures could affect the 
transmission of some infectious diseases, with increases and decreases projected 
depending on the disease (e.g., malaria, dengue fever, West Nile virus and Lyme 
disease), region and degree of temperature change (IPCC 2018:241). 
 
Clearly, there are adverse consequences resulting from the misuse of nature, and sundry activities 
of human beings that constantly degrades the environment. 
 
2.4.3. Global Warming 
Global warming (GW) is the result of the continued build-up of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. It is the “measurable increase in the average temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere, 
oceans and landmasses” (Nweke 2018:150). This is a situation precipitated primarily by actions of 
those who advocate for theories of anthropocentrism on the usage of the environment.  The 2018 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change holds human activities to be responsible 
for the increase of global warming above pre-industrial levels. The report had it that “human 
activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.5°C of global warming … Warming from 
anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will … continue to cause 
further long-term changes in the climate system” (2018:2–5). The IPCC (2007), argued that the 
“[w]arming of the climate is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations in increases in 
 
6 The IPCC 2018 report tagged Global Warming of 1.5°C is a special report organized at the instance of the 2015 
Paris Agreement to assess the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. On the other hand, 
the IPCC 2007 report earlier noted in this study is a Synthesis Report (SYR) on various scientific and assessment 
outputs on the issue of climate change. The 2007 report confirms the reality of climate change as mostly a cause of 
human activities and confirms the possible increase of global warming in the future. The 2018 special report on the 
other hand emphasizes the adverse effect of climate change on people, ecosystems and livelihoods around the world. 
It also, among other things, reiterates the essentiality of limiting the warming level of the globe to 1.5°C above the 
pre-industrial world, as levels above 1.5°C is proven to cause irreversible damages to the global world. 
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global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice” (2007:3). For 
Holmes Rolston, the global earth is “warming through greenhouse gas emissions and 
deforestation” (2012:4). The harmful gases, which include carbon dioxides, methane, nitrous-
oxide, chlorofluorocarbons to mention but a few, block some of the heat radiated from the earth, 
so causing the greenhouse effect. Informed by the graveness of the situation, Rolston further noted 
that global warming is an imminent threat to human’s well-being and continuous existence on 
earth. (2012:9). The major anthropogenic causes of increasing emissions of greenhouse gases are 
numerous. These causes include: burning fossil fuels for energy and transport; the clearing of 
forests which reduces carbon dioxide absorption; cattle raising which produces methane emissions 
as a by-product; and the use of industrial technologies that pollute the environment (IPCC 2007:6-
9). These activities have resulted into evidential effects which include rising sea levels, increases 
in extreme harsh weather, heat waves, changes in wildlife distribution disappearing glaciers and 
polar ice, damage to coral reefs and the abundance of disease vectors (Maslin 2004:2–4).  
 
Although Africa, as part of the global world shares in the degradation of the 
environment, because of her colour and low income, bears the effects of 
environmental hazards more than the developed nations (Bryant 2011:126-
127). Bryant’s concern was succinctly expressed by Maslin: “Be under no 
illusion: if global warming is not taken seriously, it will be the poorest people 
in our global community, as usual, that suffers most” (2004:3). This, thus, 
becomes a motivation for this thesis in arguing for a framework that would 
be fit in the discourse of environmental crisis generally and global warming 
in particular. 
 
2.4.4. Atmospheric contamination and climate change 
Atmospheric contamination and climate change are environmental conditions characterized by the 
reduction in quality of the air environment (IPCC 2018:89). It is a condition that can be caused by 
either natural and/or human activities. Some of the natural causes are volcanic eruption, 
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whirlwinds, earthquakes, to mention but a few. However, anthropogenic or human induced causes, 
which account for the main degradation of the environment includes:  inappropriate waste 
disposal; gas flaring; oil exploration; industrial pollution; coastal erosion burning of fossil fuels; 
deforestation for agriculture; and industrial activities. The effect of such human activities 
according to Nils Zimmermann, is the “unprecedented increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
from 280 parts per million (ppm) 200 years ago, to about 400 ppm today” (Zimmermann 2016:45). 
Thus, the overloading of the atmosphere and of ocean waters with carbon is the major cause of 
climate disruption which is known to impact both aquatic and terrestrial lives and contribute to 
bio-diversity loss (Rolston 2012:23). Noted is the fact that the effects of climate change if not 
properly curtailed could lead to climate-related risks to: health; livelihoods; food security; water 
supply; human security and economic growth (IPCC 2018:269). Such climate-related 
endangerment of humans is expected to be of adverse effect in regions of the world that are poor, 
of low income, and undeveloped. The IPCC confirms this view thus: 
…the regions at disproportionately higher risks [to the effects of climate change] 
include Artic ecosystems, dry-land regions, small island developing states, 
disadvantaged and vulnerable populations; some indigenous peoples, and local 
communities dependent on Agricultural or coastal livelihood” (IPCC 2018:9).  
 
To this end, efforts towards the reduction and possible end to atmospheric contamination and 
climate change is a continuous act that is expected to involve all and sundry.     
 
Envisioned solutions involve replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy; reforestation; reducing 
emissions from agriculture and calls for change in industrial processes. However, Zimmermann 
noted that these suggested solutions are not being applied “quickly enough” to prevent catastrophic 
climate disruption (2016:22). Also, it should be noted that many of the proffered solutions are 
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sometimes designed oblivious of the indigenous or traditional lived experience of the people 
leaving in the community of affected areas. This is however receiving a gradual change with the 
call for alternative approaches in the management of and conservation of natural resources and 
built environments. The 2018 IPCC report clearly recognise this, with a huge section of 
recommendations in the report arguing for the development of alternative method and approaches. 
Developing alternative livelihoods and food sources as well as alternative management and 
adaptation strategy were identified as required options for ecosystem restoration in the quest to 
reducing the impacts of climate change (IPCC 2018:226). Specifically, the report argued that  
Ecosystem resilience may be increased through alternative [approaches to] 
livelihoods, which are among a suite of options for building resilience in the 
ecosystem … combined with the advantages of using indigenous knowledge to 
guide transitions, solutions can be more effective when taken in partnership with 
local communities, cultures and knowledge (2018:330). 
 
This research work also falls into the genre of studies responding to the call for the development 
of alternative approaches in the quest for solutions to the perennial environmental crisis of the 
contemporary world. 
 
With the overview of various human activities that engenders environmental crisis and the 
understanding earlier explained about conceptualising environmentalism, the next section attempts 
to examine how scholars engage the environmental issues from the philosophical point of view. 
However, the Western orientation in environmental philosophy is now considered before looking 
into orientations from other climes.  
 
2.5.  Perspectives on contemporary Western environmental philosophy 
In this section I attempt to discuss the idea of the Western orientation in environmental philosophy. 
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Though this study is centred on African environmental philosophy, it is considered apt to begin by 
analysing the corollary of issues surrounding the development of environmental philosophy from 
Western perspectives. This is in recognition of the global nature of the crisis vis-à-vis the 
contemporary challenges being faced by the discipline of environmental philosophy. Particular 
attention is given to contemporary perspectives of philosophy in environmentalism. This is not to 
say that there have not been philosophical views in traditional Western philosophy with concern 
for the environment. As a matter of fact, literature abounds that considers environmental thinking 
in the history of philosophic traditions from classical Greece to the present day.7 Indeed, J. Donald 
Hughes, in his article “Ancient Philosophy” (2009), argues that there are rich intellectual facts that 
could be garnered from the ancient Greek experience which can be used as a resource and 
understanding for the discourse of environmental philosophy in contemporary times. 
 
However, the choice for this study, for not presenting the environmental philosophical views of 
each epoch is due to the present author’s belief that such an attempt falls within the area of 
environmental history. As noted by Hughes, environmental history is “a subfield of history, it 
seeks to understand human beings as they have lived, worked, and thought in relationship with the 
rest of nature” (2009:384). In other words, environmental history is the study of the relationship 
between human culture and the rest of nonhuman nature, interpreted as the major predictor of 
human history.  Hughes highlights the major themes of environmental history as a field of study 
that is: (1) investigating the history of impacts of natural changes on human societies and histories; 
(2) investigating human impacts on the natural environment, and the effects such impact holds on 
human culture and history; and (3) the studying of human thoughts about and attitudes toward 
 
7 See (Carone 2001:67–80); (Coman 2006:55–62).  
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nature and how such systems of thoughts have influenced human-nature relationship (Hughes 
2009:384–87). 
 
This research is centred mainly on the development of a contemporaneous environmental 
philosophy of an African orientation, especially from the rubrics of African epistemology. Thus, 
it should be noted that the purpose of the research is not to give an historical overview of the 
human-nature relationship. The historiology of environmentalism has its advantages to knowledge 
enrichment in the field of environmental philosophy. Nevertheless, this study does consider some 
of the shortcomings of Western environmental philosophy, especially the over-reliance on ethics 
in the discourse of environmental philosophy.  Hence, the focus of the next section is on the idea 
of environmental philosophy as chiefly aired from the 19th Century scholars. 
 
2.6. Environmental philosophy: an overview 
In this study, environmental philosophy is taken as an applied form of philosophy to issues of 
environmentalism.8 Although, one might question the possibility of philosophy to have practical 
applicability, due to its abstract nature whilst application suggests practical (Almond and Hill 
1991:1). It should however be noted that applied philosophy should be understood as “the name 
for philosophical engagement with the many issues of practical life” Almond and Hill (1991:5). 
 
8 Applied philosophy is the application of the main or core areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics 
and logic to problems of practical life, with the objective of solving the problems.  See Collins English Dictionary, 
12th Edition where “applied philosophy” is marked out from philosophy in general by its focus on matters of practical 
concern (2014:134). It is often identified with applied ethics, but although this forms a large part of the area of applied 
philosophy, the broader term includes discussion of philosophical problems, some metaphysical, some 
epistemological, in fields such as law, education or art, that are not strictly or uniquely ethical. For Brenda Almond, 
applied philosophy is not a new subject as its origins and background can be traced back to the first of the early Greek 
philosopher, Thales (c.585 BCE) (Almond 1996:46). She, however, noted that applied philosophy as a field of study 
has suffered a period of neglect because of a paradigm shift from the speculative metaphysics of the nineteenth century 




This also explains the motivation behind this thesis, wherein the aim is to contribute to the viable 
ways in which philosophy can have an impact in the world. Applied philosophy examines the 
questions that are most central and relevant to the ways that we live our lives. Many of these 
questions are epistemic in nature, as they are about what can be known, understood, and reasonably 
believed. Further, such questions are about how we ought to inquire and seek to understand the 
world around us. It should be noted that these questions are crucial to how we live our lives and 
forms the fulcrum of guides as to how we ought to relate to other humans and nonhuman members 
of the environment.  
 
Environmental philosophy is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the natural 
environment and humans’ place within it. It asks crucial questions about the relationships between 
humans and the environment, such as: “What do we mean when we talk about nature?; What is 
the value of the natural, that is the nonhuman, environment to us, or in itself?; How should we 
respond to environmental challenges such as environmental degradation, pollution and climate 
change?; How can we best understand the relationship between the natural world and human 
technology and development? and What is our place in the natural world?” (Callicot and Frodeman 
2009:576–77). 
 
In the introductory part of the edited work, “Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to 
Radical Ecology”, Michael Zimmerman (1998:v–x) is of the view that environmental philosophy 
can be divided into three main fields. These fields are: radical ecophilosophy; environmental 
ethics; and anthropocentric reformism. Radical ecophilosophy’s agenda hinges on the necessary 
condition of revolution or a cultural paradigm shift in the quest to save the world from 
43 
 
environmental destruction. This idea rests on the resultant effect of countercultural analysis of 
human society, which according to Zimmerman reveals “the conceptual attitudinal, and social 
origins of the ecological crisis” (1998:vi-vii). Examples of works in these countercultural eco-
philosophical movement are deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology. 
 
Environmental ethics is the second category of the genre of environmental philosophy identified 
by Zimmerman (1998). For him, this field of study considers extending the traditional boundaries 
of ethics from solely applying to humans to including the nonhuman world (1998:vii). At the heart 
of environmental ethics, a major component of environmental philosophy, lies the attempt to 
articulate a moral or ethical basis of concern for the natural world. Environmental ethics among 
others “maintains that progress could be made in ending [the] ecological crisis if (sic) we changed 
our anthropocentric ethical attitudes and granted ‘moral considerability’ to nonhuman beings” 
(Zimmerman 1998:viii). One major fact that could be deduced from these two areas of 
environmental philosophy, is the fact that they both see anthropocentric attitudes as cause for the 
environmental crisis. However, while the former calls strictly for a cultural paradigm shift, the 
other advocates for a change in anthropocentric oriented ethics. This may suggest that there is a 
thin line between radical ecophilosophy and environmental ethics. The reason being that, one may 
find environmental ethicists that are so critical of anthropocentric ethics and the underlying 
“dualistic categories of Western society” (Zimmerman 1998:ix) that such would easily pass for a 
radical eco-philosopher, as are the cases with Arne Naess and Freya Mathews among others9. 
However, a less radical position: weak anthropocentrism makes long and thick the line between 
 
9 Arne Naess as a deep ecology proponent comes to mind here especially in his argument for an environmental ethics 
borne out of the consideration of the unity and diversity of life. This he termed: “Eco-sophy-T” (Naess 1989:163–
212). Also (Mathews 2000); (Mathews 2009). 
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radical ecophilosophy and environmental ethics. In Zimmerman’s view, weak anthropocentrism 
is the view that holds humans to be more intrinsically valuable than nonhumans, and also grants 
that some nonhumans should not be used or considered instrumentally (Zimmerman 1998:viii-ix). 
 
In the third area of environmental philosophy, there is the intellectual call for the reformation of 
human tenets in the quest for the panacea to the environmental quagmire besetting the world. This 
third worldview, anthropocentric reformism, maintains that “the root of our environmental 
problems is neither anthropocentric attitudes about humanity’s place in nature, nor the political-
economic structures that embody those attitudes. Rather, air and water pollution, wasteful use of 
natural resources and the like stem from ignorance, greed and short-sightedness” (Zimmerman 
1998:viii). It further shows that such factors and crises may be addressed by enacting legislation, 
and changing public policies, among others. 
 
From the foregoing, it could be argued – without any form of polemic contradiction – that 
environmental philosophy cannot be limited or reduced to environmental ethics, environmental 
aesthetics, ecofeminism, environmental hermeneutics, or environmental theology. Hence the view 
of Zimmerman, that the idea by some scholars to reduce environmental philosophy to 
environmental ethics alone is misleading. Environmental ethics is only one part of environmental 
philosophy. The latter exerts influence on a large range of disciplines including environmental 
law, environmental sociology, eco-theology, ecological economics, ecology and environmental 
geography. Little wonder then that J. Baird Callicott categorises environmental ethics as “one 




2.7.  Beyond the ethical perspectives in environmental philosophy 
The present author is of the view that the understanding of environmental philosophy – as a field 
of study that engages more than just the ethical platform is – essential for an exploration of the 
part-whole relationship between environmental ethics and environmental philosophy. The 
argument here is that, the magnitude and even the recalcitrant nature of the challenges of 
environmental crises in our contemporary world makes it not only misleading, but conceptually 
fallacious to limit or reduce environmental philosophy to environmental ethics. It should be noted 
that, the query of overplaying ethics in the discourse of Environmental Philosophy is a pivotal 
point for this study. Indeed, it is one that calls for a shift in the conceptual framework, approaches, 
as well as methods employable in confronting the environmental challenges besetting the world 
today via philosophical thought-processes. As noted by Colyvan: 
 
The central focus of environmental ethics ought to be that of how to implement 
ethical environmental strategies in the face of uncertainty—uncertainty both 
about how the world is and about the relevant values. But the proper 
representation of the uncertainties in question is the business of epistemology, 
and the proper framework for making the decisions in question is the business of 
decision theory (2006:98). 
 
For Colyvan therefore, to think that “either of these later issues falls within the purview of ethics 
is a dangerous [category] mistake” (2007:103).  
 
On the part of Freya Mathews, (2006:85–91) the concern of philosophy in environmentalism is 
purely metaphysical. She opines that, “the Environmental Crisis is a crisis of metaphysics” 
(2006:96), one that according to her, calls for a revision of the “metaphysical premises of our 
civilization.” In her view, the metaphysical approach is important as it aids our understanding of 
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the world, which in turn, would determine how we live in the world. She elaborates as follows: 
“(a) how we understand the world (our metaphysical premise) determines, to a large degree, how 
we treat it (b) how we treat our world constitutes our basic modality (c) our basic modality colours 
everything we do—our (ethics) and entire culture takes its cue from it” (2006:86). Furthermore, in 
her ‘Environmental Philosophy’ she avows that “the hard problem of environmental philosophy is 
the question of metaphysics of the nature of Nature” (Mathews 2014:169). However, scholars like 
Arne Naess (1973), (1989) and Warwick Fox (1989a), (1989b), (2006) in affirming the ‘beyond 
the ethical perspective,’ advocated for psychological or phenomenological stances in 
environmentalism. For these scholars, the quest for psychological identification with wider circles 
of nature as a source of ecological consciousness underscores the concern of environmental 
philosophy.  
 
Arguing in consonance with the idea that it is a mistake to think of the philosophical issues in 
environmentalism as merely ethical, are scholars who opined for an epistemological approach to 
the question of environmentalism. Of such are Jim Cheney and Anthony Weston (1999), 
Christopher Preston (2003), Adam C. Scarfe (2008), Jason Kawall (2010), Akinpelu A. Oyekunle 
(2011) and Bunyan Bryant (2011); who all submitted that philosophical concerns in 
environmentalism are much more than mere extension of general ethical principles and methods 
to a new applied area, requiring the normative stance of epistemology. Accordingly, attempts were 
made, though in differing ways, to bring the concerns of environmental discourse into direct 
contact with epistemology. One point underlying the various epistemological approaches to 
environmentalism is the argument that the idea of the “frontier mentality” is built upon traditional 
Western epistemology (Mumford 2009:88). Thus Oyekunle (2011:23–59), in agreeing with Scarfe 
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(2008) that “epistemology is both descriptive as well as prescriptive,” examines the foundation of 
the human-centred use of nature. He argues therein that traditional Western epistemology provides 
the frameworks through which humans were able to experience reality as if they are isolated 
consciousnesses interacting with a mechanical and devalued world” (2011:56). Oyekunle opines 
that such traditional underpinnings are anti-environmentalist, as they project a reality where loving 
or respecting the natural world is almost as ludicrous as loving a photocopy machine (2011:57). 
Such an epistemic tradition as displayed in traditional Western philosophy requires a form of 
reconstruction for its applicability to environmentalism. As enunciated in Scarfe (2008), Kawall 
(2010), Oyekunle (2011) and (2015), and Bryant (2011), a reconstruction of traditional Western 
epistemology was attempted to make it conducive and applicable for environmental discourse.10 
This study contributes to intellectual perspectives that the philosophical issues in 
environmentalism surpasses ethical framework or application. 
 
In the next section, I highlight some of the challenges faced by environmental philosophy, 
especially as it relates to emergent and recent discourses in the field. While it would be practically 
impossible to cover all the challenges in this study for want of time and space, some of these 
intellectual challenges are engaged with. The aim is to emphasize, via the examination of these 
intellectual challenges, the beyond-ethical perspective being argued for in this thesis. Also, such 




10 Such attempted reconstruction is envisioned in the resultant effect of the synthesizing internalism and externalism 
theory of justification. This was referred to as “Enlightened Externalism” by Oyekunle in his “Towards an 




2.8. Contemporary challenges for environmental philosophy 
The challenges to be examined in this section are: the quest for alternative methods/approaches 
and their integration; overcoming of the anthropocentric view of nature; and environmental politics 
and justice. Noted is that the first two of these intellectual challenges are pivotal to the discussion 
of environmental philosophy of which this research work argues for – a non-anthropocentric 
environmental philosophy, that is African in making. Examining these contemporary challenges 
is significant to this chapter, as the nature of the issues and questions each of these challenges 
poses reveals that they exceed only ethical answers. Obtainable from the examination of these 
challenges is the stance that further strengthens the ‘beyond the ethical perspective’ argument of 
this study. 
 
2.8.1. The quest for alternative methods/approaches in environmental philosophy 
There is an old English adage that desperate situations warrant desperate measures. In the face of 
the dire situation posed by the perennial environmental challenges that seems to defy solutions, 
and are militating against peace, good health, political stability, sustainable development, etc., in 
the world today; the consideration for alternative approaches as a sustainable measure in the quest 
for panacea to the lingering environmental crisis becomes imperative. The reason for this is not 
far-fetched. As noted by Louis Pojman, environmental concerns are global issues” (2001:249). 
This is also resonated by Bryant (2011) where Africa, as well as other low-income part of the 
world, were noted, as the parts of the world that bear the major brunt of the consequences of the 
environmental crisis. One thing to note here is the fact that these environmental challenges are 
largely because of the culture of use and misuse of nature characterising the developed nations’ 




The air we breathe may have been polluted by corporations on another continent 
while the air we contaminate reaches Africa and Asia. The chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) we use, which breaks down the ozone layer, affect everyone in the 
world… (2001:249).   
 
What the views above drives home is the complex nature of the environmental crisis afflicting the 
world today, and the fact that the issues have so far defied solutions and the need for alternative 
methods in the quest for solutions to this perennial challenge. 
With the advent of globalisation – that sees the world operating on a platform of a holistic global 
framework – what happens in Europe, for instance, has a consequential effect in Asia; and the 
events of Africa impact, say, in the socio-economic and political context of America, and vice 
versa. It thus becomes important to ensure that methods or approaches to ending the contemporary 
environmental crisis have a global outlook. Indeed, the contemporary African states place great 
attention to the agenda of  environmental management crisis and sustainable exploitation of natural 
resources (Mawere 2014:xiv). In fact, the theme of sustainable natural resource-use has been high 
on the international agenda since the first global environmental conference in Stockholm, Sweden 
in 1972 – The United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE).  On this, Chand 
Prakash noted that: 
 
The UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) was a turning point in 
the evolution of humanity’s relationship with the earth and global concern about 
the environment. While most of the conference’s accomplishments were mainly 
rhetorical, its ultimate success was that environmental policy became a universal 
concern within international diplomacy, and the conference’s motto of “Only one 




Recently also, the quest for conservation and sustainability plays a vital role in the Paris Accord 
of 2015 – especially through local, community participation and indigenous conservation 
epistemologies in less developed countries (UNFCCC 2015:1–32). Equity is one of the things that 
makes the quest for alternative approaches required in international environmental diplomacy. The 
developing nations often feel skeptical to embrace the global environmental agenda, because “they 
feared such accords would undermine their economic growth and prosperity” (Prakash 2019:22). 
Thus, solutions that are inclusive, equitable, ecologically effective; in recognising the needs, 
peculiarity and aspirations of the developing nations make alternative approaches imperative in 
international environmental diplomacy.  
 
In the bid to present an African perspective on the global challenge of the environmental crisis, 
Kelbessa, in his 2015 article titled: African Environmental Ethics, Indigenous Knowledge, and 
Environmental Challenges opines that “non-Western traditions remain a fertile source for many 
thinkers attempting to re-conceive the culture-nature relationship and envision a theoretical 
foundation for sustainable living” (2015:288). This is a re-echoing of Pojman in his call for a 
nobler motive in the field of environmental philosophy where he noted that “we can [hopefully] 
learn from each other in the quest to act responsibly and lovingly toward [other] human beings and 
nature” (2001:13). Such a multicultural dimension to environmental philosophy, Pojman argues, 
is an “international environmental ethic that takes into consideration the insights and perspectives 
of various cultures and point of views” (2001:249). Similarly, J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. 
Ames, presented the Asian traditions as a conceptual resource for environmental philosophy in 
their 1989 co-authored book: Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental 
Philosophy (1989). They point out that there is an “emerging [as of then] consolidated 
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metaphysical consensus that would necessitate a complete re-visioning of the human nature 
relationship in Western thought” (Callicott and Ames 1989:vii). It was further noted that “…the 
environmental crisis challenges rationality… it calls into question at a very fundamental level our 
most familiar understanding of the nature of other and relatedness” (1989:xi). As a possible 
resource for an alternative understanding of ‘the other’, a critical look was made to classical 
Taoism and its elaboration as an alternative interpretation of ‘the other’ (Callicott and Ames 
1989:xix). My study falls within the genre of alternative approaches in the discourse of 
environmental philosophy, especially as stipulated by African environmental worldviews. 
 
In the same vein, Mawere noted that the “exclusion of local communities in resource management 
and undermining alternative approaches to the western worldviews has continued to be inhibitors 
to success against the environmental crisis of the world” (2014:ix).  Such exclusionist methods 
could partially account for the lack of solutions to the perennial environmental crisis which takes 
form in resource depletion, increasing desertification, soil erosion, ozone layer depletion, and 
declining biodiversity in terrestrial and aquatic resources. It is my considered opinion here, that 
unless there is a calculated attempt at synthesising indigenous worldviews and Western 
perspectives in the quest for the panacea to environmental quagmires of the world, success in the 
environmental enterprise will remain a mirage.  In other words, there is a need for critical 
intellectual dialogue in which all perspectives, from diverse cultures of the world, that are relevant 
towards achieving sound environmental management be represented. Solutions to the global 
environmental crisis must be set up “…in ways that leave open clear avenues for criticism and 
debate” (Preston 2003:124). The avenues for the consideration of alternative points of views in 
such dialogue is essentially required in the field of environmental philosophy to ensure that a 
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diversity of perspectives are brought to bear on environmental solutions. It is thus the aim of this 
research work to contribute to environmental philosophical studies via the presentation of an 
alternative perspective from the African epistemological point of view.   
 
2.8.2. Overcoming anthropocentrism 
In this study, “anthropocentric environmentalism” is understood as the human-centred use of 
nature as well as all other nonhuman member of the environment. In other words, anthropocentric 
environmentalism characterises the promotion of unbridled and, exclusive use of the environment 
in general, mainly for human welfare. It could thus be held that environmentalism may not be 
sustainable if it hinges on anthropocentric tenets. The reasons for this are not far-fetched as the 
human-centred worldviews and activities have been shown to be major underlying factors for the 
environmental crisis in the world. For Moran, the core of the challenge to overcoming 
anthropocentricism is coming to terms with the idea that “human values determine what is valued 
in nature, even in the bid to argue for the intrinsic value of nature” (2012:3). In other words, any 
conceptualisation and considerability that humans could make of  nature would always be coloured 
by human categories. Such categories place nature’s utility in perpetuity at the service to human 
needs. This could be seen as forming the fulcrum for narrow/strict anthropocentricism and weak 
anthropocentrism. The latter opening up the full range of values that nature provides and the former 
encapsulating value-considerability on human determinacy (Mylius 2018:159–62).  
 
The research would want to argue in accord with John Passmore in holding anthropocentric 
environmentalism culpable and responsible for the environmental crisis the world is battling with 
today. In the words of Passmore, “…many if not all intractable problems and issues for discourse 
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and engagement in environmentalism are caused by the anthropocentric use of the natural 
environment” (1974:3). Succinctly put, the idea of human-centred use of the living and the non-
living members of the environment instil humans with the values of the culture of use that is 
ravaging the natural environment. Right from the 17th century, the outlook and status given to 
science and technology from the works of great minds like Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and the like 
was an optimistic one.  This is in sync with Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, who both described 
the “scientific enterprise as the means of liberating the human race form drudgery, famine, 
diseases, natural disasters and war” (2004:123).  
 
Although there are outstanding advances and remarkable trends in the enterprise of science and 
technology exemplified in the success of science in putting humans on the moon, transportation, 
developing drugs, information technology, modern medicine, etc., on the other hand, there are 
failures, too. Mumford argues that the “modern man is the victim of the very instrument he values 
most” (2009:29). His reason for this claim is that every gain in power, every mastery of natural 
forces, every scientific innovation and addition to knowledge has proved potentially dangerous to 
humanity (2009:45). This is exemplified in contemporary reality, as humans now encounter 
various challenges and difficulties emanating from scientific technologisation, like: industrial 
pollution; misuse of nuclear weapons; plane crashes; malfunctioning artificial intelligence, to 
mention but a few. There is, even, the appealing view that there seems to be a great uncertainty at 
the frontiers of scientific knowledge and innovations. Hartshorne captures it better in his 1980 




… [I]t is now clear that not only does technological man expand at the expense 
of other forms of lives, but in principle, he faces limits beyond which his own 
expansion is possible or self-defeating (1980:70) 
 
This in no guise leaves us with the dilemma of modernisation -- as the scientific enterprise aimed 
at the liberation of human beings – is leading towards the destruction and possible extinction of 
the world. Putting the anthropocentric mentality to check in the quest for philosophical ideas that 
would address the perennial environmental crisis becomes an intellectual challenge for the field of 
environmental philosophy. This study contributes to this challenge by bringing in a non-
anthropocentric environmental view from the African epistemic process. The African 
epistemological process that is structured on the unification of the epistemic subject and object, as 
will be shown below, proffers a ground for rationalising an African environmental philosophic 
view that is devoid of anthropocentrism. 
 
2.8.3. Environmental politics and justice  
As argued by John Callewaert, environmental justice “is the fair treatment and involvement of all 
people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies” (2011:79). 
Environmental justice could thus be viewed as the conceptual connections and causal relationships 
between environmental issues and social justice. It is an environmental discourse that is borne out 
of the idea that the environment plays a major role in the socio-political situations of the countries 
of the world. This is in consonance with Mawere’s (2014:xxiii) view that, “the natural environment 
is a huge contributing factor to socio-economic development and sustainability”. For Callewaert, 
environmental justice arose as a concern for resolution to inequalities in the distribution of 
environmental burdens among the nations around the world (2011:45). In other words, the concept 
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of environmental justice is out to challenge the fact that some communities or human groups are 
disproportionately subjected to higher levels of environmental risk than others. The idea of 
environmental justice is also out to enunciate prevalent socio-political crisis that are consequences 
of such environmental crisis. A vivid example is the Boko-haram insurgency in the North Eastern 
Zone of Nigeria which has been argued to be effects of the environmental degradation of the Lake 
Chad basin (Iyorchia 2014:1–55). This buttressed Munyaradzi’s view that “the role and importance 
of the environment in sustainable development (and social order) cannot be under-estimated” 
(2014:xxv). 
 
Environmental justice arose as a concern for philosophy in the illumination on the issues of 
responses and resolution to inequities in the distribution of environmental burdens in nations round 
the world. In the view of Robert Figueroa and Claudia Mills, the two dimensions of environmental 
justice includes: “distributive justice and participatory justice” (2001:427). For the later, concerns 
are focused on racial, or and economical biases in respect to democratic participation as well as 
representational inclusion in environmental considerations. Following this view environmental 
justice is seen as a social movement and a field of study put into one. On the other hand, the former 
is concerned with exploring every intellectual means to expose the fact that communities/countries 
of colour and low-income have higher disproportionate exposure to environmental risk, hazards 
and pollution. For Figueroa and Mills: 
 
…distributive dimension of environmental justice begins with the observation 
that people of colour, the poor, and under-represented groups such as indigenous 





Their view coheres with Bryant’s (2011) idea that “race and wealth are the two main predictor for 
the degradation of environment and location of hazardous waste disposal sites”. Bryant further 
argued that countries of colour and low income, such as the developing countries are 
disproportionately impacted by the world’s environmental crisis (2011:12). 
  
An example of instances showing how Africa bears high impact of environmental degradation is 
obvious in the Late Kwame Nkrumah’s complaints about the activities of the Government of 
France in 1960. He vehemently spoke up against the usage of the African soil – the Sahara – as a 
waste dump site and nuclear weapon test grounds by the French government.. In his February 13, 
1960 speech titled: French Atom Test in the Sahara, Nkurmah argues: 
 
My government has learnt with horror that the Government of France, in total 
disregard of repeated protest by Ghana and other African States, and of the 
Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, has defied the 
conscience of mankind and has this morning exploded a nuclear device on 
African soil. 
My government further noted a declaration by the French Prime minister that this 
explosion is only the first of a series of similar explosions to be carried out by 
the Government of France. 
In these circumstances, my government must take immediate action to safeguard 
the interest of the people of Ghana and, therefore, as a first step, my government 
has decided to freeze, from today, the assets of all French firms in Ghana until 
such time as the effects on the population of Ghana of the present atomic 
explosion and the future experiments referred to by the French prime Minister, 
become known. 
I appeal to the nation to remain calm. My government will take any further action 
which may become necessary (Nkrumah [1960] 1997:25). 
 
Furthermore, the degrading of the developing nations’ environmental spaces through the economic 




In March, 1988, a Norwegian shipping company dumped 15, 000 tonnes of 
incinerator ash from Philadelphia into a quarry on Kassa Island (Guinea). This 
incident was discovered when the island’s vegetation began to die; 
In May, 1988, 900 tonnes of toxic waste was exported from Italy to Koko, 
Nigeria. Of these 900 tonnes of toxic waste, 150 tonnes were PCBs. Other 
imported chemicals included formaldehyde and methyl melamine, both of which 
are suspected carcinogens…As opposed to listing the chemicals that were 
actually being imported, the construction company applied for a permit to import 
mineral wax, polishing oil, cinder ash, and other industrial chemicals; 
In 2006, 17 people died… and over 80, 000 were forced to seek medical attention 
due to vomiting, nosebleeds, and difficulty breathing in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. 
This was the result of 500 tonnes of toxic waste that was dumped by Trafigura 
management in 14 sites around the city— primarily sites near water and 
agricultural sources…It is estimated that proper treatment of this waste would 
have cost the exporting country $250, 000, while in Africa they were charged 
only $18, 500 (2013:9). 
 
Obtainable from these examples is the fact that, environmental degradation and hazards in Africa 
are largely a result of contemporaneous action in pursuit of wealth. With relentless pursuit of 
wealth identified as a genre of ‘frontier mentality’ (Mumford 2009) that accounts for the attitude 
of the incautious use of nature. 
 
The distributive dimension of environmental justice beams its search lights on morally susceptible 
and repressible notions of inequities in the distribution of environmental burdens. Environmental 
justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all regardless of race, colour, national 
origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations and policies (Callicot and Frodeman 2009:344). Fair treatment 
means that no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups, should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local and tribal programs 
and policies (UNFCCC 2015:23). Thus, environmental justice could be seen as the intellectual 
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platform (both social and academic) upon which the unequal distribution of environmental benefits 
and harms are espoused, engaged and challenged.  
 
As noted by Bryant (2011:126), “in the USA, most communities of colour and low-income (often) 
face a disproportionate exposure to environmental health risks such as air and water pollution, 
environmental hazards such as landfills, incinerators, sewage treatment plants and polluting 
industries”. This is also the case in many of the African countries as examples of countries of low 
income and of colour dissents. The state of poverty – underdevelopment, deprivation and 
dwindling economy in Africa– makes the continent readily open to the hazards of anthropogenic 
environmental misuse. In the report of a commissioned study by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the European Commission (EC) (1998), it was argued that there is a 
linkage between poverty and environmental degradation, especially in developing countries. The 
report called to question the ‘orthodox idea11’ that poverty is a necessary cause of environmental 
degradation, which must first be taken care of to achieve sound environmental protection. This 
orthodox idea was identified as the poverty-environment linkage in a “downward and mutually 
enforcing cycle” (1998:4). Noted also is that Segun Ogungbemi (1994 and 2004) also argued along 
the line of the orthodox perspective of the poverty-environmental degradation linkage, where he 
identified poverty as the root cause of environmental degradation in Africa12.  
 
 
11 The orthodox idea on a poverty-environmental damage linkage is credited to the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) report that poverty is a major cause and effect of global 
environmental problems. See World Commision on Environment and Development, 1987. 
12 A detailed critique of this is due in the fourth chapter of this thesis, in the consideration of the African orientation 
in Environmental Philosophy. Unlike the orthodox position of Ogungbemi, this study identifies the quest for wealth 
as well as capitalistic tendencies to maximize profit at the expense of the developing African countries and their 
environment, as one of the main causes of environmental degradation in Africa.  
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It was noted in the UNDP and EC’s report that the worldview of a downward and poverty enforcing 
cause for environmental damage is oblivious of “the macroeconomic responses that [increase] both 
poverty and environmental degradation” (1998:3). The position held in the report on the poverty-
environmental degradation linkage is reinforced by Bryant’s argument that: 
 
… [W]ealth – not poverty – may be the problem, because the social and 
environmental degradation and the hazard we face today are integrally linked to 
the scale and intensity of our actions in the pursuit of wealth. In our relentless 
pursuit of wealth, we often discount the future because extreme wealth and its 
by-products take away opportunities for future generations (2011:7–8). 
 
What is significant here is the idea that, rather than seeing poverty as the root cause of 
environmental degradation, poverty should be viewed as the enabling condition to make people of 
low income countries and of colour to bear more of the hazards of the environmental crisis. 
 
This is apt in consideration of poverty as a form of deprivation of opportunities “to lead a long, 
healthy, creative life and enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect and the 
respect of others” (United Nations Development Programme 1997:3). As a form of deprivation, 
poverty already places developing countries in a disadvantaged position with regards to the 
capacity and proficiency in responding to the perennial crisis of the environment. Akin Mabogunje 
drives this position home that: 
 
Because the poor are often cut off from the decision making process of their 
communities, discriminated against by other stations in society, cut off from 
abiding roots in  the community, and relegated to occupy environmentally unsafe 
areas of societal space, the solutions to their dilemmas require a multifaced 





Instructive from the above is the fact that to identify poverty as the cause of environmental 
degradation, amounts to a further injustice done to the community of the poor, even in the quest 
for environmental justice.  
 
In consideration of the global effect of environmental hazard, poverty as a form of human 
deprivation continue to provide a fertile ground for birthing the vulnerability of the developing 
nations to environmental degradation and hazards. This consideration synchronises with Bryant’s 
view, that “[i]f we can solve the problem of wealth and extravagance, perhaps we can solve the 
problem of environmental degradation (2011:8). In other words, making people advantageous in 
regard to the availability of economic opportunities, ensuring an environmental check on the 
capitalist production spree, and the provision of enabling environment that exterminates human 
depravation will stop the continual exposure of the poor as well as developing nations to 
environmental hazards. Thus, in the quest for environmental justice, especially in Africa, 
consideration of ecological and social interdependence ought to take more precedence over 
policies dictated by big business interests and geographical prejudices. In this vein, the attention 
should be placed on strengthening the concerns and institutional capacities of the developing states 
in responding to environmental challenges. The UNDP report (1998:3) also recognises the 
representation of local people’s concern by arguing that “it is important to acknowledge the local 
rather than universal experience of [responses to] environmental degradation”. Such 
acknowledgments will enhance the provision of enabling situations for a fair and or equitable 
distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. 
 
The fact to enunciate here is that, what really makes the effect of environmental injustice to hold 
sway in Africa, Nigeria for instance, is the ideological and historical foundations of the 
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environmental justice movement vis-a-vis dominant environmental policy, discourse and 
engagement. Lacking in African countries essentially, as noted by Callewaert, are the three poles 
of a sound basis for environmental justice: equity (equal distribution of the development of 
resources rather than control by a few elites); efficiency (management of natural resources) and 
aesthetics (preservation of nature without development) (2011: 84). On the three poles of 
environmental justice, vis-a-vis the contemporary African state’s quest for environmental justice 
through environmental management and policies, little or nothing could be taken as being 
achieved. Equity has always been a mirage; efficiency in management of resources has always 
been marred by ethnic or myopic political prowess; and conservationism is purely of Western and 
colonial orientation. A total detachment from the local people’s participation and contribution mars 
the little or lip-service effort geared at environmental justice. This underscores the quest of this 
research, even from the ‘beyond the ethical perspectives’, to interrogate indigenous the African 
epistemic worldview. Such interrogation must be with the intent of bringing the potency and 
normativity of African epistemology to the fore in the quest for theoretical cum practical panacea 
to the salient environmental challenges bedevilling Africa and the world beyond. This would not 
only demonstrate the possibility and strength of the African indigenous worldview, but also reveal 
the viability of such ideas in a complementary task with worldviews of other climes: Asian, 
African, or Western in the development of frameworks for conceptualising solutions to the  
tapestry of environmental crisis of Africa and by extension, the whole world. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
From the above it has been shown that the whole world is experiencing environmental crises of 
diverse kinds. The existential realities of the contemporary society unveil the magnitude of the 
environmental crisis permeating every part of the global world.  The chapter has featured the 
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evaluation of the idea and problem of environmentalism, as well as ensuing contemporary 
intellectual challenges being faced in the field of environmental philosophy. These contemporary 
intellectual challenges for environmental philosophy have been examined in order that they might 
reveal the imperativeness of the ‘beyond ethical perspectives’ that this thesis is arguing for. It has 
been further noted that the human-nature relationship that is predominantly anthropocentric forms 
the fulcrum for the environmental crisis ruining the world. A pertinent question at this juncture is: 
what is the source or foundation of this anthropocentric human-nature relationship? And what has 
been the attempt at salvaging or solving the crisis, especially as opined in diverse climes?   Hence, 
in the next chapter, the thesis turns to consider and critique the Western orientation to 
environmental philosophy. The aim is to explore the Western worldview regarding the 
















A critique of the Western orientation in environmental philosophy 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will argue in support of the view that the environmental crisis wrecking the 
contemporary world is traceable to the subject/object, mind/matter dichotomy dominant in the 
Western traditional intellectual heritage. The chapter unveils the fact that anthropocentric 
environmentalism is structured upon the religious, epistemological and technological framework 
of traditional Western culture. A critical look at some key aspects of the Western traditional 
intellectual framework, the chapter posits, will reveal a long tradition of separating humans from 
the nonhuman environments they live in. Such a tradition, as will be further explained, engenders 
an uncaring attitude towards nonhuman nature as well as the misuse of the environment. The 
present author opines that this human-centred worldview, explored in the previous chapter, is built 
upon the dualistic tendencies pervading Western traditional thought.  
 
The chapter among other things, critiques the standard epistemic standpoints provided by the 
Western traditional epistemological framework with its roots in Cartesian duality. To this end, the 
Western epistemic framework especially as institutionalised by the Cartesian intellectual project 
will be explored in conjunction with how such a framework dovetailed into the Enlightenment-
foundation for science and technology. It will also be noted that this dualistic epistemic framework 
permeates the emerging and enduring intellectual thoughts of the traditional Western orientation. 
The plausibility of the critique offered, show traditional Western epistemology as having the 
tendency for being a model for anthropocentric environmentalism. Furthermore, the critique will 
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show that traditional Western intellectual thought seems deficient in its theoretical and conceptual 
framework and hence may be deemed unsuitable for the development of an attitude that enhances 
respect and/or love for nature, and the nonhuman environment in general.  
 
3.2. Critiquing the cause of the environmental crisis in traditional Western thought13 
This section interrogates the history of Western thought to ideas that are inimical to nature and its 
use. It will explore traditional Western thought, especially as canonized in its philosophical, 
religious and technological foundations, and show that they bear some marks of 
anthropocentricism. By traditional Western thought, the study is delineating14 the critique to the 
modern and enlightenment intellection that proffers the foundation for science and technology, 
especially from the anthropocentric prejudice. Writers in environmental philosophy have critiqued 
anthropocentrism as the root of the contemporary environmental crisis (White 1967); (Capra 
1982); (Attfield 1983); (Bateson 1991) and  (Minteer and Manning 2005). Related to 
anthropocentrism and following the same trajectory through traditional Western intellectual history 
are the dualistic and hierarchical worldviews that have been widely attributed to ancient Greece, 
the cradle of Western philosophical thinking. While such ideas certainly preceded ancient Greece, 
the works of Plato and Aristotle are often cited as pivotal in the development of Western 
philosophy generally and Cartesian thinking specifically. Platonic dualism and the Aristotelian 
‘categories of being’ contributed to the belief that humans are superior to nonhumans, and to the 
 
13 The research employs the term ‘traditional Western thought’ to conceptualize the corollary of ideas and the 
intellectual heritage of a Western orientation. Such intellectual positions, as will be further shown in the chapter, 
shape the view, position, and perspectives of various proponents of intellectual thought in the Western tradition. 
14 Delineating the research’s critique of Western philosophy to the traditional and enlightenment era is in the 
understanding that Western philosophy often generates its query within itself. Although, one could not totally rule 
out the tendency by contemporary Western philosophy to lean to traditional Western intellectual thought despite 
some critical currents of the traditional Western views, however, traditional Western philosophy did get awoken up 
by other Western philosophical movements i.e. postmodernism.  
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rest of the natural world. As Betty Jean Craige explains in Laying the Ladder Down, in relation to 
Platonic dualism, 
 
 Plato’s separation of the world into two realms—the realm of ideas and the realm 
of their appearances in nature—constituted a split between spirit and matter, 
stasis and flux, mind and body, self and world, and culture and nature (1992:76).  
 
Aristotle expounded upon Plato’s ideas, accepting the dualism between spirit or soul and matter, 
and ascribing greater value to those species that exhibited a greater proportion of soul or spirit 
(1926:C;12.z5). Regarding the human-nature dichotomy as presented in the Aristotelian categories 
and bifurcation, Craige further argued that, “this scale of ascent is inherently a model of 
domination that sees difference as distinguishing rank or value” (1992:85).  
 
The epistemological implication of Aristotelian metaphysical duality portrays a mode of 
categorisation that presents things as discrete quantities, thereby handling the ontological 
constituents of entities as separated from each other. Such ontological thought bears the mark of 
epistemic defects wherein the subjects of perception are not poised to be able to grasp or intuit the 
object completely and comprehensively. Aristotelian ontology arbitrarily separating the essentials 
from the accidents, introduced polarisation and categorisation in the understanding of being 
(Aristotle 1926:d10). Such dichotomist worldviews – permeating traditional Western 
philosophical thoughts – induce minds to be discriminative and prejudiced against nature in the 
human-nature relationship. To this human-nature bifurcation, the African philosopher, Innocent 
Asouzu has this to say: “Whenever and wherever the ego or the mind is trained or indoctrinated to 
be bifurcating and hegemonic, it invariably also tends to lose controls on its general outlook to the 
world” (2007:146). The implication of Aristotle’s dichotomist worldview is that it fuels negative 
66 
 
anthropocentrism wherein human beings are regarded and affirmed essentially as beings that are 
distinct and superior to nonhuman beings, which in turn are relegated to the sphere of accidental 
and inconsequential beings. 
 
It must be noted that the Western intellection of Plato and Aristotle observed above has a form of 
rational footings into Judaeo-Christianism. In other words, traditional Western intellectual 
tradition forms the seedbed for Judaeo-Christian account of religion. The Judaeo-Christian biblical 
account of the creation narrative15 in the first two chapters of Genesis (1:1-31; 2:1-25), as well as 
the corollary of biblical events and records also show biases against nature. It should be noted that 
this research is not unaware that other thoughts could be explicated from the biblical account of 
creation, for instance the theological implication of the Genesis account on the plan of redemption 
for humanity by God. However, exploring the biblical account as will be done later in this chapter, 
shows that the Judaeo-Christian biblical tradition appears to fuel anthropocentricism, and thus 
leads to a utilitarian outlook towards nature. The dualistic and hierarchical thinking of Plato and 
Aristotle had an important influence on Christianity, the scientific thinking of René Descartes, and 
the evolution of Western science. For example, Paul the Apostle, not only adapted the dialectical 
argument found in the Platonic dialogues to write his epistles, but also employed Platonic dualism 
(Oelschlaeger 2001:64–65). By Christianising Greek philosophy, Paul further divides the world 
into the supernatural/natural, sacred/profane, transcendent-eternal/corporeal-evanescent, 
celestial/terrestrial, spiritual/natural. Paul argues: 
 
15 The Judaeo-Christian biblical account of the creation is the story that account for creation in the tradition of the 
bible as held by the Christian belief. The Christian theology draws its account of creation from the old testament. 
The old testament scripture, on the other hand, is a product of the Jewish tradition. The term Judaeo-Christian thus 
exerts a synchronisation between Christianity and Judaism in the creation narrative as it shows that the intellectual 




There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial: but the glory of the celestial 
is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another… there is a natural body, and 
there is a spiritual body … Now this is saying, brethren, that flesh and blood 
[natural, corporeal] cannot inherit the kingdom of God [spiritual/transcendental]; 
neither doth corruption [natural] inherit incorruption [spiritual] (1 Corinthians 
15:40-50).  
 
Descartes shared Plato and Paul’s dualistic thinking which overemphasises the separation between 
body and mind. For Descartes, reality is divided into res cogitans and res extensa—a thinking 
human and the extended thing (1999:I 20. II 28. & VI; 79-88). The mind, according to Descartes, 
is indivisible and therefore greatly different from the body, which – being part of (material) nature 
– is divisible (1999:II; 25). What distinguished humans from the rest of the material universe was 
the soul, the consciousness that was not of this world (1999:II; 87). His famous maxim – “I am, I 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” – succinctly 
states Descartes’ belief that the mind is wholly detached from the body and the rest of the world 
(1999:II; 25). It must be noted here that Descartes’ dualism privileged spiritual and self-conscious 
life over material life. In other words, the human body together with the material world are of less 
importance in his worldview. This shows that the problem is not only dualism, but also the 
hierarchisation of beings. 
 
A point of fact to note is that Descartes built his ontology on Protagoras’ (481-411 B.C.) – the 
father of subjectivity, as Protagoras’ subjective criterion pioneers Cartesian full-fledged modern 
subjectivism (Lozar 2018:253). Protagoras’s subjectivism was well enunciated by Laertius 
Diogenes in his account of the lives and saying of Greek Philosophers. Describing Protagoras as a 
subjectivist, Diogenes quoted him as arguing that “man is the measure of all things, of the things 
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that are that they are, and of the things that are not that they are not” (Diogenes 1925:§51). A 
salient fact to note here is the conceptual bias against nature that forms the fulcrum of intellectual 
discourse of traditional Western culture. In other words, if ‘man’ is the measure of all things, 
humans are justified to use nature to achieve their selfish and exclusive needs and wants. It is 
interesting to note that this anthropocentric worldview manifest itself to the extreme in the 
continental philosophical orientation. For instance, in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), Hegel 
argues likewise that nature, an ‘unconscious’ matter is ‘other’ to the human person whom s/he 
defines as ‘self-consciousness’. He elaborates, 
 
Self-consciousness is to begin with, simple being-for-itself, self-equal through 
exclusion from itself of everything else. For it, its essence and absolute object is 
‘I’; and in this immediacy, or in this [mere] being, of its being-for-self, it is an 
individual. What is ‘other’ for it is an unessential, negatively characterised object 
(Hegel 1977:113). 
 
In the quote above, the human person is defined and described as a ‘self-conscious’ and a ‘being-
for-itself’ entity.  As such, the human person is defined as a being that is pre-occupied with itself 
and whose essence excludes what is around him or her, including nature. Nature is seen as ‘other’ 
and hence unimportant to the essential being of the human person.  Even in relation to God, Hegel 
continues to describe nature as being of secondary importance. In his Philosophy of Mind, he 
asserts that “…God the Father (this simple universal or being-within-itself) putting aside His 
solitariness creates Nature [the being that is external itself, outside of itself]” (Hegel 1971:30). 
Implied in this is that God in him is indeterminate and as such an abstraction. He is a reality without 
content. Thus, he needs and uses nature to assume a determinate form. But nature on the other 
hand has no being of itself. It has no inwardness. It is an external manifestation of something real 
– God or Geist. Therefore, nature, according to Hegel lacks rationality because it is governed by 
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external necessity and hence un-freedom. Simply put, nature has no consciousness. This then 
brings us to Hegel’s famous dictum, namely that “what is rational is real and what is real is 
rational” Hegel (1967: 10). Thus, it could be inferred from the above that nature in the Hegelian 
analysis has no being of its own. It is not real. It is simply one of the phases of Spirit or Mind. 
Nature is God’s self-exteriorisation. 
3.2.1. Religion and Anthropocentrism 
The Judaeo-Christian biblical narrative of creation exemplifies the human-centredness of 
contemporary society. The story of Adam and Eve is primarily a cultural narrative in Judaeo-
Christian Western society, and its influence on Western society’s relationship to nonhuman nature 
is so pervasive that its assumptions have rarely been explored (Gabel, Wheeler, and Anthony 
1996:103). According to the biblical account of the creation narrative (Genesis 1:1), the world was 
created by God. This creation, we further read in the biblical account was for the use and welfare 
of humans. From this narrative account, God (in verses 1, 26 and 28 to 30) gave the instruction 
and rights to humans to dominate nonhuman creatures.  
 
1. In the Beginning God created the heaven and the earth.  
26. And God said let us make man in our own image, after our likeness: and 
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the air, and 
over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that 
creepeth upon the earth.   
28. And God [blessed], and said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and 
replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, and over the fowl of the air, over every living thing that moveth upon 
the earth.  
29. And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is 
upon the face of the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree 
yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.  
30. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to 
everything that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there if life [that has life], 





When God (in Genesis 2:19-20) instructed Adam to name all the animals, Adam established his 
dominance over them. Although the act of naming and thus establishing dominion over every 
creature, is an innocent act in itself, it has however opened the natural world for abuse and misuse 
by human beings. As noted by Minteer and Manning, “God planned all of this explicitly for man’s 
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man’s purposes” 
(2005:95). Minteer and Manning’s conclusion is justified if “to subdue and have dominion over” 
something is to be interpreted as a negative and toxic domination rather than to exercise 
stewardship on something. 
  
Furthermore, the idea that human beings are made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26) 
has often led human beings to underplay the significance of their material nature. Such an 
underplay also points to human beings’ selective reading of the bible. The Bible has a second 
account of the creation of the human person besides the one in Genesis 1:26. According to this 
second account, “the Lord God formed man out of the clay of the ground and blew into his nostrils 
the breath of life, and so man became a living being” (Genesis 2: 7). In this account, clearly human 
beings are part of the natural world and not simply spiritual beings by virtue of the breath they 
received from God. They are matter and spirit in their ontology. Nevertheless, the tendencies to 
dominate and use nature solely for human’s welfare is strengthened by the overplaying of human 
beings’ spiritualistic constitution at the expense of their material constitution.   
 
To note also from the creation story is the view that Adam and Eve’s subsequent expulsion from 
Eden is also tacitly anthropocentric. Because of the actions of two humans, with the aid of the 
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serpent, this world is regarded as a fallen place designed to inflict pain, suffering, and death on 
humans as punishment for their disobedience to God. Nature, in essence, it would seem, is used to 
punish human beings for their sin of disobedience: 
 
And to the man he said, “Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, 
and have eaten of the tree about which I commanded you, ‘You shall not eat of 
it,’ cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of 
your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you; and you shall eat the 
plants of the field” (Genesis 3:17-18).  
 
On the quote above, Charles Ellicott has this to say: 
 
Adam had passively followed her (Eve, his wife) lead in disobeying God’s 
command; and therefore, ‘the ground’ the adamah out of which Adam had been 
formed…becomes unfruitful… Left to itself, it (the ground) will no longer bring 
forth choice trees laden with generous fruit, but the natural tendencies will be to 
degenerate, till ‘thorns’ only ‘and thistles’ usurp the ground (1971:13–14). 
 
Ellicott confirms the biblical author of (Genesis 2) that nature (the ground) was cursed by God, so 
it would not be able to give to humans the benefits of its beauty and productivity. However, it 
could subsist to hold, especially from the theological point of view, that nature – from the Genesis 
account – was employed by God as a punishment tool for humans. On the documentary entries on 
“Fall and Sin” by John L. McKenzie, God’s usage of the natural world to punish human beings 
has led to the triple divisions, namely, between human beings and God; between man and woman 
(as when Adam blamed Eve for the fall); and between human beings and nature (1965:271). Thus, 
in the creation account, disobedience to God was responsible for humans’ estrangement from 
nature, and consequently led to disharmony between nature and humans, and between humans and 
God (McKenzie 1965:271–273). Later in the story of the floods (Genesis 6-8) the writer describes 
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the destruction of the world to punish human wickedness. This also represents another narrative 
that reinforces the cultural worldview that humans are the most important creation on earth.  
 
Another line of thought, from theological parlance, is to see these myriads of events as a form of 
cycle of salvation, aimed at reconciling humans to God. In other words, the punishment for humans 
could be taken as deterrence to forestall humans’ continual separation from God, tacitly intended 
to return humanity to God. However, a critical look at the judgment pronounced by God on 
humans, consequent on humans’ misdeeds, shows that nature is punished to withhold its benefits 
to humans. “And unto Adam He [God] said… cursed is the ground [nature] for thy [humans’] 
sake…” (Genesis 3:17)  
 
It must be noted here that this thesis holds that, although the authors of the biblical narrative of 
creation neither deliberately intends to promote anthropocentrism nor advocate for the abuse or 
misuse of nature, the story however may easily lend itself – from choices of interpretations – to 
anthropocentrism. For ecological philosophers such as Naess, Callicott, the instances highlighted 
above in the creation account validate Lynn White’s claim that “Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen” (quoted in Minteer and Manning 2005:14).  White 
points out that one of the first tasks of the early Christian church was to vanquish the paganism of 
the Greco-Roman world (1967:1203-4). The pre-Christian classical Roman society has a cultural 
life and religion based on the belief system in which every element of nature “has its own genius 
loci, its own guardian spirit” (Harvey 2009:135). Hence, nature in this line of belief system, 
possesses inherent vital living force and is communicative (2009:136). Thus, in Christianity’s 
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triumph over paganism, animism16 was destroyed and replaced by a cultural assumption that nature 
was “inanimate and neuter” (Sheldrake 2001:5). This “de-animation” of nature, Sheldrake argues, 
only exacerbated the separation between humans and nonhumans members of nature, enhancing 
the West’s anthropocentric orientation and leading to a mechanistic theory of nature advanced by 
Enlightenment-era scientists (2001:6).  
 
On the other hand, besides its negative usage in the human-nature relationship, nature, for example, 
‘wilderness’, has a paradoxical status as a place of redemption in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Throughout the Old and New Testaments, prophets, holy worshipers and religious leaders retreat 
to the wilderness for spiritual purification. Notably is the biblical account of Jesus’ retreating into 
the wilderness to be alone for spiritual engagements (Mark 1:13), (Luke 5:16). As well as the 
heavenly visions given in the Biblical account of ‘Revelation’ to John the Beloved17 at the island 
of Patmos (Rev 1:9). Nevertheless, in this more positive view of nature, nature’s value is still 
tacitly anthropocentric. In other words, “nature exists for the benefit of humans to renew their own 
connections with God” (Nash 2001:15).  
 
Furthermore, while Bill McKibben critiqued the “institutional version of Christianity” (McKibben 
2003:25), he also noted that there are traditions within Christianity that are more 
 
16
 Animism is the idea that the universe is a community of living and relating beings, but all of whom deserve respect 
(Nelson 2004:55). In other words, it is the widespread idea that, everything in existence (both humans and nonhuman) 
possesses a spirit, living force or attribute, thus, relates together. This view “enshrines the concept of a limit to human 
utilization and commodification of the world” (Harvey 2009:138). For more on animism, see Harvey, G. 2006. 
Listening People, Speaking Earth: Contemporary Paganism. London: C. Hurst. Also, in Harvey, G. 2009. 
“Paganism.” In J. B. Callicott, and R. Frodeman.(ed.) Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy. Vol. 2, 
Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference, Gale. Pp. 135–38. 
 




environmentalistic. A case in point is the life and teachings of St. Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) – 
a Catholic friar and mystic, whose deep connection to the environment is especially characterised 
in his “Canticle of Brother Sun.18” St. Francis, showed the diversity of creatures as an expression 
of God’s creativity and benevolence (Armstrong and Brady 1982:38). St. Francis in the Canticle 
writes: 
 
Most high, all-powerful, all good, Lord! 
All praise is yours, all glory, all honour and all blessing… 
All praise be yours, my Lord, through all that you have made, 
And first my Brother Sun, 
Who brings the day; and light you give us through him… 
All praise be yours, my Lord, through Sister Moon and Stars; 
In the heavens you have made them, bright and precious and fair… 
All praise be yours, my Lord, through Brothers Wind and Air, 
And fair and stormy, all the weather’s moods, 
By which you cherish all that you have made… 
All praise be yours, my Lord, through Sister Water,  
So useful, lowly, precious and pure… 
All praise be yours, my Lord, through Sister Earth, our mother, 
Who feeds us in her sovereignty and produces 
Various fruits with coloured flowers and herbs… (Francis of Assisi [1225] 
1964:130–31). 
 
Personifying nonhuman creatures with terms known for family relationship, St. Francis as shown 
above, advocate praises to be expressed not only through religious worship, but by acting in 
manners consistent with respect and understanding created diversity. 
 
Obtainable from Francis of Assisi’s canticle is an ecological and environmental proposal, 
wherein all creatures of the world participate in a wide range network of interrelationships. Such 
 
18 Also referred to as The Canticle of the Creatures. This is a poetic or hymnal arrangement written by Francis to 
eulogize the significance of creation, and to elicit the praise of God through His creatures. For further information 
of the “Canticle of Brother Sun”, see Timothy J. Johnson “Francis and Creation” (2012:143–58). 
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relationship is adjudged to engender interrelationship and one that unveils a mutual source of 
life, vitality and existence (Johnson 2012:145). As noted by Keith Warner, “The Franciscan 
understanding of the Incarnation emphasises continuity between humanity, creatures, and 
elements” (2011:2).  
 
McKibben also acknowledges the story of Job as a lesson in respecting the sanctity of the land 
(2003:76). On the contrary, while McKibben recognises the possibility of reforming Western 
religious thought, Craige argues that the “Judeo-Christian tradition is fundamentally dualistic and 
predominantly an harbinger for anthropocentric environmentalism” (2001:12). This view of 
Craige is strengthened by recourse to the argument of Thomas Berry for ecological spiritualism, 
where he argues for a reconstruction of the universe [creation] story to a “new story” (1999:3-4). 
For Berry, the creation story needed a reconstruction to enhance ecological civilization. Giving 
reason for the reconstruction of the creation story, he argues: 
 
Our modern world is not working. Christianity, in this sense, is not working. 
Particularly, there is the inability of the Christian world to respond in an effective 
way to the destruction of the planet. Religion is assuming no responsibility for 
the state of the earth or the fate of the earth  (1999:3). 
 
This state of event, for Berry, calls for a ‘Great Work’, which is about the “transition from a period 
of human devastation of the Earth to a period when humans would be present to the planet in a 
mutually beneficial manner” (1991:143).  
 
In furtherance, Berry noted that such ‘great work’ requires, a collaboration between science and 
religion (1988:112). This collaboration is to ensure that both the scientific and religious 
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community functions to chart an ecological oriented approach for human-nature relationship 
(Berry 1988:112–13). It could thus be observable from the creation narrative and other biblical 
accounts explored above, that the Judeo-Christian tradition may be incapable of adopting a holistic 
perspective essential for sustainable environmental practice. Although the Genesis account had 
some other theological benefits regarding the redemptive plan for humanity, it nevertheless 
appears overtly anthropocentric. In short, from some scriptural passages of Judaism and 
Christianity it could be argued that the two religions have transformed the relationship that 
Western culture had with the nonhuman members of the environment to the degree that the Judaeo-
Christian tradition could be adjudged as anti-environmentalist for their stance towards elevating 
humanity above all other members of the earth. The creation narrative in Genesis, with its emphasis 
upon the control and usage of nature by humans appears to provide the justification for felling 
trees and timber in the forests, creation of roads through the wilds, and the extermination of earth 
living plants, insects and animals. The above traditions have been described by Joseph Campbell 
as the “socially-oriented mythology” (2001:5) of a mobile people. This he opined, is in contrast 
with the nature-oriented mythology of an earth-cultivating society (Campbell 2001:5). To this end, 
one could thus adjudge Sheldrake to be right in his opinion that Judeo-Christian anthropocentrism 
has the onus of “an immense burden of guilt” for the ecological crisis (2001:7).  
 
3.2.2. Cartesianism and the culture of utility 
Having shown above that traditional Western intellectual orientations as well as religion are 
anthropocentric, the intellectual project of René Descartes will be explored here as a prototype of 
such anthropocentrism. The exploration is to show that Cartesianism provides, to a large extent, 
the framework for anthropocentricism. In other words, the idea of the culture of the use of nature 
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may be traceable to the epistemological theory of Descartes (1596-1650), popularly known as 
‘foundationalism’.  
 
Descartes starts-off  out to launch a knowledge system purely established on the certainty of truth 
via elimination of doubts or errors (Williams 1999:xiii). One could hold that for Descartes, the 
search for certainty is the quest for knowledge. He thus sought to establish an evident truth, “the 
foundation”  from which all other truth derives (1999:I; 18). Walter O’Briant captured this view 
well when he argued: 
 
 With a brashness and optimism typical of the early modern period… Descartes 
took upon himself the task of reconstituting philosophy so as to ensure a firm 
foundation upon which to erect a sound superstructure (1980:79–80).  
 
This view of Descartes is encapsulated in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1999) which he 
wrote in 1641. In the First Meditation, Descartes decides to set aside previously held beliefs or 
any opinion opened to doubt and skeptical challenge (1999:I; 18). He further argues that the 
existence of an external world is open to doubt, and that the experience of the world may turn out 
to be part of a dream (1999:I; 19). Moreover, the entire external world may be a “… fiction induced 
in him by a deceiving evil demon” (1999:II; 24,25). One could therefore hold that, Cartesianism, 
as it were, raised the stance of modern skepticism against the reality of the external world. 
 
In the Second Meditation, Descartes establishes that to be deceived in the manner expressed in the 
previous meditation, he must exist as a conscious thinker (1999: II; 25). In other words, the result 
of his methodic doubt is due to the certainty of his own existence which lies in the dictum “ego 
cogito ergo sum”: “I am, I exist” (1999: II; 25). In another translation, this is stipulated as: “I 
78 
 
think, therefore, I exist” (1998:107). Based on this certainty about his own conscious existence 
and the undoubted knowledge of the reality of who he is – ‘a thing which thinks’ – Descartes 
reveals the existence of a non-deceiving God who guarantees the truism of any claim that he 
“clearly and distinctly perceives” (1999: II; 28). God’s non-deception thus enables Descartes to 
re-establish that an external material world exists (1998:109). Consequent upon this phase of The 
Meditations, there are two most fundamental facts, as confirmed by O’Briant, that shape the 
thought processes of humans, as well as their relationships with the nonhuman environment. (1) 
That humans are “essentially a soul” (since only souls can think), and that (2) “the external world—
which is material—is less than myself—which is spiritual” ( O’Briant 1980:83). In fact, Descartes 
clearly stated that the external nonhuman world is a mere fiction of the mind created by the 
imaginations of the mind for the satisfaction of the creative thought processes of the thinking 
being: ‘man’.19  
 
Furthermore, Descartes reiterates the fact that rationality, thinking, consciousness and thought-
configurations are the indices of determining humans from nonhumans (1999:II;85-88). 
Conceptualisation  existence is indeed premised on thinking; to think is to live. Thus, if the external 
world is the fiction of the thinking being, one could hold that the external world – in the framework 
of Cartesianism – is of less importance in value, magnitude and consideration. Hence, the 
justification is provided for the most superior thinking beings – humans – to fashion out how best 
to use the nonhuman, non-thinking substances or parts of the world, even if only for the benefit of 
humans. Of a striking note is a particular point in the conclusion of the Second Meditations that 
“…bodies …are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only because they are 
 
19 “…I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and place are merely fictions of my mind” (Descartes 1998:111). 
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understood or rightly comprehended by thought” (Descartes 1999:II; 34). In other words, the only 
justification for the existence – and if there would be, importance – of the external world is that 
which lies at the mercy of the thinking mind of humans. Since the existence of the external world 
is dependent upon the perception and imagination of the mind, any value, at all, that is ascribable 
to the nonhuman world would be one that serves anthropocentric ends.  
 
These views of Descartes’ could be seen as completely antithetical to those of authors of current 
trends of environmental philosophy and a sound ground for anthropocentrism (Curley 2006:732). 
One could then hold that the thoughts of René Descartes are clearly reflected in the positions that 
humans are essentially unique creatures that are not a part of nature. In other words, the human 
has a soul – precisely ‘a rational soul’ – and a faculty which sets humanity apart from all other 
creatures and the entirety of nature. These philosophical views dominated Modernity, becoming 
the “common-sense views of succeeding centuries and have persisted relatively unchanged into 
the contemporary time” (Curley 2006:757). 
 
Descartes’ basic views – as encapsulated in the Meditations – could be held as the idea fuelling 
his doctrines about nature. The external world that Descartes reintroduces toward the end of The 
Meditations is very different from the natural world of his medieval predecessors. As argued by 
David Bradshaw, Medieval scholars,  in Aristotelian style, presented living things as “having 
specific sets of capacities” (2004:78). Aristotle adjudged various forms of capacities for different 
types or kinds of beings in existence. Thus the capacity of any being, is determined by its form of 
existence (Aristotle 1926:C; 2,4,,12. Z 1). Bradshaw gave a clear example on this: “blades of grass 
have the capacity for nutrition and growth; cats also have those of nutrition and growth and 
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additional capacities of movement and sensation; and so on” (2004:99). Humans on the other hand, 
possess the capacities of nutrition, growth, movement, and sensation, as well as the unique capacity 
to reason (2004:100). In contrast, Descartes was a supporter of the scientific revolution that 
replaced Aristotle’s views with a conception of nature as wholly mechanical in character (1999:II; 
26). Thus, the external world reintroduced in his Meditations consists of ‘dead’ matter whose 
behaviour can be understood by reference to a set of mathematical laws (1999:VI; 72-3). O’Briant 
also pointed out that The Meditations is seen as privileging the conscious thinker and his or her 
experiences over the dead material world, which is seen as the ‘other’ that lies outside the mind 
(1980:81). This is a pointer to the fact that, although Descartes saw human beings as composites 
of mind and matter, he however ascribes moral standing to them solely on the grounds that they 
have minds and are capable of conscious experience (1999:VI; 86, 88).  
 
Again, Descartes’ idea that the entire physical universe, of which animals are parts, is mere matter 
governed by the uniform set of mechanical laws, necessitates thoughts that enunciate nature as 
lacking moral standing. As such, nature is instrumental only as an object for human exploitation. 
As a matter of fact, Descartes’ epistemological project constructed a superstructure for knowledge, 
setting the foundation upon the thinking ability of humans. In other words, if humans can think, 
and the external world is the creation of their imagination, then humans could be said to be justified 
in thinking out the ways of using the external world.  
 
The corollary of the Cartesian thought-processes recapitulate into the mentality of “use and 
continuous use of the environment that permeates through various ages of human development 
right from the modern period” (Wee 2001:34). This careless attitude towards the environment, 
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evident even in the contemporary time, is reinforced by the notion that virgin territory will always 
be open for human’s expiration and exploitation whenever their surroundings are depleted of the 
element needed to sustain their livelihood (O’Briant 1980:85). Hence the appealed view of Lewis 
Mumford (2009:88) that “today’s scientific and technological world operates largely with a 
frontier mentality”. This mentality is a human-centred view characterized by three precepts: first, 
it sees the world as an “unlimited supply of resources for human’s use with the basic premise that 
there is always more” (2009:86). In other words, from this worldview, nature is seen as a means 
of fulfilling human needs. For example, the European settlers in North America, Mumford argued, 
“cut down the forest and grew crops on the soil until the nutrients had been eroded away by rain. 
After this, they headed into new territory and begin the cycle again” (2009:86). In the industrial 
world of today, it is no different, as there is an unrelenting and irrational commitment to maximum 
material output and consumption. That commitment implies a focus mainly on the internal cost20 
of production and distribution of finished goods. 
 
Secondly, the frontier mentality views humans as a being that exists apart from nature, rather than 
as part of it. By the tenets of this view, humans are separate from nature; our chief role, then, 
becomes one of domineering over nature. With such a mentality, feeling separate from nature and 




20 “Internal costs” are directly required to effect the production of goods and services. Internal costs are price 
determining costs. It is used here to drive home the profit-maximization orientation undergirding the industrial and 
capitalistic world, where cost is effective only for production without much consideration of the social and 
environmental effects of production.  
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The third perspective of the human-centred mentality takes nature as something to overcome. As 
a matter of fact, this is the belief that there is always more to consume, more to control, more to 
use and more to destroy (2009:87-89). The nonhuman natural world, for instance, is often viewed 
as having no value outside of the anthropocentric ends – what they could produce for humans in 
the forms of food, research, or entertainment.  The anthropocentric paradigm of the use of the 
natural environment, deems the natural world as a means to satisfying human wants and needs. 
Such nature-usage perceptions are often oblivious to the repercussions of the exploitative actions 
that characterise feats of technological inventions. It has been shown that Western intellectual 
culture – even as structured on the traditional foundations of Cartesianism – does not provide the 
framework that could create or influence the advancement of a caring, loving and symbiotic 
relationship with nature.  
 
In the next section, we will explore the intellectual development of the ‘Enlightenment’ and its 
effect on the human-nature relationship. The reason for this is that the intellectual foundation as 
well as resources for conceptualising thoughts in the enlightenment were largely informed by 
Cartesianism. Hence in the next phase of our discussion on the epistemological foundation for the 
environmental crisis, we shall explore the relationship between Cartesianism and the 
Enlightenment. This is germane so that we might unearth the ground for the main weapon of 
humans against the environment: science and technology. 
 
3.2.3. The Enlightenment foundation for science and technology 
By the end of the seventeenth century, scientific knowledge, and Cartesianism had become 
universal properties of the educated class; and a new literature began to arise, that is encyclopaedic 
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in its aims, anti-authoritarian in its preconceptions and outspoken in its style (Cassirer 2009:137). 
The ideas of this epoch remain “decidedly clear, elegant, haughty and ironical” (2009:138). 
Cassirer (2009:139) further noted that the ‘philosophies’, as they came to be known, stand at the 
end of a century in which intellectual, political and moral revolutions had upset the authority of 
Church and State. The Cartesian philosophic method raised the stance of Modern skepticism about 
any concept or thought that could not be backed either by reason or experiment, thus, the 
philosophies that engender the Enlightenment were largely shaped intellectually, by Cartesianism. 
However, by now this skepticism, separated from the intellectual accomplishment of the 
metaphysics which stemmed from it, had become a literary device, a means to sustain a detached 
attitude of rational unbelief, and institutionalised a systematic development for science and 
technology (2009:139). As noted by Adorno and Horkheimer, the “philosophies and the figures of 
the literary Enlightenment, authors of literary masterpieces as diverse as Voltaire’s Le Siècle de 
Louis XIV and Diderot’s Le Neveu de Rameau, would not have existed but for the decades of 
Cartesian metaphysics which cleared the intellectual air for them” (2016: 257).  
 
Historically, the heliocentric theory developed by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) marked the 
commencement of the “scientific revolution” (Cassirer 2009:145). Based on experimentation and 
reason, the scientific revolution questioned previously held truths, reconsidered opinion and 
speculations about nature and calls for new answers. The scientific revolution helped to shape the 
Enlightenment. As it was to be in every intellectual epoch, many people were involved in its 
articulation, and laid diverse emphasis on different aspects of human thoughts. For example, 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) made the first systematic studies of uniformly accelerated motion and 
improved astronomical observations, which helped to support Copernicanism. Edmond Halley 
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(1656-1742) discovered the proper motion of ‘stars’ and the periodicity of ‘comets’ (Cassirer 
2009:1.38-145). Other significant “scientific advances were made by Johannes Kepler (1571-
1630), Francis Bacon (1588-1679), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Robert Hooke (1635-1703), and 
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716)” to mention but a few (Adorno and Horkheimer 2016:92). As a 
matter of fact, Francis Bacon (1651-1626) was one of the prominent figures of Western Modernity 
at the birth of the Age of Enlightenment (science and technology) (Briggs 2013a:24). 
 
Bacon advocated thoughtful and systematic applications of science to the natural world. Such 
application for Bacon must however be in the sole interest of humans; for the “love of humanity” 
(philanthropia)21. In the first book of His celebrated Novum Organum, Bacon’s anthropocentrism 
comes to the fore: 
 
Aphorism I 
Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands only as 
much as he has observed of the order of nature in fact or by inference; he does 
not know and cannot do more. 
III 
Human knowledge and human power come to the same thing… For Nature is 
conquered only by obedience; and that which in thought is a cause, is like a rule 
in practice. 
IV 
All man can do to achieve results is to bring natural bodies together and take 
them apart; Nature does the rest internally (Bacon 2012:33). 
 
Again, in the second book of the Novum Organum, Bacon averred:  
 
 
21 Bacon’s conception of philanthropia is what contemporary environmental philosophers call “anthropocentrism,” 




Directions for the interpretation of nature comprehend in general terms two 
parts: the first for drawing axioms from experience; the second on deducing or 
deriving new experiments from axioms (2012:109). 
 
Bacon in the above, sets the standard for the considerability of nature’s usefulness. If the only 
means or reasons for comprehending nature is for the sake of experimentation and deducing of 
axioms, then nature lacks self-enforcing inherent values and humans are justified for their 
interpretation and usage of nature. Descartes’s perception of humans as “masters” with rationality 
to lord and use the material and mechanical nature syncs with Bacon’s view of philanthropia.22 It 
could thus be obtainable, from the themes of these two founders of modern science and technology 
that anthropocentrism governed the spirit of Western science and technology. Such view sync with  
Briggs’ (2013a:59), who observes that the intellectual and practical roots of the environmental 
crisis may be found in the Enlightenment.  
 
Isaac Newton (1643-1727) in his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica explores the 
possibility of mechanistic explanations of nature. He combined mathematics of self-evident proof 
with mechanics of physical observation in order to establish a coherent system of verifiable 
predictions of nature (Jeans 2012:110). Sir James Jeans argues that Newton’s claim came from a 
“systematic application of algebra to geometry, which synthesised a workable calculus applicable 
to scientific problems” (2012:119). It should be noted here that; the arrays of innovations and 
 
22
 Francis Bacon, as noted by Hwa Yol Jung, master-minded and spearheaded an industrial civilization grounded 
firmly on scientific and technological advancement (2009:87). For Bacon, to create and apply technology, there 
must first be a knowledge of the world, obtained by what he called ‘‘the inquisition of nature” (Bacon 
2012:34).Nature must be interpreted to reveal her secrets (Bacon 2012:109).And by increasing knowledge 
through experiment, humans extend their dominion over inert nature (Bacon 2012:33). By positing utility as the end 
of knowledge, Bacon laid the foundation of humans’ ability to “subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries 
of humanity, through the use of nature”. See Eiseley, Loren. 1999. Francis Bacon and the Modern Dilemma. 




inventions of the enlightenment had significant effect on both commerce and philosophy. In the 
first flush of scientific confidence, scholars of the Enlightenment tried to carry over the quest for 
first principles into every human intellectual endeavour, which had been attended with such 
success in Newton’s physics. This quest is engendered by a skeptical attitude towards authority, 
rejecting whatever it is that has no verifiable foundation in experience. Hence, the Enlightenment’s 
project of favouring reason and rationality and the subsequent emphasis on the scientific method, 
as the most secure way of attaining objective knowledge, gave rise to Modern science. This sort 
of worldview would also be part of the fulcrum of ideas behind Logical Positivism (later Neo-
Positivism) that, true thoughts are empirical and empirical verification became the criteria for 
knowledge justification (Carnap 1936:419–20). In other words, anything outside the use of the 
scientific process is deemed to be meaningless. 
 
Subsequently, a scientific and technological worldview was instituted in the quest for Modernity. 
With various form of innovations and discoveries, the ground was prepared for the provision of 
the means to achieving a modernised, industrial world. However, the new ideas instituted by the 
scientists and philosophers of the seventeenth century had little direct influence on the lives of 
most people, as “science then [did] not really enjoy the unified, objective and widely accepted 
status it has now” (Achterhuis 2001: 14).  
 
But this fact is certainly not true of the innovations that science made possible in the eighteen to 
nineteenth century, as I will explain. The textile industry was the first to be transformed, using 
water and steam to power new kinds of machinery, and also through the organisation of works in 
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the factories where disciplined labour were made available (2001:100). This growth had a 
multiplying effect. Charles Boyle and Peter Wheale pointed this out when they opined: 
 
As cotton sales shot up, so too did the production of coal and iron. Chemical 
industries developed to manufacture the acids and alkalis, bleaches and dyes 
necessary to treat the cotton. A machine-tool industry grew to provide for the 
increasing demand for machinery… the period of expanding railway systems that 
spread out in great networks across the continents of the world, and in 
conjunction with the electric telegraph, revolutionised communications. 
Improved agricultural techniques were introduced to feed the increasing 
population displaced to the towns from the country sides (2001:102–3).   
 
Indeed, it could be held that the approach to the world right from the Enlightenment era is basically 
technological. This is so as intellectual efforts are geared towards essentially forging an alliance 
between certainty of knowledge and changing the world. The commitment to scientific 
technological inventions gave the impetus that characterized all forms of human development right 
from the Modern period to the contemporary industrial and subsequent post-industrial world.  
 
Perhaps the most striking characteristics of science and technology over the last century are the 
expansions of the extent of scientific and technological knowledge and the change in the economic 
and social-ideological contexts within which scientific work is carried out (2001:57). First, in the 
natural sciences, as opined by Boyle and Wheale, there has been the astonishing revolution 
associated with the theory of relativity and quantum theory, providing a sharp break with 
Newtonian mechanics and classical physics: laying sound frameworks for all future research in 
physics (2001:47). The growth of biological sciences, biochemistry, organic chemistry and interest 
in the workings of genetics have produced descriptions of phenomena associated with cells that 
are more chemical and molecular, and less concerned with problems such as consciousness or 
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mind. For instance, cloning, genetic engineering, bio-fuels, to mention but a few. More so, the 
development of the electron microscope and X-ray radiography, and the discovery of the structure 
of DNA provides a great contribution to these mechanistic tendencies, as systemic and electronic 
interpretation of the human anatomy and neuron cycles is made available. The triumphs of 
technology in the twentieth century are well known. A few important developments include: the 
introduction of electronics, radio, airplanes, automobiles, television electronic communications, 
synthetic materials such as nylon, plastic and many others, artificial fertilisers, space technology 
and exploration, medicines and medical transplants, developed computers, information 
technology, increasing automation, and many more. The growth, development and sustainability 
of life and progress of this contemporary world, founded upon Modern hopes in the efficacy of 
science and technology cannot be overestimated. Indeed, that science and technology has grown 
in its scope, contents, contexts and in the resources it consumes, is obvious. It needs to be stressed 
here, that it is this commitment to science and technology that embodies the main thrust of the 
human-centred usage of nature and all other forms of nonhuman natural environments 
 
However, casting a dark shadow over the series of scientific innovations and advantages associated 
therewith, are the ills and adverse effects of technology. These defects of scientific and 
technological inventions live with us today. It becomes worrisome, as our lives are wedged around 
using science and technology. Many of these ills and defects are characterized by nuclear 
stockpiles and their threat of unparalleled destruction; challenges of other complex weapons and 
mass ownership of cars. Some others include; the unbridled use of nonhuman resources, and other 
forms of environmentally unfriendly effects of science and technology, many of which were 
touched on in the second chapter of this research. One can, therefore, submit that the commitment 
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to science and technology – along with ensuing queries regarding the problems and challenges that 
technology produces – gave impetus to the significance of issues in the philosophy of technology, 
as well as in environmental philosophy. 
 
3.3. Western traditional epistemology 
In this section, an examination of the traditional epistemology of the Western orientation will be 
attempted. The aim here is to show the prevalent intellectual stance of the human-nature 
detachment in the epistemological postulations of the traditional Western orientation. As will be 
rightly shown below, the various genres of the two main camps of the Western epistemic positions 
– rationalism and empiricism – advocate for the subject-object dichotomy. Each gives primus to 
the subject’s cognitive as well as experiential position in the acquisition and justification of 
knowledge claims, and with little or no consideration for the object; the framework for the human-
nature separation was established. In other words, the epistemological project of the Western 
traditional orientation, though not explicitly stated, could be seen as an intellectual framework for 
the understanding of nature as that which is apart or detached from humans. The external world, 
being treated as less essential in the epistemological process, entrenches an understanding or 
attitude of care-freeness or insignificance for the environment, hence, the misuse thereof. 
 
The word ‘epistemology’ etymologised from conjoining two Greek words: episteme and logos: 
meaning ‘knowledge’ and ‘theory’ respectively. Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is the 
branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions 
and bases, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge (Klein 1999:2493). Epistemology is 
concerned with the definition of knowledge and related concepts, the sources and criteria of 
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knowledge, the kinds of knowledge possible and the degree to which each is certain, and the exact 
relation between the one who knows, and the object known (1999:2494). Epistemology, as a study 
into the theory and idea of knowledge, includes the attempts to refute skepticism, justifying the 
possibility of knowledge claims; and then proceeds to clarify the nature and the scope of 
knowledge. The standard analysis of knowledge claims in the Platonic format, is that it is justified 
true belief (Rowe 2015:89). This is a definition initiated by Plato in the Theatetus (Plato 2008) 
(Rowe 2015:89), although it is challenged most recently by Gettier’s problem (Gettier 2017 :69–
71).23 However, this definition has engendered a series of philosophic analyses, especially on the 
relation between knowledge and belief, between knowledge and truth, and between knowledge 
and justification. The last issue is especially central. In a sense, epistemology pays more attention 
to the problem of what it is to be justified in believing than to knowledge per se. Another main 
task of epistemology concerns “the origin of knowledge, that is, to assess the role of sense and 
reason in the acquisition of knowledge” (Bunnin and Jiyuan 2004:218).  
 
The Platonic account of knowledge is articulated in a manner that places knowledge in a place that 
is far removed from the physical entities and everyday activities of human life. Knowledge for 
Plato is a form of ascent that is detached from the shadowy and confusing particulars of the 
everyday world. Hence, as shown in the Republic, Plato noted that arriving at knowledge requires 
a rational and arduous struggle to climb out of the darkness of the cave into the light of a very 
different kind of world (Plato 1961a:517–c). Thus, it is expected that the rational powers of the 
 
23 Edmund Gettier in his 1963 famous three-page article had presented some objections aimed specifically at the 
traditional normative accounts of epistemology, which is largely foundationalist in outlook. Thereof, he pointed out 
that a false belief can be supposedly justified, and its justificatory status can be transferred to another proposition 
through deduction or other principles of inference  (Gettier 2017:70). This, he argued, would seem that the inferred 
proposition is true, justified and believed, but it clearly is not knowledge, since it was inferred from a false 
proposition that appears true by mere coincidence (Gettier 2017:71). 
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human mind must transcend to a different realm of existence that is different from the everyday 
appearances of the world. The process to acquiring knowledge is further enunciated in the Phaedo. 
To gain knowledge, it is essential that there is a “[separation of] the soul as much as possible from 
the body and accustoming it [the soul/mind] to withdraw from all contact with the body and 
concentrate itself by itself, and to have its dwelling, so far as it can, both now and in the future, 
alone by itself, freed from the shackles of the body” (Plato 1961b:67c-d). As noted by Preston, 
what is needed for knowledge, from the platonic base of traditional Western thought, is to 
“disengage from everything about us that is human and physical, and using reason – a gift from 
the gods – as a conduit back up towards truths located somewhere else entirely” (2003:6). Preston’s 
observation is significant if one considers Plato’s idea of a person who holds claim to knowledge. 
Such a person in the words of Plato is one who “grows wings… [and] stands outside human 
concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed and rebuke him for 
this, unaware that he is possessed by the god” (Plato 1995:249b). Thus, it could be held that 
epistemology, fashioned along the Platonic thoughts, presented a state of detachment between 
epistemic subject and epistemic object of the external world. With true knowledge residing in the 
forms, Plato makes knowledge acquisition a pure subject-oriented function, without consideration 
for, and thus detachment from the physical world (Preston 2003:6-7). 
 
Aristotle, in his denial of the coherence and usefulness of the Platonic separation of the worlds of 
forms and of the physical could be adjudged to have removed the dualistic dichotomy 
characterizing knowledge acquisition. However, the Aristotelian reintroduction of the forms also 
made his epistemic postulation unfit for extrapolation to environmentalism. For Aristotle, to have 
knowledge claims of any object whatsoever, the rational part of the soul must be “capable of 
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receiving the form of an object” (Aristotle 1941:429a15). In other words, though Aristotle seems 
to underline the significance of the material concrete object of the world, he seems to be over-
privileging the grasping of the form over and above the material object that the forms is about. As 
noted by Preston, the form in the Aristotelian schema “still had a universality to it that it had to be 
something distinct from the physical object itself” (2003:7). For Aristotle, knowing an object 
means knowing its form, hence the process to know does not have anything to do with the body. 
In other words, knowing “cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with any part of the physical 
body” (1941:429a25). Underlying this epistemic conception of Aristotle, as with Plato, though to 
a different degree, is the privileging of the soul/mind over the body/matter. This is a dichotomy 
that fuels, as will be shown below, the subject-object detachment, as well as the ill consideration 
of the external world as something not only apart from the human, but has no input in the process 
of knowledge acquisition. 
 
In the Modern era, the grasping of the forms is still retained as the goal of epistemology. Modern 
epistemologists being divided into rationalists and empiricists with respect to this issue, 
transliterated the ‘Forms’ of Plato into ‘Ideas’ (Preston 2003:8). René Descartes in his exposition 
of rationalism argued that “whatever is immediately perceived by the mind” is ‘idea’ (Descartes 
1998a:132). In the same vein, for John Locke, an Empiricist, idea is “Whatsoever is the Object of 
understanding when a Man thinks” (Locke 1975:552). Obtainable from the Moderns is the 
continual privileging of ‘idea’ over the physical object. ‘Idea’ thus becomes the main road the 
human mind must travel in the journey of knowledge acquisition. To the rationalist, reason – an 
act of the mind – alone is the process of acquiring knowledge, while for the empiricists, the 
grasping of the ‘idea’ through sense experience is the source of knowledge. Either way, the 
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mind/subject still play a sole and privileged role in the acquisition of knowledge over the external 
world/object. In other words, the subject-object distinction gets significantly grounded. Regarding 
this subject/object; mind/body distinction, Preston argues: 
 
The modern picture assumed that the mind possessed something like an inner 
eye of its own that operated separately from the eyes of the body. This inner eye 
could look upon the different simple and complex ideas that appeared in front of 
it and make knowledge claims about them… Knowledge occurred when the mind 
has made a correct judgment that the idea it saw with its inner eye accurately 
represented something in the world outside (2003:9). 
 
The mind/body; subject/object; human/nature detachment theme ran through the intellectual 
heritage of traditional Western philosophy. This dichotomy got more driven home in the 
epistemological postulations of traditional Western scholars. However, this study is focused 
mainly on the traditional epistemological project of the Modern period, and how it set forth a 
grand-totalising base for anthropocentrism. This focus is further narrowed down to Cartesian 
epistemology, especially as it unveils the subject/object distinction. 
 
3.3.1. Cartesian dualism re-examined 
The dualism and mechanism of Descartes’ philosophy, from his lifetime to the contemporary time, 
has continued to provoke a series of objections and discussions. In this section,  our focus will be 
on a response to Cartesianism that is somewhat less well-known than others (Ryle 2009:1–12).24 
The response and critique of Anne Conway (1631-1679) to Descartes’s philosophy will be the 
 
24 There are other well-known critiques of Cartesianism, chief of which is Gilbert Ryle’s “Dogma of the Ghost in 




primary focus here (Coudert, Allison. and Corse 2003).25 Conway’s reaction to Descartes is 
interesting because she speaks out of an intellectual tradition different from those of many other 
philosophers who discussed Descartes’ ideas. In addition, she makes use of a pre-modern, non-
abstract idea of spirit, a conceptualisation which has been lost or side-lined in the philosophical 
tradition after Descartes (White 2008:34). Conway, questioning the assumptions underlying 
dualism and Descartes view of spiritual substance, presented an ontological perspective of matter 
and spirit in a form that is alien to Cartesianism.   
 
For Conway, there is no distinction of substances, as there is only one substance. Arguing for the 
component of this single substance to be both matter and spirit, Conway posits:   
 
From what hath been lately said, and from diverse reasons alleged, that Spirit 
and Body are originally in their first Substance but one and the same thing. It 
evidently appears that the philosophers (so called) which have thought 
otherwise…have generally erred and laid an ill Foundation in the very beginning 
(Conway 1982:221). 
 
She expressly directed her critique at Descartes as she notes further: 
 
And none can object that all this philosophy is no other than of Descartes, or 
Hobbes under a new Mask. For first, as touching the Cartesian philosophy, this 
said that every Body is a dead Mass, not only void of all kind of Life and Sense, 
but utterly (uncapable) thereof to all Eternity; this grand (Error) also is to be 




25 For a short biography of Anne Conway by Loptson as well as contemporary and later accounts, see: P. Loptson, 
1982. "Introduction" to Anne Conway, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. The 
Hague/Boston/London/Martinus Nijhoff, Pp. 5-8. In addition, a good source of information on Conway is M. H. 
Nicolson 1992. The Conway Letters. The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their 
Friends 1642-1684. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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In her analysis of Conway’s philosophy, Carol Wayne (White 2008:78) argues against the 
inconsistency of dualism. For her, dualism is self-defeating as it erroneously assumes a particular 
location for soul or spirit, while at the same time denying spiritual substance of having the status 
of divisibility and extension. She further argues: 
 
Dualism results in mechanism because it makes too sharp a distinction between 
body and soul, thus regarding the body as a mechanical machine and the soul as 
something which is not integrally related to the body… Dualism cannot account 
for the interaction between mind and body. The two substances of which a dualist 
speaks are defined on the basis of the exclusion of characteristics. But the two 
things which have nothing in common cannot influence each other causally 
(2008:79–80).  
 
A striking anti-anthropocentric point to note in Conway’s idea is that she was able to put forth a 
philosophy that engenders an interrelationship between humans and other creatures. In other 
words, there was no sort of demarcation between human and nonhuman beings. For her, “…all 
Kinds of Creatures may be changed into another…[because] the nature of a Creature is to be 
changeable” (1982:224). The essential point of Conway’s anti-Cartesianism is better shown in 
Sarah Hutton’s article. Hutton noted that Conway’s opinion is that matter and spirit are not two 
totally different entities, but that they share the characteristic of having extension, penetrability, 
and divisibility (1995:380) 
  
There seems to be little doubt that this is true of matter, at least down to the smallest particle levels, 
but what of spirit? It may seem that Conway’s ether-like – or particle – view of spirit is outdated, 
not fitting into the Modernity of Descartes’ conceptualisation of the soul as completely immaterial. 
Yet, contemporary philosophers have not gotten much further in answering the ontological 
question “what is spirit?” (Heidegger 1959); (Benningtong 1993); (Derrida 1995); (Ross 2008); 
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(Nuzzo 2013). This could well be partly due to the fact that we are encouraged by the Cartesian 
tradition to see spirit strictly – from the dualistic perspective – in a non-concrete way. As a matter 
of fact, this strict duality at the core of Cartesian thinking, introduced by Plato and developed by 
St Paul and Descartes, dichotomised reality “between self and world, between spirit and matter, 
between mind and body” (Craige 2001:22).  
 
We have seen the importance of traditional Western epistemology in proffering foundations for 
anthropocentric environmentalism. Further, it has been shown how the thought-process of the 
Modern era, dovetailing into the preoccupations of the Enlightenment Age, gave impetus to the 
establishment of science and technology as the main instrument of dominating the environment. 
We shall next critique Western anthropocentric environmentalism and the epistemological 
framework establishing it. 
 
3.4. The effects of Western epistemology on environmentalism 
This section examines the fact that the intractable environmental crisis we have today is the product 
of various assumptions buried deep within Western epistemology. The purpose here is to question 
traditional Western epistemology, especially as stipulated in the epistemic project of Descartes, as 
well as subsequent intellectual feats of the Enlightenment. The plausibility of the critique is to 
show that traditional Western epistemology lacks the theoretical and conceptual framework 
suitable for the development of attitudes that enhance respect or love for nature and the nonhuman 
environment in general. Karen Warren in her Ecofeminist Philosophy, (2000), clearly noted that 
“the three streams of ‘radical environmental philosophy’—deep ecology, social ecology and eco-
feminism, though of different philosophical perspectives share in common a critique of Western 
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traditional philosophy’s role in the contemporary environmental crisis” (2000: 86). A critical view 
into the rubrics of traditional Western epistemology, even as shown above, reveals facts and ideas 
that indict traditional Western epistemology, and the subsequent contemporary society for their 
destruction of both human and nonhuman communities. Western philosophy – or what Freya 
Mathews called “the dominant worldview” (2005:197) – is the basic belief that informs 
contemporary society and its institutions. No single term adequately describes this “worldview”. 
While Fritjof Capra identified such a philosophical perspective as “Enlightenment in the Cartesian, 
and Newtonian forms of thinking” (1982:57), Betty Jean Craige has described it as “hierarchical, 
atomistic, and dualistic” (1992:15).  
 
The reason why this ‘worldview’ is sometimes called ‘Enlightenment thinking’, is because this set 
of beliefs reached a level of stability during the late eighteenth century. More specifically, the 
evolution of the mechanistic view of the world became the dominant metaphor of Modernity. 
Many of the accomplishments of this era are due to the culmination of the writings of Copernicus, 
Galileo, Newton, Bacon, and René Descartes. However, because Descartes developed the 
“analytic method of reasoning” implicit in mechanistic thinking (Capra 1982:54), many eco-
philosophers call this dominant Western philosophy “Cartesianism” (Naess 1989:39); (Sheldrake 
2001:49) and (Oelschlaeger 2001: 85).  
 
Perhaps the oldest and most fundamental characterisation of Cartesian thinking is that it is 
anthropocentric. As noted in the second chapter of this thesis, anthropocentrism is a worldview 
that assumes the superiority to and separation of humans from nature. From this viewpoint, a world 
without humans would cease to have a reason to be.  Hence, humans in all ages live with the 
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mentality that justifies the use of nature to an abusive level. This view is aired by Robert Sheldrake 
in his The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God. He averred that the effect of the 
human alteration of the environment was significant even in the Palaeolithic era (2001:12). Though 
Palaeolithic societies “seem to have lived in greater harmony with nature than agricultural societies 
or urban civilisations, they still appear to have wrought major changes in their environments” 
(2001: 36). Among the changes were species extinctions through overhunting and habitat alteration 
by intentional burning (Sheldrake 2001:37). Most surprisingly, “much of the world’s 
desertification may have been aggravated by the activities of prehistoric man” (2001:38). The 
difference between then and now, however, is the vast increase in human power, fuelled by the 
development of technology. 
 
However, there have been contrary positions from various environmentalist scholars, emphasising 
the fact that humans are not very significant to the existence of the world. Christopher Manes 
points out: 
 
[If] fungus, one of the ‘lowliest’ of forms on a humanistic scale of values, were 
to go extinct tomorrow, the effect on the rest of the biosphere would be 
catastrophic, since the health of forests depend on Mycorrhyzal fungus, and the 
disappearance of forests would upset the hydrology, atmosphere, and 
temperature of the entire globe. In contrast, if Homo sapiens disappeared, the 
event would go virtually unnoticed by the vast majority of Earth’s life forms 
(Manes 1996:15–16).  
 
The above quotation calls for the need to query the philosophical framework justifying 
anthropocentric environmentalism—the worldview that espouses the continuous use of the 
nonhuman world for the benefit of humans alone. The reason is that the traditional epistemological 
framework underlies the outlook which enhances the reasoning that the earth’s resources, both 
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organic and inorganic, are meant for human consumption. In fact, traditional Western 
epistemology proffers the epistemic realities that do not give room for the extension of ethical 
consideration even to nonhuman members of the whole earth.  
 
Historically, anthropocentrism originates in ancient Greece and develops through the rest of 
recorded history. A profound articulation of the culture of the misuse of nature in the Western 
tradition can be found in Aristotle’s Politics, where he argues: 
 
It is also from natural causes that some being commands and others obey, that 
each may obtain their mutual safety; for a being who is endowed with a mind 
capable of reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor, 
whereas, he whose excellence is mere corporeal is formed to be a slave. 
.…plants exist for the sake of animals and animals for the sake of man, the tame 
for use and for, the wild, if not all, at least the great part of them, for food, and 
for the provision of clothing and various instruments (1928:14–16)  
 
Inextricably bound to the ideas of dualism and the hierarchisation of being that developed 
throughout antiquity, is the idea that the universe is a machine – a concept that originated in the 
sixteenth-century (Henry 2002:161). In Descartes’ time, there was a general fascination with the 
mechanical functioning of clocks (Craige 1992:98). Clocks’ design quickly became a dominant 
metaphor for how the world functioned—as an enormous timepiece that continued to spin through 
the movements of individual parts (1992:100). The effect of this metaphor, however, was the de-
animation of the natural world: “the living cosmos [was] replaced by the universe as a machine” 
(Sheldrake 2001:49). Along with his ideas that the soul was separate from the rest of material 
existence, Descartes’ mechanical model of the world exacerbated the anthropocentrism and 
hierarchical thinking he inherited from the Western philosophical tradition. Like Newton, 
Descartes was a mathematician who devoted his career to explaining that “everything in the 
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material universe worked entirely mechanically according to mathematical necessities” (2001:49). 
Thus, in his Principles of Philosophy (1998b), Descartes applied this new mechanical way of 
thinking to everything, including plants, animals, and humans. Animals had only a shell of a body 
without the spirit. As such they were automata like clocks, capable of complex behaviours but 
lacking souls that enabled them to think. Such a view of animals as mere machines “furthered his 
explicit aim of making men ‘lord’ and possessors of nature” (Sheldrake 2001:53).  
 
As such, Descartes’ view was that “animals were not only incapable of thought but unable to feel 
pain” (Descartes 1999:III; 134)26. As Tom Regan puts it, animals were subjected to a derogatory 
testing that “their screams during laboratory testing were considered simply the noise of a little 
spring that had been touched” (2004:29). Though the vitalists of his day objected to Descartes’s 
view of animals as mere machines, his mechanistic theory achieved supremacy within academic 
biology (Sheldrake 2001:53). And this led to the attitude of delineating and detaching humans 
from nature. This detachment of the mind from the body or from emotions, led to the notion of 
“scientific detachment” (2001:56) that has become pervasive and privileged in contemporary 
Western thinking. The myth of scientific detachment or objectivity remains strong both inside and 
outside of the academy. As a matter of emphasis, Sheldrake holds:  
 
[Scientific detachment] is not confined to the ranks of professional scientists and 
technocrats; it has an all-pervasive influence on modern society, deepening the 
divisions between man and nature, mind and body, head and heart, objectivity 








This mechanism – found in Newtonian physics and advanced by Cartesian philosophy and the 
scientific method – has become so widespread in Western society that to question it is to question 
the very foundation of modern civilization. Sheldrake opines further that, “[t]he mechanistic theory 
of nature has acquired such prestige through the successes of science and technology that it now 
seems less like a theory than a proven fact” (2001:74).  
 
Another ill of Cartesian philosophical thinking is atomism. As defined in the English Oxford 
Dictionary (EOD), “atomism” is the theory in modern philosophy “that all statements, 
propositions, situations, and phenomena, are composed of mutually independent, simple, primary, 
and irreducible elements” (2006). For Epicurus, an ancient Greek philosopher, atoms are principles 
(archai) in the sense that they constitute the nature of bodies: the invisible principles are 
necessarily the nature of bodies (Taylor 1999:D5). In other words, atoms are changeless principles 
of nature. It is through the indivisible, unchanging corpuscles of reality that concrete things arise 
from. In his letter to Herodotus, an ancient Greek historian, Epicurus made an outline of what an 
atom is: 
 
Nothing comes from what is not nor disappear into what is not. The all is made 
of bodies and void, which are the only complete nature/ per se existents; 
Amongst bodies, some are composites, other are those from which composites 
are made; the all in unlimited or infinite both in the number of atoms and the 
extent of void; the number of different atomic shape cannot be conceived; the 
atoms move constantly and endlessly because of the existence of voids (1999: 
Ep. Hdt. 38-44) 
 
Though pre-Socratic Greeks are credited for the idea that “the world is composed of homogeneous 
particles” (Oelschlaeger 2001:55), Enlightenment philosophers and scientists used the idea of the 
atom to decode the mysteries of the natural world. The term, atom, was consequently employed 
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by Modern scientists to describe what came first to be theorised over and secondly to be observed. 
Bacon employs atomistic thinking when describing his utopian view of a research university in 
The New Atlantis.27  
 
However, Descartes is the philosopher who developed a new scientific method based upon 
dividing “each of the difficulties” he examined “into as many parts as possible” and reducing them 
to their “simplest and most easily known” elements (1994). Viewing nature as a machine with 
singular function component parts, the atomistic thinker studies phenomena in isolation, unaware 
of the multiple functions each element plays within a complex system.  
 
Combined with anthropocentrism, dualism, and hierarchical thinking, the power of atomistic 
thinking cannot be underestimated. While this study is not unaware of the contemporary anti-
scientism position like that of Jan C. Smuts (1926) and Fritjof Capra (1982) among others, it 
however notes that the belief in the scientific method as the only valid approach to knowledge 
pervades various streams of the traditional Western intellectual paradigm. As noted by Capra, 
“during the past decades all these ideas and values have been found severely limited and in need 
of radical revision” (1982:31). The shortcoming of atomistic thinking, as opposed to holistic 
 
27
 In The New Atlantis, Bacon describes the centrepiece of a technocratic utopia, Salomon’s House—“the noblest 
foundation . . . that ever was upon the earth . . . dedicated to the study of the works and creatures of God” (1964:20). 
Salomon’s House included “in-closures of all sorts, of beasts and birds; which we use not only for view or rareness, 
but likewise for dissections and trials, that thereby may take light what may be wrought upon the body of man” 
(1964:33). Besides vivisection, the scientists of Salomon’s house try all poisons, and other medicines upon them. 
Dividing the study of nature into discrete and separate departments, Salomon’s House is Bacon’s vision of the 
modern research university, which until very recently, was structured around strict division between departments 
for the purpose of accurately studying nature (1964:33-34). Such a view that separates humans from the rest of 
nature is characteristic of the mechanistic and atomistic perspectives of Cartesian thinking. See Farrington, 
Benjamin. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: An Essay on Its Development from 1603 to 1609, with New 




environmental thinking, is that it fails to appreciate fully the interrelationship between discrete 
elements. By viewing the environment as a system of elements that function only as a whole, the 
ecosystem environmentalist more accurately identifies and understands the characteristics of 
individual phenomenon. This holistic, ecological model unifies the myriad of environmental 
philosophical theories. Though the holistic model finds the roots of our environmental crisis in 
Cartesian thinking, it is important to remember that such criticism does not view Cartesian thinking 
as sinister or invalid (Capra 1982:40).  
 
To a certain extent, the traits of Cartesian thinking are responsible for important scientific and 
technological discoveries. Certainly, Cartesian thinking considers the interactions between objects 
in nature.28 However, by trying to understand a phenomenon by isolating its simplest and most 
easily-known elements, Cartesianism often fails to recognise that identity and character are 
determined by all of the relationships that that phenomenon has in its natural environment. In 
addition, though useful in many ways, atomistic thinking is counter to ecological understanding 
that the identity and function can only be understood in context.  
 
In fact, while appreciating the scientific discoveries made possible through Cartesian thinking, I 
argue that strict atomism has led to an inability to think more holistically. Further, atomism has 
contributed to the failure of valuing relationships between phenomena that define identity and 
character. Such inabilities to comprehend nature holistically has had catastrophic environmental 
implications. It is little wonder, therefore, that Fritjof Capra argues that Modern society has 
 
28 This is evidenced via a consideration of Cartesian interactionism. Although, it is not without its flaws, 
interactionism still buttresses the point that there is an interrelationship among various substances of existence. See 
Daniel Garber, “René Descartes.” Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 1998. Pp. 16-22 
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“disproportionately favoured Cartesian thinking almost to the exclusion of holistic thinking” 
(1982: 33). Consequently, the predominant view in the field of environmental philosophy is that a 
holistic framework is more consistent with how nature functions and can serve as a guide for 
environmental sustainability of the widest possible biodiversity (Naess 1973:97). Writers like 
Capra (1982) and Craige (2001) who also acknowledged such environmentalist views have argued 
that Cartesian thinking is slowly being supplanted by a scientifically-based, holistic paradigm. 
Such a holistic framework is envisioned as one that balances competition and cooperation, thus, 
stressing the importance of sustainability for the health of humans and nonhumans alike (Craige 
1992:12).  
 
Intellectual frameworks are being developed to emphasise and advance ideas underlying the 
interconnectedness of all nature; and this study is a contribution to the philosophic advancement 
of such frameworks from the epistemic viewpoint. This holistic worldview holds humans to be a 
part of, and inseparable from, nature. Hence, humanity is conceived not to be isolated from nature 
and viewed as such, humanity would not annihilate or destroy nature, and further would not use 
nature adversely; rather, humanity is constantly engaged with the rest of the environment and 
constantly interacting with nature. 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that the history and philosophy of the traditional Western 
intellectual culture appears not to give attention or adequate interest to a holistic environmental 
philosophy because its epistemological-cum-ontological foundation places primacy on human 
reason. To wit, the external world is placed as secondary in the acquisition of knowledge.  The 
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second chapter of this research corroborates this, as it was shown therein that the need for 
environmental discourse was due essentially to the advent of the environmental crisis that was 
largely a consequence of self-interested human actions. In other words, the fear of a ‘global 
holocaust’ arising from the desecration of the environment was what forced the attention to the 
environmental crisis. Traditional Western philosophy’s conceptualisation of the environment, 
wherein objects are understood as changing, pliable, and not essential to knowledge, could not 
have given birth to any major interest in ecological appreciation for the environment. Conversely, 
the epistemological attitude of the West is significantly prejudiced in favour of the permanent, 
eternal and indestructible eidetic objects of knowledge and reason. The human mind that 
rationalises epistemic thoughts, is placed above nature. This line of thought permeates the 
philosophy and history of traditional Western scholarship, which is particularly influenced by the 
Cartesian worldview. 
 
In contrast to environmentalists’ thinking, “anthropocentric environmentalism” – as influenced by 
Cartesian thought – inhibits the understanding of the holistic and complete interconnectedness of 
the human with all other nonhuman members of the earth. It is, therefore, not incorrect to interpret 
traditional Western epistemology as having set forth the intellectual framework that enhances the 
isolation and annihilation of nature from the human. This explains Capra’s (1982:102) and 
Craige’s (2001:45) optimism that, in contemporary times, there is a shift away from Cartesian 
thinking, towards holism. The plausibility of their optimism inheres in the fact that the Cartesian 
worldview, as a prototype of the Western traditional intellectual thought process, can be held 
ideologically responsible for the destruction of the natural environment and all nonhuman forms 
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of existence. To this end, this study opines that the current environmental crisis has 
epistemological foundations.  
 
Further, this study identifies traditional Western epistemology as the root of the pervasive 
environmental crisis and its un-reformable human cause. One should, therefore, be cognisant of 
the place of humans within the environment and of the rapaciousness of the Cartesian worldview: 
consuming, alienating, annihilating, and destroying of natural resources. At the source of this 
alienation is an anthropocentric and mechanistic mode of thinking that is the product of traditional 
Western epistemology. The need therefore arises to lay out an alternative epistemological 
framework, within which knowledge concerning nature (the external world) and the human subject 
is symbiotic. Noted is the fact that such an epistemological framework would provide a clear 
motivation for critiquing traditional Western epistemology. It will further provide a background 
for contemporary thinking with regards to issues surrounding environmentalism.  
 
However, before the alternative framework that is conducive for environmentalism is articulated, 
attempts will be made to examine the African orientation in environmental philosophy, vis-à-vis 
environmental ethics and philosophy, as well as some contemporaneous challenges facing the 
development of African environmental philosophy. This includes a review of some works by 
scholars who question the dominant dichotomised epistemic view in their various bids to advance 
an African environmental philosophy. Consequently, we will be able to develop an alternative 






A critique of the current African orientation in environmental philosophy 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter attempts to critique the current African orientation in environmental Philosophy. 
Whilst considering the distinction raised in the second chapter of this study, between 
environmental ethics and philosophy, the chapter presupposes that African environmental 
philosophy is a genre of African Philosophy. Also, it will be argued that current attempts at 
constructing an African environmental philosophy have approached the subject from an ethical 
perspective. It should be noted that this thesis is not oblivious of the significance of the ethical 
perspectives in the discourse of environmental philosophy. However, the study argues that ethical 
perspectives are not enough. While the ethical perspective may be necessary for construing an 
African orientation in environmental philosophy, the ethical perspective is insufficient. Hence, the 
adoption of an ‘epistemologico-ontological’29 approach which seeks to rediscover the ontological 
human-nature relationship from an epistemological perspective.  
 
Beginning with discourse on the concept of African Philosophy, we then explore the current 
African orientations in environmental philosophy. Recognising the limitation of this research 
work, we do not claim to exhaust all views of current African orientations in environmental 
philosophy. However, from the arrays of examined current opinions on African orientations in 
environmental philosophy, the chapter aims to arrive at an understanding that proffers a motivation 
 
29 This is a synthesis of the ontological and epistemological understanding of the human place in nature as well as 
that of the human-nature relationship. 
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for an alternative approach to current African orientations in environmental philosophy; namely, 
an epistemologically oriented perspective of African environmental philosophy. 
 
4.2. Conceptualising “African Philosophy” 
Conceptualising African Philosophy is apt for the discourse on African Environmental philosophy. 
This is in sync with the earlier held position of this research work (in chapter two), that 
environmental philosophy is a genre of applied philosophy. We take African Philosophy here as a 
genus class (broader category) of African environmental philosophy. This study thus identifies 
African environmental philosophy as a specie of African Philosophy, simply put, an application 
of African Philosophy to environmentalism. It is therefore imperative that the discussion on 
environmental philosophy be within the broader perspectives of African Philosophy. Seeing 
African Environmental Philosophy as the engagement with the subject of environmentalism from 
the philosophical opinions of African philosophers, the focus in this section will be on the 
conceptualisation of African Philosophy.  
 
However, the attempt at conceptualising African Philosophy is not an apologia for the existence 
of African Philosophy. Rather, it gives a justification for explaining the part-whole relationship 
between environmental philosophy and philosophy from an African perspective. Given that this 
study has considered the Western, Modern denigration of the environment, the impact of such 
environmental denigration on the global world, and the present environmental catastrophe that we 
find ourselves in, conceptualisation. African Philosophy here permits us to explore the African 




A caveat here is that we do not aim this study at proffering solutions to the environmental 
challenges faced by Africans alone, but we are offering an environmental philosophy that may 
contribute solutions to the global problems of the environment. In other words, the research is not 
parochial; instead, it offers solutions that may apply and be useful for the discourse on 
environmentalism in any part of the world. The study suggests an epistemic cum ontological 
understanding of the human relationship with mother nature. Such epistemologico-ontological 
perspectives, the study opines, will allow for an apt understanding of human beings’ position in 
relation to nature. Thus, the study will contribute insight into how humans ought to relate to nature, 
and how we ought to treat it. 
 
4.2.1.  Background 
 
The attempt here is to conceptualise a theoretical working definition of ‘African Philosophy’ for 
this thesis.  However, this will be done without going into the old debate of the existence or 
otherwise of African Philosophy.30 Thus, conceptualisation  African Philosophy from the old 
debate will amount to an effort in the mere repetition of past studies, a debate that has been dealt 
with justifiably (Uduigwomen 2002:3).  
 
The point of entry for this chapter—in conceptualisation  African Philosophy—is on the question 
of ‘what is the nature of African Philosophy?’ To answer the question on the nature of African 
 
30 By old debate, I mean the debate that centres mainly on the question of existence or otherwise of African 
Philosophy, as well its nature. This debate has been extensively engaged with by revered African Philosophers, such 
as Kwasi Wiredu (1980), (1998a); Paul O. Bodunrin (1981), (1985); Odera Oruka (1987); Kwame Gyekye (1987), 
(1997); Sophie B. Oluwole (1989), (1999), (2015); Mogobe Ramose (2002); Andrew Uduigwomen (2002); Moses 
A. Makinde (2007); Olusegun Oladipo (2008);  Doyo Guyo (2011); Emmanuel Chukwudo-Eze (2017) among 
others, have held – though from diverse point of view– that African Philosophy exists. One fact deducible from their 




Philosophy, we begin with a consideration of the intellectual directions or approaches that the 
development of African Philosophy is taking, i.e. trends in African Philosophy. 
 
4.2.2. The three trends in African Philosophy 
The three discernible senses of African Philosophy as argued for by Samuel Imbo (1998) will be 
the focus here. Imbo highlighted three discernible senses of extant African Philosophy as 
“ethnophilosophical, universalist and hermeneutical approaches” (1998:14). It must be noted that 
our study is not unaware of the many trends in African Philosophy as for example, those outlined 
by Oruka (1978) (1990b): Ethnophilosophy; Philosophic Sagacity; Nationalist-Ideological 
Philosophy; Professional African Philosophy; Literary-artistic Philosophy and Hermeneutical 
theory in African Philosophy and later by Wiredu’s (1980): Traditional African Philosophy and 
Contemporary African Philosophy. One of the significant authors to give a commentary and 
interpretation of these trends is Imbo (1998:14-45). The position of Imbo, though summative, is 
apt and comprehensive for this study. Imbo’s scheme is adopted because his three discernible 
senses of African Philosophy cover all the trends identified by both Oruka and Wiredu, although 
with modifications that appear fitting for this study. It is more rational to think that within the class 
of the Universalist, for instance, it is not unlikely to have some Nationalist-ideologists as well as 
Professional philosophers. Also, ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy would well feature 
in the hermeneutical sense of African Philosophy. Imbo, recognising the possibility of the 
interplays and overlapping nature of these individual trends, thus, aptly represents the various 
trends of African Philosophy with the three discernible senses: ‘ethnophilosophical’, ‘universalist’ 




4.2.2.1.1. The ethnophilosophical approach to African Philosophy 
The Ethnophilosophical approach refers to philosophical opinions that are entrenched in mythical, 
religious, linguistic, anthropological as well as poetical worldviews of different African cultures. 
With this view, African Philosophy is to be known by the nuances of the unique belief system and 
ethnocentric concepts such as language, mysticism, magic, fables, and myths. The 
ethnophilosophical approach is best seen in the works of Alexis Kagame (1951), Leopold Senghor 
(1964), Placide Tempels (1969), John Mbiti (1969), among others. 
 
To a great extent, ethno-African Philosophy is found in traditional cultures, proverbs, fables, 
folklore, and mythological conceptions. While one would understand the attempts of the 
ethnophilosophical scholars in situating African Philosophy in culturally specific views, their 
attempt is owed essentially to the urgency of proving the Eurocentric denial of rationality in Africa 
wrong. Chief among these being the Hegelian description of Africa as a continent of savages whose 
thought and life hinges on primitivity, and as such without history or proper philosophy (Hegel 
1956. For Hegel, Africa as a continent “is unhistorical, undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the 
conditions of nature” (1956:47). In furthering his Eurocentric prejudice against Africans as 
culturally defective, Hegel opines: 
 
We shall therefore leave Africa at this point, and it not need to be mentioned again. 
For it is an unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own 
(1975:37) 
 
The denial of African Philosophy is entrenched in the subtlety of racism, for the basis for the 
deniability of African Philosophy is upon the supposed lack of rationality by anyone under the 
classification or specie, “African”.  This has also recently been noted as “a denial of humanity to 
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Africans” (Etieyibo 2018:15). The intellectual reactions against such views as that of Hegel 
culminated into the great debate. However, efforts by some African philosophers in this debate, 
argues Isaac Ukpokolo, only present the continent’s cultural homogeneity in a poor light as it 
shows African Philosophy as being incapable “of its own unique and consistent logic” (2017:2). 
In other words, the great debate presupposes that without the need for the intellectual reactions to 
Eurocentric-denial of African’s rationality, African Philosophy may not have been developed. 
 
4.2.2.2. The Universalist approach to African Philosophy  
 
The Universalist worldview begins with the definition of philosophy as an objective and universal 
principle-laden enterprise.  This means that the universalist worldview or approach is a stance 
opposed to the culture-specific method. To the pioneer proponents of this view: Innocent 
Onyewuenyi (1976); Kwasi Wiredu (1980), (1991); Peter Bodunrin (1981), and Paulin Hountondji 
(1996), philosophy is not culture-dependent. Rather, philosophy is a “systemic and methodological 
inquiry that should not be altered by its geographical application” (Imbo 1998:22). 
 
For the Universalists, therefore, intellectual skepticism should be cast upon any philosophy that is 
not written down (Hountondji 1996:118). To the Universalist, the ability to develop a tradition of 
debate and sustained inquiry cannot be developed or sustained by non-written philosophy (Imbo 
1998:9).  There are Universalists who give room for oral philosophy, like Henry Odera Oruka, 
who developed the idea of Sagacity wherein he presents a Socratic-like person referred to as the 
African Sage in the African parlance (1990a:22). Such people are believed to be philosophic about 
various traditional worldviews, despite their level of literacy. So, contention between the 
Universalists and Ethnophilosophers is evident in the idea that a proper African Philosophical text 
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should be limited only to written words or the canonisation of oral experiences. In Kwasi Wiredu 
(1998b:19-21), the Universalist ideation of African Philosophy is that of a “proper” philosophy of 
the African orientation that includes a critical reconstruction of African traditional thoughts, to 
reveal philosophical elements thereof. This includes the use of literary and scientific resources of 
the West, which Wiredu argues “does not make the constructed text any less African” (1998b:20). 
 
4.2.2.3. The hermeneutical approach to African Philosophy 
The hermeneutical approach challenges both the Ethnophilosophical and Universalist 
perspectives. As argued by Imbo (1998:12), the hermeneutical philosophers take African traditions 
as their starting point, as they seek to escape the enslavement of the past by critically using the 
past to open-up the future. It is the understanding of these scholars that Philosophy – suitably 
construed – must move beyond a preoccupation with ethnological considerations and universalist 
abstraction, by calling into question actual relations of power in Africa (Imbo 1998:11). The works 
of Theophilus Okere (1971), (1983), (2004); Tsenay Serequeberhan (1991), (1994); Marcien Towa 
(1991); and Okonda Okolo (1991) exemplify this hermeneutical orientation in African Philosophy. 
The hermeneutic approach inheres in the application of tools of philosophy to issues regarding the 
existential realities of the continents, even in the face of globalisation. This is in contrast to the 
Ethnophilosophical worldview, which subsist in holding “culture specific views” (Imbo 1998:9). 
 
Observable in the aforementioned approaches to African Philosophy, is the fact that the approaches 
aimed at grappling with the social, political, economic, and intellectual challenges emanating from 
the lived experiences of African people. The three discernible senses – Ethnophilosophical, 
Universalist, and hermeneutical approaches, used different reasonings in addressing existential 
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challenges in Africa. Certain factors could be seen to be playing through each of the approaches. 
Thus, in the next session, attempts will be made to look at the factors that characterized each of 
the approaches in African Philosophy discussed above. 
 
4.2.3. The tripartite factors for defining African Philosophy- 
The three factors to discuss in this section are identity; method and relevance. One of the facts 
apparent in the consideration of the tripartite factors is that the varying approaches or trends in 
African Philosophy are informed or necessitated by the tripartite factors. The tripartite factors 
provide a unifying ground of operation to the varying approaches. It will, thus, be held here that 
the characterisation of trends of African Philosophy can be identified by the attempt at dealing 
with the intellectual challenges of identity, method, and relevance. To put it in another form: every 
trend follows a particular method to unearth the African identity and drives home the relevance of 
such a method for addressing the everyday challenges of the people. Hence, the quantum of efforts 
by scholars to opine for a philosophy that is classified as ‘African’ is informed by the tripartite 
factor of identity, method, and relevance. 
 
On identity: Much of the debate that starts the discussion about African Philosophy like: Wiredu 
(1980); Bodunrin (1981) Oruka (1987); etc. is focused upon the quest for African identity. The 
identity challenge is set at countering the deniability of African Philosophy. The quest for identity 
is given preference more in the need to deal with the challenge of refuting the colonial cultural 
denigration of Africans and African societies. Such denigration of colonised cultures came with 
the establishment of Western-centric evaluative parameters for engaging with African belief 
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systems. In the face of such Eurocentric engagements, the crisis of identity ensued. Thus, the 
factor of identity became germane in the canonisation of various trends of African Philosophy. 
 
On method: The factor of designating a functional method that would be employable for the 
discipline of African Philosophy is another deciding factor for defining African Philosophy. 
Method sets at answering the question of what to include as the subject of discussion? What 
process of enquiry would be adjudged to be suitable for an intellectual engagement? What research 
questions would be essential for determining salient discourse that could pass for African 
Philosophy?.  
 
On relevance: The quest for relevance is the third deciding factor to be considered by this study 
for characterizing philosophy as an authentic African Philosophy. How relevant is the idea put 
forward in addressing the existential challenges of Africa? How relevant are the philosophic 
postulations to the socio-cultural experience of Africans even in the search for sustainable 
development and in the face of globalization?  The African continent is not only peculiar because 
of its predicaments, since there is no segment of humanity without its predicaments. 
However, the African predicament generates conceptual dynamism that ensures that any concept 
and idea to be applied to the continent must have a unique trajectory that facilitates the twin 
task of self-definition and development. This informs, to a large extent, the imperativeness of 
the ‘relevance’ factor. The relevance of an idea, theory, or concept towards addressing the 
existential challenges of Africa is not only significant for defining African Philosophy; but 




Our view here is that the discipline and practice of African Philosophy is better advocated for by 
engendering factors of identity, method, and relevance. This position is argued from the position 
that defining African Philosophy based on the oral/written contention between the 
Ethnophilosophical or Particularist and Universalist approaches, appears to be a disservice to the 
discipline of African Philosophy, as it undermines the significance of the tripartite factors. Thus, 
while it may not necessarily be the social context or the written text that confers the label 
‘philosophy’, it is not out of place to argue that the three factors of identity, method, and relevance 
appear to be essential in the quest for an authentic African Philosophy. This view, I want to believe, 
holds regardless of place, person, or time. Furthermore, the three factors discussed above serves 
as rallying-points for the various positions argued for by the different discernible senses of 
categorising African Philosophy. Be it through the forward-looking and the backward-looking 
approach to the conception of African Philosophy (as noted by Safro Kwame (2017:99–100)), or 
through the Particularist/Universalist distinction (Adeshina Afolayan ( 2006:21–28)); we could 
explain African Philosophy by these three factors.  
 
Conceptualisation  African Philosophy in light of the tripartite factors is to see it as a critical 
exploration of the social constructions of the answers to the existential questions on the continent. 
The existential questions that these factors make viable in the discourse on African issues make 
such philosophical expositions qualify for African Philosophy. Answering such questions 
accurately requires a reflection that transcends social or cultural boundaries and still being able to 
hold ties to cultural orientations. Engaging in African questions especially along the line of the 
three factors of identity, method, and relevance also shows forth the continental consciousness 
required for the generation of philosophy. This is against the background of Eurocentric 
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worldviews of late Enlightenment and early 19th century scholars, who proposed that Africans and 
Africa lack the required quality for philosophising, namely reasoning: e.g., Hume (1963); Kant 
([1775] 1902), (1997) and Hegel (1956), (1975). This deniability and the response thereof hold 
sway in the early philosophical discourse for Africa. However, the legitimacy or quality of African 
Philosophy should not be consequent upon the denial of its existence. This is because to argue for 
the non-justification of African-oriented reflective and critical thoughts – because of the 
phenomenon of colonialism and the deniability of rationality – is to beg the question of the rational 
ability of the people of the African continent.31 
 
Although we cannot pretend that the effects and challenges of the European incursion in Africa do 
not have consequences, we should not consider this interaction as casting the shadow of non-
existence upon indigenous thought processes. This is because indigenous thought processes, be 
they Asian; African; Australasian, or Occidental, with sound merit and ingenuity, have an 
existence outside the interaction with other cultures of the world. Wiredu noted this in his 
celebrated essay:  “Are there Cultural Universals?”, wherein he argued for the existence of inter-
cultural communication (1998a). The logicality of the possibility of such genuine and functional 
indigenous ideas do not only subsist for the existence of reflective thought-making processes in 
African culture. They also give credence to the fact that intercultural communication32 between 
indigenous African thought and the rest of the world is possible.  
 
 
31 Kwame Gyekye noted this when he argued that “to deny African peoples philosophical thought is to imply that 
they are unable to reflect on or conceptualize their experience” (1987:8).  
32 Communication between different cultures. The possibility of inter-cultural interaction gives credence to the 
existence and functionality of indigenous ideas, as without it the bases for communication is non-existence. 
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Observable at this juncture is that having an adequate grasp of the existential questions from the 
intellectual stance of the tripartite factors will inform answers that will and must reflect the ability 
to transcend while holding ties to cultural orientations. The debate on ethnophilosophy and 
professional philosophy on the purpose of African Philosophy comes to light here. The contention 
is over whether philosophy must be solely of personal presentation, i.e. textual, or if it should 
include oral, communal, and cultural worldviews. While cultural worldviews may be the raw 
material for intellectual or philosophical engagements, they remain a particularist cultural 
orientation, until they are made to pass through the crucible of rational enquiry and critical 
reflection. This attitude is open to humanity by virtue of the ability to reason, holding for any set 
of persons or culture. Thus, African Philosophy in the attempt to grapple with the nuances of the 
three factors can be definable on a part-whole relationship between operating in a particular 
context-oriented form (subjective); and grounding such operations on a general feature of life 
realities (objective). The part-whole relationship ensuing between the subjective and objective 
stance of philosophising, will be the focus of the next section in this chapter. 
 
4.2.4. The objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy 
It is the position of the present author that there is a part-whole relationship entrenched within the 
subjective and objective dimensions of philosophy, respectively. By the subjective dimension, I 
mean the contextual components of intellectual resources that inform one’s particular philosophic 
view and which are products of one’s cultural lived experiences. The objective dimension on the 
other hand holds for the basic components of life realities that are not peculiar to any section of 
humanity but apply to the experience of all cultures. This would be the global character of 
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philosophy. To get this done, this section will engage in an examination of these dimensions of 
philosophy to reveal the nature of philosophy and, by extension, African Philosophy.  
 
Kwasi Wiredu (2004) rightly notes the perplexity involved in the bid to define ‘philosophy’. For 
him, “there is hardly a single question to which there can be said to be an established answer. Here 
not even on the question of what philosophy is” (2004:139). To this end, it is pertinent to note that 
philosophy has been defined from diverse points of view. One thing derivable from various 
definitions of ‘philosophy’ – which would also be instructive to note in my conceptualisation of 
African Philosophy – is the relationship between the objective nature of philosophical questions 
and the varying subjective approaches to them. The question here should be: is the subjective 
approach to defining philosophy or addressing any philosophical issue enough to legitimise the 
discipline of philosophy? Or does it play down the merit and authenticity of the discipline? To 
hold a positive answer to the question above will be to give in to extreme relativism, which often 
informs the popular view that nobody has said the last word in philosophy. But this study does not 
subscribe to such relativism. However, this does not mean that I wish to overthrow every form of 
subjectivism. Some measure of subjectivism is necessary, provided that one can argue for one’s 
subjective viewpoint. On the significance of putting forward one’s thoughts with clarity, Peter 
Bodunrin argues:  
 
When one is putting forward a philosophical thesis, we expect him to state the 
issues at stake as clearly as possible so that we know what we are being invited 
to accept. We expect him to argue for his case – [to] show us why we must accept 




Whatever the various positions and opinions are and whatever importance such views may carry, 
they have to display lucidity, rationality, clearness, and critical analysis to be acceptable and to be 
worthy of the name “philosophy”.  
 
It is, therefore, essential that focus is placed on the creative analysis of any system of thoughts 
before we canonise them as “philosophy”.  Thus, despite the open-ended nature of philosophy, it 
is possible to identify some ideas that befit the characterisation of philosophy. Efforts will thus be 
made to consider in this regard, ideas of two of the foremost African Philosophers; Odera Henry 
Oruka and Kwasi Wiredu. In choosing these two scholars or philosophers amongst others, I intend 
to bring home their understanding of philosophy to bear on the case for African Philosophy. 
Although their points of view vary, they are essential for my conceptualisation of what 
‘philosophy’ in general is and what ‘African Philosophy’ in particular, should be.  
 
Odera Henry Oruka conceptualised “philosophy” as “… an art of reasoning… [that] provides a 
critical intellectual weapon and methodology for analysing and synthesising the basic problems of 
man, society and nature” (1997:140). In other words, philosophy is a critical intellectual 
engagement with the conditions in which people live. For him, therefore, philosophy cannot exist 
ex nihilo but should be seen and understood as the creative effort of thought processes in response 
to the prevailing social conditions (1997:143). From Oruka’s description of philosophy, it can be 
said that philosophy is the intellectual effort that is exerted in applying concepts and theoretical 




The second definition of “philosophy” considered is that of Kwasi Wiredu. For him, “philosophy” 
is systematic reflective thinking on life (2004:1). Earlier, in his Philosophy and an African 
Culture, he had noted that “philosophy is a rational and critical reflection on the most 
fundamental ideas and principles underlying our thought about human life and its environment, 
natural and supernatural” (1980:91). This, for him, is the intellectual orientation that any activity 
must meet to be regarded as “philosophy”.  Wiredu (1980:32) also believes that philosophy thrives 
on criticism, and hence the evaluative aspect of the discipline. Without argument and clarification, 
there is strictly no philosophy as philosophers are expected to argue for their theses by clarifying 
meaning and answering known and anticipated objections (1980:47). 
 
I infer, from the input of Oruka and Wiredu, that philosophy is an activity that is based on 
reasoning. As a rational discourse, philosophy thrives on the practitioners’ ability to engage 
critically with issues, making such engagements worthwhile. Another fact deducible from the 
definitions above, is that philosophy has two dimensions to itself, namely, the objective and the 
subjective dimensions. Oruka’s view on philosophy is subjective, in the sense that the reflective 
thinking on a particular life – be it Asian, African, or European – in relation with other numerous 
life forms of humanity as a whole, could be considered as “philosophy” from the subjective point 
of view. For him, philosophy is an engagement with and a response to social conditions, for the 
expressed purpose of finding meaning in life. It is a rational weapon to examine and deal with the 
societal problems experienced around and in a particular locale. 
 
On the other hand, Wiredu’s view can be categorized as philosophy from the objective stance, 
because his perception of what philosophy is, is a consequence of the universal and global 
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character of philosophy. A look at Wiredu’s description of philosophy shows that it resonates with 
the non-peculiarity of philosophy as a system of thought and that its methods or the problems it 
engages with transcend a particular segment of humanity. Philosophy, from the words of Wiredu 
above, is encapsulated as ideas and principles underlying human thoughts, that is present in every 
human being irrespective of culture. The position of Wiredu underscores the fact that intellectual 
thought that is of rational and critical reflection is not a particular attribute of any segment of 
people, rather it is a character that is expected to be seen in all cultures. The characteristics of 
systematic reflections, criticism, and evaluative clarification of ideas epitomises that which is 
expected to be taken as philosophy, and any intellectual thought from any part of the world that 
exhibits these traits necessarily passes as philosophic. Thus, in this objective line of thought, there 
are no African, Asian, or Western truths, instead what exists is ‘truths’ (Kwame 1992:104). The 
global applicability, as it were, of the philosophic system informs the objective dimension of 
philosophy. A point to note here is the fact that both Wiredu and Oruka are classified into the 
Universalists African philosophic tradition.  However, the distinctive line of 
universalist/particularist divide has been shown above to have been overshadowed by the tripartite 
factors inherent in attempts by various schools to conceptualise African Philosophy. In other 
words, engaging with the tripartite factors in the cloak of the objective/subjective dimension of 
philosophy does not conform to a specific distinctive line of philosophic categorisation. This is 
because whatever classification of ‘philosophic’ of any school that one may want to be committed 





The present author, however, sees philosophy from the complementary relationships of these two 
equal dimensions. In other words, it is possible to conceptualise philosophy from the objective 
dimension as a critical reflection on any life forms that exist. Applying such reflective thinking to 
a particular form of life is doing philosophy from the subjective stance. The complementary nature 
of philosophy is corroborated by Gyekye’s argument that philosophy, being an intellectual activity 
is of a universal [objective dimension] practice, which cannot be confined to a geographical 
location [subjective dimension] (1987:9). Recognising the importance of the subjective dimension 
of philosophy, Gyekye noted that “answers to philosophical questions provided by thinkers from 
different cultures may differ in quality sophistication and persuasiveness” (1987:9–10). On the 
relationship between the two distinct but related dimensions of philosophy, Gyekye writes: 
 
When I claim that philosophical activity is universal, I mean simply that thinkers 
from different cultures or philosophical traditions ask similar philosophical 
questions and think deeply about them. It is in terms of the philosophical attitude, 
of the propensity to raise questions relating to the fundamental principles 
underlying human experience and conduct and not in terms of the uniformity of 
doctrinal positions, that philosophy can be said to be universal. This approach to 
certain fundamental questions about human experience is, in my view, the 
common denominator of all philosophical activities and doctrines (1987:10). 
 
While it is necessary to undertake or consider philosophy from the objective prism, it is desirable 
for the sake of completeness to also see it as a strand of subjective application. Thus, I agree with 
Guyo that the objective dimension of philosophy “is the proper dimension upon which we should 
ground any particular [subjective] philosophy regardless of its origin” (2011:59).  
 
Philosophy from the objective view would accord meaning to any activity in line with its 
intellectual orientation as ‘philosophy’, regardless of geographical locations, socio-economic 
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capacities or, the ethnicity of the people engaging in such intellectual activity. Thus, this study 
sees both the Eurocentric conception of rationality with its deniability of African rationality and 
the ensuing ‘response debates’, as intellectually prejudiced, unnecessary, and conceptually 
deficient. This is because any human being may engage in a systematic reflection on life. To hold 
thus that the “philosophical epoch of humanity began first among the Europeans is to undermine 
the vastness of reflective thinking and nothing but sheer intellectual chauvinism” (Guyo 2011:62). 
As Oruka (1987:66) opined, “reason is a universal trait, and that the greatest disservice to African 
Philosophy is to deny it reason”. Indeed, the denial of reason to Africa and her people is fallible 
(M B Ramose 2002:20).  
 
We posit that applying or making objective conceptions of philosophy to bear upon one’s way of 
life is itself a subjective move. It is for this reason that Wiredu noted that “philosophy is practical, 
it is also theoretical, and it is theoretical before it is practical” (2007:78). While it would be apt to 
note that a theory will have objective or universal status, the application of such theory to different 
clime and cultures requires some particular orientations. What this points to is the fact that it is 
“our objective understanding of philosophy that enables us to claim for subjective and particular 
philosophy [of any culture]” (Guyo 2011:59). Without any form of contradiction, one could thus 
hold that rational and systematic reflection, thus, become a ground upon which particular 
philosophy – i.e. Asian, Western, or in the case of our discourse, African – will stand. Such a 
reflection also enables intercultural communication. As noted by Bruce Janz, questions relating to 
the geographical location of philosophy do not diminish the stance and quality of philosophy 
(2009:5). Being geographically located also does not suggest that philosophy should only – though 
it could be part of its immediate forms of reasoning – be reducible to ethnophilosophy. Janz stated 
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that “placing philosophy in a geography suggests that it has contingent (depending, commission, 
liable) but not arbitrary interest and that it responds to and shapes particular sets of the condition 
of reflection” (2009:2). It follows, then, that any worthwhile philosophy is consequent upon certain 
questions emanating from the quest to make such philosophy viable for its answers. However, this 
does not necessarily reduce such a philosophy to its subjective or particular dimensions. This 
caveat is further noted by Janz when he argued that “philosophy must attend to the conditions in 
which its questions arise… this attention does not diminish philosophy’s traditional (although 
never completely fulfilled) striving for universals” (2009:2). It, thus, becomes instructive to hold 
that a suitable view of philosophy must be one that would be based upon the objective stance of 
rationality, critical reflection, and also be able to transcend particularities of its subjective 
dimensions. This study thus holds that philosophy is a critical, rational reflection about life from 
the objective dimension without underplaying the subjective dimensions of life. Philosophy in this 
view becomes something that is expressed subjectively by its practitioners. 
 
It is, thus, my considered view that African Philosophy should be seen as a nodal point from which 
hang the two complementary and equally objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy. To 
reduce philosophy to either of the philosophical strands is to nullify the dynamic part-whole 
relationship between the two dimensions. For instance, while it would be right to agree that 
philosophy cannot be done in a vacuum and as such will be made to bear on the existential realities 
of the practitioners, to reduce philosophy to such subjective engagements is to create an intellectual 
hegemony for philosophy itself. This appears to be the challenge that are facing the debate in 
African Philosophy today. The debate, good as it may seem to be, engages in the reduction of the 
objective dimension of philosophy to a particular dimension. This, I argue, is a reductive exercise 
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that is coloured with ethnocentrisms of all sorts. I believe that cultural orientations, social 
conditions, and particular traditional dispositions are important in the creative thought processes 
of philosophising. However, not to allow such subjective considerations to transcend themselves 
into the objective ground is a distortion and negation of philosophy as a critical engagement. It 
must also be noted that caution must be taken in the process of transcending subjectivity so as not 
to universalise a particular conceptual idea. This is perceivable in the European discourses of 
exclusive models of rationality. For Guyo, such a worldview is nothing but a “subjective denial of 
objective ground, that struggles to globalise a particular ethnocentric view” (2011:58). 
 
Thus, African Philosophy will be seen as a rational and critical activity done on the objective 
ground without negating its subjective dimensions.  All practitioners of philosophy regardless of 
race or group must embrace the objective ground of philosophy. To also reduce philosophy to the 
particularistic view of any culture without the rigours of the objective dimension is to deny that 
culture the intrinsic value or trait of rationality. Thus, the philosophy of any cultural orientation is 
essentially expected to be enshrined upon the tenets of objectivity – critical, rational, and 
systematic – while still holding ties to its particular forms of life.  
 
What this suggests is that it is impossible to detach any philosophy from the ‘life-process’ of its 
practitioners. By life-process, I mean the critical apprehension of encountering or engaging with 
one’s immediate environment and the universe as a whole. Life-process should be seen to be 
beyond a people’s worldview or opinion. It is the experience of life by people (Masolo 1995:248). 
Also, life-process should be seen as the vivid canonisation of human’s confrontation with the 
complexity of life. Such a confrontation may be in the form of spiritual, ethical, scientific, or the 
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mere expression of bewilderment. Yet it sparks of a process that is not particular to any race, 
colour, or form; it is a process that is universally experienced by all. However, such confrontations 
with the complexity of life, are borne out of the various correlating factors like geographical 
location, cultural or social inclinations. Such factors particularise our experience of life. 
 
It would, thus, suffice to note that particular philosophies – i.e. Asian philosophy, African 
Philosophy, German philosophy, etc. – could be named as such following their confrontation, 
engagement, and experience of life-process. This reveals life-process as the medium of 
philosophical reflections on every aspect of human existence. Such reflections are born out of 
confrontations with everyday human life. Thus, to do philosophy without the consideration of life-
process would amount to doing philosophy ex nihilo. Philosophy cannot be detached from the life-
processes of its practitioners. Theophilus Okere corroborates this in his remark that “for 
philosophy to be African, it must have some expressions of the African life” (2004:22). This also 
syncs with the Wireduan view that philosophy is a symbiotic function of theory and practice, albeit 
his view that it is theoretical before it is practical (2007:78).  
 
Therefore, this study conceptualises ‘African Philosophy' as a subjective presentation of any 
practitioner’s intellectual endeavour to grapple with the African oriented life-process, situated on 
the objective ground of philosophy. This definition suggests that while any philosophy is expected 
to be subjectively written and based upon the life-process of the author, such philosophies must be 
grounded upon the objective dimension of philosophy. In other words, this study presents African 
Philosophy as one to be understood from the particular African life-process through the objective 
nature of philosophy. To do African Philosophy is to deal with essential challenges of African’s 
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life-process on the precepts of objective factors like rationality, critical reflection, and ethical 
standards. As we deal with the particularities of the African life-process, such engagements would 
only be philosophy if done in recognition of the fundamental nature of philosophy. Hence, 
Hountondji’s view that “the universality of philosophy does not negate its particularity” (1983:57). 
It is, thus, in the conception of African Philosophy as a resultant of the complementary relationship 
between objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy that this study will be looking at the 
orientation of African discourses on the perennial challenges of the environmental crisis in the 
next section. This aptly informs the reasons for the attempt thus far in this chapter to conceptualise 
a working definition of African Philosophy. 
 
4.3. Towards an African Environmental Philosophy 
In chapters two and three of this study, attempts were made to explore Western orientations in 
environmental philosophy, and a critique therein, respectively. In this section, consideration will 
be given to current African perspectives in the environmental discourse. Here, concerns for the 
environmental crisis will be taken as a form of life-process, especially in the ways Africans 
encounter the enormous environmental challenges of contemporary African societies. African 
environmental philosophy is thus taken as a component of African Philosophy. As noted in the 
second chapter, this research work sees the philosophical discourse of environmentalism as that 
which surpasses the thresholds of ethics and its underlying metaphysical/ontological 
considerations. It was shown in chapter two that such reduction is intellectually erroneous and 
grossly underplays the vastness of environmental issues. Thus, from the stance of ‘beyond the 
ethical perspectives’, this study is aimed at developing an effective theoretical and pragmatic 
philosophic response to the global challenge of the environmental crisis from the parlance of 
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African epistemology. In other words, in locating environmental philosophy in African 
philosophical discourse, I will examine how an African epistemic-based environmental outlook 
would address the environmental crisis.  
 
The scholarly assumption of this thesis is that an epistemic-based environmental philosophy will 
enormously assist to reconstruct and elicit an effective theoretical and pragmatic philosophic 
response to the global challenge of the environmental crisis from the African parlance. This 
approach is within the purview of the earlier understanding of African Philosophy from the 
complementary relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy. As a 
genre of an applied African Philosophy, African Environmental Philosophy (AEP) will be 
presented as a rational and critical discourse on environmentalism from the African parlance.  I 
am of the view that environmental concerns are global; hence, attempts to address those concerns 
need to go beyond the Western horizon. The global nature of the problem also requires a global, 
multi-modal response. To this end, it could be argued that AEP – although local as is all knowledge 
of other cultures (Okere (2004:22) – has a contribution to make to global Environmental 
Philosophy. 
 
4.3.1. Considering current African Environmental Philosophy (AEP) 
African Environmental Philosophy is an intellectual exploration of the relationship between 
African Philosophy and environmentalism. It is an application of the fundamental principles and 
theories of philosophy to the human-nature relationship based on African worldviews. Yes, 
environmental problems, ranging from resource depletion, increasing desertification, soil erosion, 
ozone layer depletion, and declining biodiversity in terrestrial and aquatic, global warming, are of 
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global concern as they affect everyone regardless of place and time. However, as noted by Chigbo 
Joseph Ekwealo, “responses, reactions and attitudes [to ecological problems] are at times affected 
or influenced by people’s special ideologies, philosophies, and worldviews” (2011:8). In other 
words, despite the universal nature of the environmental crisis, some specificities make it felt more 
particularly in some parts of the world than in others. For instance, Bunyan Bryant was of the view 
that “countries of colour and low income [Africa] are disproportionately impacted by the 
environmental crisis of the world” (2011:12).  These specificities inform the idea of Ojomo that 
the construction of environmental ethics that is African in its making for the environmental 
challenges of Africa is “most fundamental for contemporary African Philosophy because of the 
importance of the African Environmental experiences” (2010:62).  
 
Furthermore, to drive home the point of the viability of the subjective dimension of AEP, even in 
its objective outlook, Ekwealo argues: 
 
…[A]lthough every group of people are faced with environmental problems as 
is contained in this work, in Africa, in addition to these problems… we are 
experiencing poverty which is a specific background to pollution for it affects 
the populace and at times forces the hand of governments in making concessions 
which ordinarily ought not to because they will have a long term negative 
implication of effect to the generality of the nationals. These include oil spillage, 
poisoning of waters, rivers, and streams with its attendant death of the aquatic 
kingdom, dumping of industrial wastes in the name of second-hand goods, 
militarism leading to wars with attendant diseases and death, et cetera” (2011:8–
9). 
 
The above puts forward the peculiarities of environmental crises in Africa. The peculiarity clause 
in the existential encounter with environmental crises from different parts of the world necessitates 
the diversity of philosophies that will be cognisant of the peculiarity of environmental challenges 
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inherent in each culture (Ifeakor 2019:180). Also called for is a panacea that would bring about 
the uniqueness of African ideologies and philosophies on the issues raised. In other words, the 
African orientation in environmental philosophy is justified not just because Africa is part of the 
global world, but essentially because Africa has indigenous worldviews that are significant to 
mitigating the environmental crisis. It, thus, becomes clear that African Philosophers must employ 
all their intellectual tools to “fight both ignorance and poverty and diffuse the dilemma of survival 
and conservation even in the battle against the environmental crisis bedevilling the continent as 
well as the quest for survival” (Chimakonam 2018:4). 
 
The aim here is to examine the various attempts by African scholars in Environmental Philosophy, 
especially from the African perspective. Such an examination is purposed to appraise their efforts 
as worthy of consideration in the quest for a panacea to the perennial crisis of the environment in 
Africa and other parts of the world. Also, I hope to demonstrate the weaknesses of over-relying on 
ethics in African environmental discourse. This study put forward an epistemic framework for 
African environmental discourse. Ekwealo (2011:10-11) demonstrates insight into this view when 
he notes that AEP has a global effect as it projects a platform that is consistent with universal ethics 
and value. He further pointed out that such a consistent platform for ethics and values is achievable 
through its “epistemology and metaphysics [as] rooted in the ontology of complementary 
dualism”. I will show that while much has been done in the presentation of the metaphysical aspect 
of this platform, the epistemological aspect has not been given the required attention. As noted and 
duly argued for in chapter two, I will not be engaging in a historical mapping of philosophical 
orientations in environmental discourse. However, I will look through the efforts of some African 
scholars in the presentation of an African orientation in environmental philosophy. The earliest 
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attempts to construct an AEP could be seen in the work of Kwasi Wiredu’s “Philosophy, 
Humankind and the Environment” and that of Henry Odera Oruka and Calestous Juma’s 
“Ecophilosophy and the Parental Earth Ethics.” Both works, published in Philosophy, Humanity, 
and Ecology: Philosophy of Nature and Environmental Ethics (1994), were previously presented 
at the World Conference of Philosophy held between 21st and 25th July 1991 at the Kenyatta 
International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya. In the 1991 conference’s opening address, Oruka 
noted that the nature of the environmental crisis facing the world destined the world to a common 
future (1991:3). Showing that the ecological crisis is a global phenomenon, Oruka argued that “the 
pollution of water or air in some parts of the world will not only affect life in that region alone, but 
it will also affect life all over the Earth” (1991:3). This proffers a ground for an African orientation 
into the perennial ecological crisis. As a global crisis, Africa shares her portion of the 
environmental challenges, thus, the need for an African reflection in the quest for solutions to the 
crisis.   
 
4.3.1.1. The Wireduan contribution: Communalist Environmental Ethics  
In his work, Philosophy, Humankind and the Environment, Wiredu enunciates a communalist 
environmental ethics. He notes that: 
 
[T]he external world that the traditional African, as far as I know, recognises 
includes other human beings and living and non-living beings as well as extra 
human beings of various grades of power and intelligence, ranging from the 
superhuman to the sub-human. All these are regarded as regular parts of the 
world order (1994:45). 
 
Wiredu’s African orientation in environmental philosophy is premised upon the traditional African 
practice of communally-based life. This communal life-process is a consequence of the African 
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perception of reality as one whole system33. Wiredu noted that with the understanding of this one 
system of reality, the idea of controlling nature, or of exploiting the nonhuman environment does 
not arise. Such an idea “does not make sense… in any African language” (1994:45). For instance, 
the knowledge of unitary ontological reflection will inform ethical agents of the imperativeness of 
being cautious while relating to the environment – which in this understanding, the human subject 
is part of the environment.  
 
What is enlightening from this is that the Western dualistic perception of reality, which was 
highlighted as the foundational framework for the misuse of nature in chapter three of this study, 
does not hold in the traditional African understanding of nature. For Africans, Wiredu (1994:46) 
opined, “we do not set any domain of objects and processes aside from human beings and give it 
a designation comparable to the Western concept of nature”. As such, the question of domination 
or control of nature does not arise at all in the African idea of the human-nature relationship. The 
unifying account of reality is conducive for environmental discourse that respects the natural 
environment: 
 
[F]irst, any object, living or non-living, maybe within the immediate province of 
a super-human force or power, and one has to avoid reckless and, in some cases 
un-supplicated use of it. Second, in any case, the land, the most fundamental 
means of livelihood, belongs not to individuals but to whole clans, and 
individuals only have rights of use that they are obligated to exercise 
considerately so as not to render nugatory the similar rights of future members 
of the clan (Wiredu 1994:48). 
 
 
33 This will be further enunciated in the sixth chapter of this study to drive home the unitary ontology underscoring 
African intellectual thoughts. 
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From the above, it is clear that the environment is of common benefit for all. This view of nature 
calls for an ethical attitude toward nature which can easily lead to harmonious relationships 
towards the environment. 
 
To this end, Wiredu proposed the “Communalist ethics of Traditional Africa” (1994:47) as an 
environmental outlook to the problems of the environment in contemporary African society. For 
him, the communalist ethos is a presupposition of all morality as it engenders the readiness of the 
individual to “empathise with demands of the communal welfare over an expanding field of 
interest” (1994:47). This ecologically considerate ethics is a by-product of the traditional system 
of perceiving reality as one harmonious whole. In this worldview, all are duty-bound to cater for 
the environment, because such actions carry a two-fold obligation towards those in the past and in 
posterity, which for Wiredu is “obligations to both ancestors and descendants” (1994:46), 
respectively. The observance of this two-fold obligation will ensure that the environment is kept 
in shape for the continual sustenance of society.  
 
To this end, it is a common practice in traditional African societies, to make some kinds of libation 
(spiritual appeasement to the ancestors) before the plucking of leaves as herbs, felling of trees, 
games hunting, etc.  This shows that traditional Africans in their conception of reality understood 
the intricacies of the interrelationships between the human and nonhuman. Also, such 
understanding breeds a moral scheme that makes duties to the ancestors and the unborn imperative. 
What communalist ethics, as envisioned by Wiredu project, is a motivation for “environmental 
carefulness” (1994:46). Communalist environmental ethics promotes carefulness or caution in the 




The outline of environmental carefulness that is entrenched in the communalists’ ethics has a 
practical implication and application for contemporary African society. It reiterates the importance 
and viability of indigenous African ideas as essential heritage that can benefit the contemporary 
African world. It also serves as a call for an African consideration for solutions to some of the 
environmental challenges in the continent. As Wiredu notes, the idea of communalist ethics 
“retains appreciable vitality” even in the face of globalisation and industrialism (1994:46). This is 
because communalist ethics proffer a practical motivation for a harmonious relationship with 
nature. Wiredu further called for the application of this ethical worldview as it will “prevent us 
[Africa] from mindlessly imitating the industrialism of the West, pollution and all” (Wiredu 
1994:47). The African orientation in environmental philosophy as opined by Wiredu could be seen 
to be purely an ethically oriented discourse on environmentalism.  
 
While Wiredu is commendable for fashioning out this AEP on the consideration of the ‘unitary 
ontology’ of the African conception of reality, his idea however is reducible to environmental 
ethics. I now discuss Odera Oruka’s and Calestous Juma’s contribution to AEP. 
 
4.3.1.2. Oruka and Juma’s contribution: Eco-philosophy and the Parental Debts 
Principle (PDP) 
In their work, “Ecophilosophy and the Parental Ethics,” Oruka and Juma, give a holistic outlook 
on reality where they show that “everything is related to everything else” (Oruka and Juma 
1994:117). For them, ecophilosophy (or ecological philosophy) represents the corresponding 
philosophical approach wherein reality is viewed as being characterized by interrelationships. In 
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other words, human beings are seen as being one with the natural environment. Ecophilosophy, 
studies “the totality of the philosophy of nature” (1994:119). Thus, they distinguished the idea of 
ecophilosophy from environmental ethics and environmental studies. For them, environmental 
ethics is the attempt to consider the possibility of extending ethics from human beings to the 
nonhuman creatures of the earth. At the same time, they confine environmental studies to the study 
of the earth and the atmosphere (1994:119). The position of Oruka and Juma on ecophilosophy is 
supported by this research work, especially in the view that Environmental Philosophy stretches 
beyond the demands of ethics in environmental discourse. Thus, in a bid to elicit an ethic that 
stems from a holistic view of reality, Oruka and Juma developed and explored the idea of ‘Parental 
Earth Ethics’ (PEE).  
 
PEE is the idea employed by Oruka and Juma to enunciate the mental and physical attitudes as 
well as the obligations required of members of the earth community – both individually and 
collectively – towards nature. According to Oruka and Juma, PEE is “not simply a product of 
intellectual inquiry. It is the basis upon which different cultures around the world [including 
African culture] base their environmental perceptions” (1994:123). Figuratively speaking, as 
members and children of one mother –mother earth – all cultures of the world are expected to be 
guided by an ‘earth protecting’ ethical code that is meant to guide the treatment of other members 
of the earth family: nature and humans. In elucidating further the idea of PEE, the authors invented 
two related principles and rules, namely, the ‘Parent Debt Principle’ and the ‘Individual Luck 
Principle’ (1994:123). Both principles are for Oruka and Juma, “unwritten ethical laws that guide 
lives and relationships of the family” (1994:123). According to them, the PEE should be a template 
on which to advance ideas that drive the point home that the world has enabled us to share a 
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common past and thus in it, we face a common future especially in the need to handle ecological 
crises that are of global magnitude. I now continue to explain the two related principles. 
 
4.3.1.2.1. Parental Debt Principle (PDP) 
The ‘Parental Debt Principle’ is a concept adopted to explain the familial nature of the different 
cultures of the world, who must understand themselves as members of one earth family. It is 
expected that this principle will elicit an intellectual base for discussing environmental issues in a 
manner that seeks the survival of every member of the earth community. This principle, Oruka and 
Juma noted, comprises four related rules: (1) The family security rules, (2) The kinship shame rule. 
(3) The parental debt rule and (4) The individual and family survival rule (1994:123-125).  
 
I. The Family Security Rules:  
The family security rules state that the fate and security (Physical or welfare) of 
each member of a family is ultimately bound up with the existential reality of the 
family, as a whole. Presenting a hypothetical family of six members, the authors 
note that any one of the six members may, for example, be arrogant and have 
enough to claim self-sufficiency and independence from the rest. However, 
eventually, the person and the person’s progeny may experience a turn of events 
which could make them desperately in need of protection from the family (Oruka 
and Juma 1994:123-124). 
 
This shows that, though there are different cultures in various parts of the world, there remain 
certain common factors that bind all together as members of the same earth family. Oruka and 
Juma, taking a look at the world’s historical facts, noted that following this rule, when one part of 
the world needs to seek protection, assistance, and rescue from the other, on the principle of 
reciprocity, each will be obliged to assist (1994:124). This points to the fact that the world is bound 




II. The Kinship Shame Rule  
The kinship shame rule explicitly underlies the subjective dimension of addressing the perennial 
challenges of the common world. Although the fact of the common grounds suggests that what is 
done in one part of the world, necessarily has effects in distant other parts, it appears that the closer 
kinship of the family relationship determines rates of response. On this, it was argued that “the life 
condition of any member of the family affects all the other’s materially and emotionally, as no 
member can be proud of his or her situation nor be however happy if any member of the family 
tree lives in squalor” (Oruka and Juma 1994:124). This explains the reason why for example, issues 
concerning the countries of Germany and the United Kingdom will be of greater concern to the 
West than to Africa or Asia.  
 
III. The Parental Debt Rule: 
 By the parental debt rule, the authors argued that the success of any members of a family is a 
direct corresponding effect of the historical, as well as familial relationships in the family. For the 
authors, this explains the “organic relationship and debt between the family members” (1994:124). 
It was further averred that “[w]hichever member is affluent or destitute owes his or her fortune or 
misfortune to the parental and historical factors inherent in the development of the family. Hence 
within the family, no one is fully responsible for his or her affluence nor for his or her misfortune” 




IV. The Individual and Family Survival Rule: 
 The individual and family survival rule is the last under the PDP. For Oruka and Juma, this rule 
is focused on the collective survival of the earth family as a whole, where a member of the family 
could overtake – in the interest of the larger family – the control of another member’s resources 
who are perceived to be lacking in observing any of the previous three rules of the PDP. Thus, the 
individual and family survival rule allows members to interfere with the possession of any brother 
or sister who ignores their duty to live by the dictates of all the family ethics (Oruka and Juma 
1994:124). Giving the justification for the rule, the authors argue: 
 
This rule allows the disadvantaged to demand assistance from the affluent, but it 
also allows the creation and the hardworking members of the family to repossess 
underdeveloped possessions of the idle relatives and develop them for the general 
welfare and use of the community (1994:124). 
 
This rule sets out to guarantee the obedience of individual members of the family to the family 
ethics guides, and in the advent of any member’s inability to comply with the family ethics guides, 
the rule allows other members to act instead of the defaulting member for the interest of the family. 
Hence the sustainability of the earth family is seen as a collective effort that is guaranteed even in 
the event of the inability of any member to perform their duty.  
 
It should be noted that Oruka and Juma’s exploration of the interrelatedness of various cultures of 
the world, especially on how activities of one area have a direct or indirect effect on the activities 
of the other area is worthy of attention and is also commendable (1994:127-128). Of note are the 
explication of the family relationships and the usage of such an analogy to the human-nature 
relationship. The authors further note that the PEE is a form of earth insurance policy where the 
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appealed idea of “one good turn deserves another” – receiving benefits is guaranteed by being 
benevolent or giving the same or some other benefits to others – guides the actions and responses 
of the privileged and developed members of the earth family (1994:127).  
 
4.3.1.2.2. Individual Luck Principle (ILP)  
We have already alluded to the fact that there are two guiding principles in the PEE. The 
‘Individual luck principle’ is the second principle and focuses on the welfare, progress, and 
viability of the individual members of the family. This makes it different from the Parental Debt 
Principle that focuses its concerns on the earth family as a whole. According to the authors, ILP 
comprises of three related rules, namely: (1) The Personal Achievement Rule, (2) The Personal 
Supererogation Rule, and (3) The Family Public law rule. Oruka and Juma explain these rules as 
follows: 
 
The personal achievement rule’ states that what a member possesses is due 
mainly to the person’s special talents. This is a kind of family individualism 
which disregards historical experience and the organic constitution of the 
family.  
The personal supererogation rule’ provides that every member has a right to 
do whatever he or she wishes with his or her possession. While; 
The family public laws rule’ states that any member of the family who 
contravenes the right of another member as given by the second principle 
will be subject to the family public law, and would be punished or 
reprimanded and ordered to restore justice (1994:125). 
 




On the issue of practical ethical guidelines, the authors opined that on the instance of a point of 
conflict between the Parental Debt Principle and Individual Luck Principles, the former takes 
precedence over the latter. In giving a rationale for this, the two authors argued that: 
 
The ethics of common sense shows that when in any given family or 
community matters of commonwealth, and common security conflict with 
matters of the personal possession; lack or achievements, the former must 
prevail over the latter. There is no country in which, for example, an 
individual institution would be safeguarded if it endangers the security or 
the economy of all the nations (1994:125) 
 
This brings home the authors’ argument that the earth is a common good to all of humanity in 
which the members thereof have kith and kin relationships with one another. 
 
Oruka and Juma’s proposed PEE is an orientation towards Environmental Philosophy. Although 
it might be argued that they did not expressly air a predominantly African-centred view, their 
ethical postulations on environmental concerns were structured upon a holistic system of reality 
similar to that of Wiredu (1994:45). Indeed, they both alluded to the traditional African practice 
of communally based life that is guided by a unified ontology. A unified ontology in the traditional 
African culture presents reality as an entity that is devoid of dichotomy. Such a system of thought 
provides a basis for an intersubjectivity that does not allow for misuse of nature. The unitary 
system of thought process discussed by Oruka and Juma “influences the thoughts, feelings, 
behaviour, decisions, and relationships in the [earth] community (1994:122). One of the facts 
obtainable from their environmental philosophic view is expressed in the idea of PEE which can 
be seen as a “basic ethic that would offer motivation for both a global environmental concern and 
a global redistribution of the wealth of nations” (Oruka & Juma 1994:128). This could also, I 
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argue, be put forward as the contribution, though not expressly alluded to by the authors, of 
traditional African worldviews to the perennial challenges of the environment. 
 
4.3.1.3. Segun Ogungbemi and the Ethics of Nature-relatedness 
It would seem that both Wiredu and Oruka and Juma, indirectly present an African-oriented 
environmental philosophy. However, perhaps the direct African perspective could be seen in 
Segun Ogungbemi’s contribution (2001). Ogungbemi enunciated an African environmental 
discourse, which also aimed at bridging the gap between theory and practice. He made this loud 
entry into environmentalism through his pioneering article, An African Perspective on the 
Environmental Crisis (2001:265–71)34. He argued that for the understanding of the environmental 
crisis in Africa, a consideration of “both traditional and Modern societies to the environmental 
hazards” of the world is essential (2001:265). For Ogungbemi, as with the other scholars explored 
so far, the environmental crisis is a global concern (2001:265). For him, contemporary 
environmental crises can be classified into two categories, namely, crises resulting from natural 
causes (such as earthquakes, plagues, volcanic eruptions, and storms);  and those consequent upon 
human activities (2001:266). Anthropogenic activities relating to exploration and excessive use of 
the natural environment has, for Ogungbemi, exacerbated the situation (2001:265).  
 
For Ogungbemi, to talk of the African orientation in environmental philosophy is to be cognisant 
of three major dimensions of such activities, namely: ignorance and poverty; modern science and 
technology; political conflicts; and international economies (2001:265). Thus, to comprehend the 
 
34
 This is a republication from the first edition of the work of Ogungbemi (1994). “An African Perspective on the 
Environmental Crisis.” In L. P. Pojman (ed.) Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, Boston: 




gravity of the ecological crisis in Africa is to have a full grasp of the “traditional and modern 
societies and their contributions to the environmental hazards” of our world” (2001:266). 
 
The consideration of ignorance and poverty, for Ogungbemi, is pivotal in the understanding of the 
environmental crisis in Africa (2001:265). From this view, Ogungbemi thought that the 
environmental crisis in African countries is mainly a consequence of poverty and ignorance, 
among other things (2001:265). For him, “[t]he majority of African peoples live in rural areas 
where traditional modes of living lack some basic amenities, namely good water supplies, adequate 
lavatories, and the likes” (2001:265). As noted by Ojomo (2010:55), the peculiarity of African 
society being ravaged by poverty and ignorance influences to a large extent how contemporary 
African societies relate with the environment.  
 
In the same vein, Ogungbemi does not exonerate the Africans from their contributions to 
environmental degradation. On this view, Jonathan Chimakonam (2018:2), justifying African 
Philosophical concerns for environmentalism, notes the peculiar nature of situations in 
contemporary African societies, with alarming states of poverty wherein the people’s survival 
often depends on environmental resources. The economic situation coupled with the reality of 
depravity in contemporary African society, forces people to depend on the environment for some 
basic amenities. Thus, Chimakonam notes that such situations present a dilemma in the bid to 
counsel the people against the exploitation of the environment—which serves as a means of 
livelihood or survival—and the care for the same environment (2018:1–3). For him then, it is the 
“burden of the African philosopher to convince Cross Riverian35 [a type of an African society in 
 
35 Cross River is a place located in the Southern South of Nigeria. The people originating from the place are referred 
to as Cross Riverian. 
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consideration here], for example, that we owe moral obligations to the future generations with 
regards to the use of their environments” (2018:2).  
 
Making a comparative analogy between the traditional and modern African society, Ogungbemi 
(2001:266) noted the ecological consciousness of the traditional society and found it more 
applaudable than those of Modern African states. He argues that “in our traditional [African] 
relationship with nature, men and women recognise the importance of water, land and air 
management” (2001:266). However, modern African society is marked by a careless disposal of 
waste and the wanton pollution of waterways with both domestic and industrial pollutants. Also, 
the land has witnessed turbidity, erosion, desertification, and flooding, all of which are the 
consequences of the drive for unethical development. Ogungbemi (2001:267) noted that “in the 
bid to catch up with the developed nations, modern African states have exploited the land to the 
effect that the one-time valuable lands are no longer of any agricultural or life sustenance value”. 
To this, he concludes that though the exploration industry has provided jobs, the benefit derivable 
from such job production is minimal to the gravity of the environmental crisis ensuing from such 
industrial activities (2001:267). According to Ogungbemi, contemporary African society 
contributed to the environmental crisis due to their quest to industrially and technologically 
develop (2001:265). Furthermore, on the culpability of the African society for the prevalence of 
environmental crisis in the continent, Ogungbemi argues: 
 
… [T]he drive to catch up with the developmental pace of the western world by 
African states government is responsible for the mass destruction of our 





However, the traditional African society, he noted is culpable in the cause of the environmental 
crisis. For Ogungbemi, traditional societies erred in the excessive use of fuelwood and constant 
bush burning, which in turn increases air pollution, affects air quality, and depletes the forest and 
other natural habitats (2001:266).  
 
Still on this issue of air pollution, and to corroborate Ogungbemi, the United Nations’ Secretary-
General, Antonio Guterres, noted in his 2019 World Environment Day’s Message that “all around 
the world – from megacities to small villages – people are breathing dirty air. He further painted a 
gory picture of the present earth situation with the statistics that “nine out of ten people worldwide 
are exposed to air pollutants that exceed World Health Organization air quality guidelines” 
(2019:1). Such a deplorable health situation, Guterres acknowledges, lowers life expectancy and 
is also responsible for the dwindling economies across the globe. On the source of this deadly 
enemy of life on earth, Guterres pointed at tiny particles from the “burning of fossil fuels for power 
and transport, emission from chemical and mining industries, burning of forest and fields and the 
use of dirty indoor cooking and heating fuels” (2019:2). 
 
However, Ogungbemi recognises the availability of traditional environmental management 
schemes in Africa (2001:266-268). He argues that “[i]n our traditional relationship with nature, 
men and women recognise the importance of water and air management to our traditional 
communities” (2001:267). This cultural practice for him enunciates the ethical habit of not taking 
more than you need from nature. This he argued, “is a moral code” which he went further to diffuse 
from any form of religion or spiritism (Ogungbemi 2001:267). For Ogungbemi, such procedures 
are products of “natural means by which the human environment can be preserved by the ethics of 
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care” (2001:268). The cultural practice envisioned by Ogungbemi here is a kind of universal moral 
code that ensures one is not taking more than one needs from nature. In seeking panacea to the 
myriad of environmental crises in Africa, Ogungbemi posits an African environmental ethic born 
out of an “ethic of care”, which he termed the ethics of nature- relatedness (2001:268). According 
to him, 
 
… [The] ethics of nature relatedness asserts that our natural resources do not 
need [humans] for their existence and function. The ethics of nature relatedness 
can be succinctly stated as an ethic that leads human beings to seek to co-exist 
peacefully with nature and treat it with some reasonable concern for its worth, 
survival, and sustainability (2001:268). 
 
For him, the ‘ethics of nature relatedness’ is functional on the interjections of three basic elements: 
reason, experience, and the will (2001:269-270). Thus, with rationality informed by strands of 
experiences, we would have the will to adhere to the moral codes of ethics of care in our 
relationship with the environment. 
 
I think, on the whole, Ogungbemi’s work falls short of his intended presentation in the essay. His 
quest therein was to explore the traditional African society’s attitude to nature, and he emphasised 
this fact at a point in his essay wherein he held that “[i]n my discussion of the traditional African 
attitude to nature, I promise to show its credibility” (2001:265). However, it is observable that 
what Ogungbemi was able to show from the article, was the attitude of contemporary African 
society to nature; instead of that of the traditional African society that he had intended to show. In 
the introductory part of the essay, he had noted the importance of exploring the traditional as well 
as a contemporary understanding of nature in the discourse of the environmental crisis. His claim 
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that the quest to industrially and technologically develop Africa causes the continent’s ecological 
crisis, however, exonerates the traditional society. 
 
Furthermore, Ogungbemi’s claims applaud the views of some scholars like Bunyan Bryant (2011) 
and Munyaradzi Mawere (2014). For Bryant (2011:32), environmental degradation is a function 
of two factors, namely, the quest for wealth and race.  Mawere noted that “… many of the 
ecological ills in the communal areas of Africa today [is] attributed to poor management of natural 
resources” (2014:x). An uncritical look at his view may push one to conclude with the factors 
raised by Ogungbemi. But, further consideration of Mawere’s arguments inform one that the 
attributes of the poor management of natural resources “are rooted in the context of political and 
socio-economic policies that were enforced in all sectors during colonialism” (2014:ix). This will 
resonate better if one considers the fact that Ogungbemi (2001:270-271), alluded to this idea of 
poor socio-political management on the part of contemporary African political leaders and 
international economic supervening via science and technology in the cause of the ecological crisis 
in Africa. I think that such a position corroborates Mawere’s view that “in order to undertake an 
analysis of the causes of environmental crisis in Africa as well as the methodologies and strategies 
that can be put in place to deal with the crisis, we must know its generic and historical roots” 
(2014:ix). It is the historical root of the crisis that I think Ogungbemi glossed over or overlooked. 
His neglect of the historical roots of the African environmental crisis is revealed more clearly in 
Jimoh Omo-Fadaka’s (1990: 180) view that “poverty, as it is known today, was almost unknown 





4.3.1.4. Godfrey B. Tangwa and Eco-Bio-communitarianism 
Godfrey B. Tangwa (2004) has also made an important contribution to the current orientations in 
African environmental philosophy. Tangwa’s African orientation to environmental philosophy 
hinges on the ethical ideas that are receivable from traditional African metaphysics (2004:387-
389). The metaphysical outlook explored by Tangwa is akin to that of Wiredu which was reviewed 
above. While Wiredu’s view is “Communalist ethics” (1994:47), Tangwa named his, “eco-bio-
communitarianism” (2004:389). For Tangwa, this pre-colonial, traditional metaphysical outlook 
implies “recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, 
plants, animals and the human” (2004:389). This also is a view derived from the foundation of 
unitary ontology, wherein reality is perceived from a holistic lens and all beings exist in a perpetual 
state of interrelationship. Following the same path of reasoning as Wiredu – on the peculiarity of 
traditional African perceptions of reality in comparison to the Western worldview – Tangwa sees 
a form of an unbroken chain of relatedness between all forms of beings, and as such dispels any 
form of dualistic distinctions in perceiving and understanding reality, as well as forming any 
opinion thereof (2004:389). Arguing further, Tangwa opines that: 
 
This [African metaphysical outlook] contrasts with the Western outlook, which 
might be described as anthropocentric and individualistic. Within the African 
traditional outlook, human beings tend to be more cosmically humble and 
therefore not only more respectful of other people but also more cautious in their 
attitude to plants, animals, and inanimate things, and to the various invisible 
forces of the world. One might say, in short, that they are more disposed toward 
an attitude of ‘live and let live.’ African philosophies provide intellectual support 
for this worldview. Within such a worldview, the distinction between plants, 
animals, and inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and 
spirit, the communal and the individual, is a slim and flexible one. For instance, 
the belief that humans, in certain circumstances, can transform into animals and 
plants or into forces, such as the wind, is very prevalent within this system and 




The above shows among other things that the traditional African metaphysical outlook, upon 
which Tangwa’s orientation in AEP is based, is in contradistinction to the Western metaphysical 
worldview.  
 
The notion or idea of “live-and-let-live” (2004:394) inherent in traditional African culture, as noted 
by Tangwa, engenders a form of respect for the environment, which, in turn, forms the basis for 
the conserving attitude to nature and all other nonhuman parts of the earth. With his presentation 
of African socio-cultural practices as communitarian, Tangwa argues that this communitarianism 
forms the fulcrum of African relations to the environment. What is environmentally obtainable 
from this view is that an attitude of respectful coexistence, conciliation, and containment in 
relationship with the environment is naturally attained. As argued by Kayode Fayemi, Tangwa’s 
“eco-bio-communitarian African environmental ethics serves as the basis for contemporary 
Africans’ interaction with the natural world by virtue of its live-and-let-live attitude yet also a 
‘sacred mission’ for the restoration of the African environment” (2017:371). The practical 
applicability of Tangwa’s eco-bio-communitarianism is further seen in his concluding argument 
that: 
 
[T]he standpoint of these reflections [i.e. the idea of the traditional African 
metaphysical worldview] is that a more humble motivation for the pursuit of 
science and technology based on the eco-bio-centric attitude of live and let live 
can be substituted for the aggressive motivation of domination [characterising 
motivation for the development of Western technology] to the immeasurable 




One may thus applaud Tangwa for the envisioned role he gave traditional African metaphysical 
thought to play in proffering panacea to some of the challenges of the contemporary African 
society. 
 
However, Tangwa has been questioned by various scholars, chief of which is Ojomo (2010 and 
2011). For Ojomo, Tangwa’s perspective is an idealised ethnophilosophical defence of the 
indigenous African management of the environment (2010:60). This is because, argues Ojomo, 
Tangwa neither critiques nor questions the practices or lifestyles of traditional Africans which 
contribute to the degradation of the environment through ignorance and poverty among other 
things. Also, Tangwa’s endeavour to situate the ethical worldview of the African environmental 
orientation on the socio-cultural viability of African communalism seems unfounded. This is in 
consideration of Fayemi’s (2017:372) view that “recent literature has suggested that [an] 
ostensibly communalistic conception of traditional African life is questionable”. While Tangwa is 
worthy of some credit for envisioning an indigenous African perspective to the perennial crisis of 
the environment, his postulations may be characterised as an overreliance on ethics.  
 
4.3.1.5. Relational ethics and ontology 
In this section, I explore the idea of relational holism prevalent in African ethical theory and moral 
practices as well as the ontological underpinning of such ethical practices. The African orientation 
in Environmental Philosophy – via the relational ethics and ontology framework – seeks to answer 
the question of the relevance of indigenous African ethical systems, envisioned on the stance of 
relational ontology to addressing the environmental crisis. The idea of ‘relational ethics’ is 
equivalent to what was described as ‘family relationships’ by Oruka and Juma (1994). The 
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relational ethics and ontological frameworks are explored to unearth the holistic view of reality 
underpinned in them.  
 
As enunciated by Thaddeus Metz (2007, 2010, 2011a & 2011b, 2012, 2017), exploring such 
intellectual frameworks for explaining holism engenders a view that makes African ethical theories 
morally appropriate to show the significance of community over individualism. For Metz, the 
African “places relationality at the core of morality” (2012:388). Thus, according to Metz, a being 
has moral status in so far as such a being has the capacity for an intentional connection with other 
moral beings in the community. In other words, “the greater a being’s capacity to be part of a 
communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status” (2012:387). 
 
Perhaps the best intellectual articulation of applying the African relational ethical idea to 
environmental philosophy is seen in Kevin Behrens(2010); (2012); (2014); and  Munamato 
Chemhuru  (2016); (2017b). I begin with Behrens who addresses the question of what the African 
moral thought and practice – entrenched in the relational philosophy by Metz – could offer to 
environmental ethics? (2011:ii-iii) For him, this is African environmental relationalism (Behrens 
2014). The beauty of environmental relationalism for Behrens lies in a refusal to firmly prioritise 
either the interests of individuals or communities and in the understanding that individuals are 
fully realised only through community relationships (2010:467). He, therefore, posited that the 
idea of interrelatedness or interconnectedness of human beings with the rest of nature is evident in 
African thought (Behrens 2014:65). This is because an intellectual thought that recognises the 





Chemhuru, in exploring the environmental ethical import of the African relational idea, however, 
took an ontological turn (2016:1).  He is of the view that an African ontology-based and 
teleologically-oriented environmental ethics would be a veritable tool in “unpacking and 
understanding environmental ethics in Africa” (2017:41). He notes the understanding of the 
hierarchical existence of beings in African ontology, however, not without recognising the fact of 
varying degrees of potency in these various levels of existence (2017:42). Within this hierarchy of 
existence, Chemhuru (2017:42-43) argues that all beings are ultimately inclined towards some 
fundamental purpose for existence that are contained in the various appeals to environmental 
ethics. Such environmental ethical appeal includes appeals to life, vitality, sentience, and well-
being (2017:43). While Chemhuru should be credited for infusing the African ontological thought 
in his application of relational African ethical principles to environmentalism, his efforts, as will 
be further enunciated in the sixth chapter of this study, are nonetheless faulted with an overreliance 
on ethics. His employment of ethics is more glaring because ontology and epistemology are two 
sides of the same coin in African intellectual thought. Thus, to use one without the other is to 
distort the African intellectual heritage. 
 
4.4. On the call for an alternative framework in African Environmental 
Philosophy (AEP) 
One common fact obtainable from the examination of various contributions of scholars to the issue 
of Environmental Philosophy from African perspectives, is, that their ideas were anchored mainly 
on the ethical reflections of Africans in their relationship with the environment. Those not 
employing ethics directly have gone ahead to explicate the ontological understanding of African 
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society, especially the idea of interrelations of all beings prevalent in African metaphysics. Their 
attempts had been structured either through the examination of the communalistic nature of the 
African society and its effect on human/nature relationships or by considering the ontological 
underpinning of such communalistic worldview of the African culture. The scholars examined 
above have underscored the African orientation in environmental philosophy mainly through 
ethics, or ontology-based ethical framework. These observations are in line with Ojomo’s 
argument that “[g]lobal concerns about the current environmental crisis have culminated in some 
controversial environmental ethical theories… one of the underlying features connecting these 
environmental ethical theories is their grounding in Western perspectives, ethical and cultural 
experiences” (2010:49).  
 
As earlier noted in the second chapter of this study, there is a part-whole conceptual stance between 
environmental ethics and environmental philosophy. It was noted then that the vastness of issues 
to grapple with using philosophic tools on environmentalism surpasses just the employment of 
ethics as a framework. Hence, the position that the idea of overreliance on ethics in various 
philosophical orientations in environmentalism (in African studies and beyond) is unhelpful to 
deal with environmental problems. The views of both Zimmerman (1998:vi-ix) and Colyvan 
(2006:97–99) earlier noted in chapters one and two of this work comes to mind here. As their 
views reiterate the idea that environmental philosophy cannot be made an appendage of 
environmental ethics and that to do so is to commit a dangerous mistake of thinking that 
philosophical concerns in environmentalism only falls within the purview of ethics. Also, the 
employment of the African ontological view in some studies in African orientation in 
environmental philosophy sampled in this study, shows either a misrepresentation or undermining 
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of the intellectual utility of African ontology. This is because these studies neglect the fact that a 
full grasp of African ontological viewpoints requires an understanding of the African epistemic 
process. Thus, not exploring the African epistemic process in their ontological based account of 
AEP unearths an intellectual gap demanding urgent and sound attention. Our study, therefore, 
posits that in investigating the African understanding of the contemporary environmental crisis, 
such investigations should be geared toward an epistemologically enabled reconstruction of the 
African orientation in Environmental Philosophy. 
 
While the schematic arrangement of this study places the exploration of the African epistemic 
process and its application to environmentalism in the subsequent chapters five and six of this 
study respectively, the need for this alternative framework in AEP is only revealed here. This study 
in the first chapter has noted some scholars like Ekwealo (2011:10-11), Badru (2018:198-202), 
and Kelbessa (2018:309-323) who all highlighted the need to consider epistemology as a veritable 
philosophical tool in addressing environmental challenges from the African viewpoints. However, 
the fact that these studies did not commit to the exploration of Indigenous African Epistemic Order 
for environmental engagement makes their attempt passive, thus, a rationale for the advancement 
of an African epistemic process as an alternative framework for AEP. In other words, the need to 
fill the intellectual gaps created by the examined studies gave credence to proffering an alternative 
framework for addressing the global phenomenon of the environmental crisis from African 
parlance. Furthermore, the epistemic perspective to environmentalism will also add to the 
intellectual voice of the Africans among the nations of the world, even in the quest for Sustainable 




As noted above in the introductory chapter of this study, epistemology has a conceptual stance to 
provide the basis for cultural worldviews; these worldviews to a large extent determine the 
cognitive and affective tools to understanding reality, hence, epistemology could be seen to have 
a conceptual base to incite epistemic virtue that could enhance humans’ understanding of the place 
of humans in the scheme of existence. Thus, this study argues that the radical paradigm needed for 
a proper AEP is an Environmental Ethics borne out of the indigenous epistemic order of the 
Africans. To this end, the research in subsequent chapters will seek to address the need for 
alternative approaches that are firmly rooted in the African epistemic process. The envisioned 
understanding of the human-nature relationship that the African epistemic process engenders can 
influence the perception of humans as part of nature, enhance an attitude of cautious use of nature, 
guides our habits, and informs environmental oriented duties that will be essential for the 
development of an African epistemic outlook in environmental philosophy. It should be noted that 
this study, will show how the epistemic approach is both participatory and interdisciplinary. The 
participatory and interdisciplinary virtue of the African epistemic outlook for environmental 
philosophy is essential because of the vastness of issues inherent in the discourse of 
environmentalism. 
 
This study opines that an African environmental postulation that has its bedrock on the value-laden 
stance (normative) and social constructivity (descriptive) of Indigenous African epistemic order 
would give a viable reconstruction of environmental philosophy that is in coherence with ‘African 
ontology’ as noted by Tangwa. It will also give ground for the indigenous knowledge system 
needed to entrench “reason, experiences and will for the practicability of Ogungbemi’s  ‘ethic of 
nature relatedness’. In response to the earlier observed challenge posed by Ojomo, I want to aver 
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that, without an appropriate Indigenous African Epistemic framework for an environmental 
philosophy that is of African orientation, the quest for an environmental ethical theory compliant 
with the cultural existential realities of the Africans would be a mirage. Owing to the above 
justification for the call for an alternative approach in AEP, this study posits that the epistemic 
platform of intellectual consideration of environmental challenges is required for a complete 
environmental philosophical discourse. This is if one takes cognisance of Bryant’s view that 
“epistemology provides the foundation for a culture’s worldview, which in turn determines the 
mental constructs the people use in understanding reality” (2011:7). Hence, our constructs of 
reality determine to a large extent the modalities for adjudging moral considerability as well as an 
ethical point of view. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the possibility of the idea of African environmental philosophy as a variant of 
African Philosophy has been examined. While conceptualising African Philosophy on the 
complementary relationship ensuing between the objective and subjective dimension of 
philosophy, it has been argued that only upon the interrelation of such distinctive but related 
dimensions would a proper understanding of African Philosophy be arrived at. This is because 
seeing African Philosophy in this format will give a stance of engaging the existential challenges 
of Africa from an objective point of view. The chapter has thus been able to come up with a 
working definition of African Philosophy as a subjective presentation of any practitioner’s 
intellectual endeavour to grapple with the life-process, situated on the objective ground of 
philosophy. Thus, considering the environmental crisis of our time as one of the examples of life-
processes requiring intellectual engagement, the chapter made a case for an African orientation in 
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environmental philosophy. The African orientation argued for is a practical application of the 
complementary perspectives of the idea of objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy. 
AEP is, thus, considered and explored as a rational and critical discourse on environmentalism 
from the African parlance.  Thus, the chapter examined a series of attempts at providing sustainable 
solutions to the environmental crisis from the standpoint of African Philosophy.  
 
Examining the current philosophical discourse on the environmental crisis from the African point 
of view, revealed that they fall short because of their over-reliance on ethics, as is the case in the 
Western orientation in Environmental Philosophy. It is the imperativeness of addressing their 

















The nature of the “African Epistemic Order” 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with conceptualising the idea of an indigenous ‘Epistemic Order’ of an African 
orientation. In the previous chapter, the need for an alternative framework in African 
environmental philosophy was enunciated. The justification and need for such a framework is 
argued to be largely due to the deficit created by an overreliance on ethics in the existing 
viewpoints on African orientations in environmental philosophy. Such deficiencies directed this 
research work to address the environmental crisis of our contemporary world from the threshold 
of African epistemology. This study is hinged on the understanding that indigenous African 
epistemic worldviews, if explored, would enable us to unearth ecologically oriented ethical values 
that will be fit for better comprehension of the environment, and which will also enable a 
harmonious human-nature relationship. 
 
The goal, then, is to present an intellectual standpoint that would underscore the contribution of 
African epistemology to environmental philosophy. However, for a proper articulation of this 
environmental epistemic orientation, it is essential to examine the idea of African epistemology, 
upon which the environmental discourse is expected to rest. Two reasons make this examination 
imperative for this research work. One, is the observation that there is an unfair superimposition 
of the Western knowledge system over the Indigenous Knowledge systems (IKS), through the 
disruption and fracturing of the African Indigenous Knowledge Systems (AIKS). Two, are the 
methodic errors that characterise attempts by scholars to combat the denigration of African 
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Indigenous Knowledge Systems. These errors, we will argue, undermine the intellectual efforts at 
advancing AIKS. While this chapter champions and supports the attempts at advancing the 
potential of AIKS, it, however, cautions against some methodic errors in such efforts.  
 
Thus, the chapter begins by examining the idea of African Indigenous Knowledge systems (AIKS). 
Indigenous knowledge systems will be explored here as a way of knowing of the African 
indigenous people. While the present author recognises the content or praxis framework of ideating 
IKS, focus will be on the process frameworks36 of IKS and its viability for effective solutions to 
complex contemporary challenges. Thereafter, consideration of the idea of epistemic injustice in 
Africa will follow in which it will be shown that the reality of epistemic injustice engenders the 
quest for epistemic freedom by the people whose indigenous epistemic processes had been crushed 
or fractured. In the explication of an African indigenous epistemic order, efforts will be made to 
obviate two methodic errors that most authors fall victim to in their attempt to discuss theories that 
are African-oriented. The first is the usage of Western paradigms as a yardstick for rational 
intellectualism and authenticating tool for theories drawn from African paradigms. The second, is 
the tendency to canonise indigenous ideas as sacrosanct thought processes that are necessarily true 
and meant to be deified and employed without question. 
 
Thus, examining the African epistemological idea that is devoid of these methodic errors becomes 
crucial. Such an examination commences from the exposition of the concept of ‘knowing’ as a 
human activity, which reveals the defects of universalising the ethnocentric presentation of any 
 
36 Ideating IKS from the content or praxis perspectives focuses on the instances of good practices from the lived 
experiences of the indigenous people. While the process perspectives of IKS focuses on the exploration of the 
conceptual or theoretical framework of indigenous ways of knowing.   
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culture’s epistemology.  In addition, exploring the concept of knowing calls into question the 
legitimacy of referring to ‘others’ epistemic processes as inferior or lacking in intellectual 
substance. To this end, this chapter avers for an African oriented epistemic order that is devoid of 
ethnocentric tendencies and uncritical nativism. Thus, in this light, an appropriate epistemic system 
of any culture would be one that envisions the life-process37 of that culture.  
 
5.2. African Indigenous Knowledge Systems (AIKS) 
The focus in this section is to examine the idea of the Indigenous knowledge Systems (IKS). 
Examining IKS is apt to unearthing its suitability for the discourse of environmental philosophy. 
It should be noted that focus is given to the process framework of the IKS rather than the content 
framework, as enunciated below. Conceptualising IKS from the process formation unveils the 
structural, logical and the intellectual stance of IKS as a viable platform to engage any 
contemporary issue, i.e., environmental crisis. IKS here is taken as the series of knowledge 
practices of indigenous cultures. In focusing on these it goes to show that the research is not 
oblivious of the existence of various indigenous systems of knowledge acquisition and justification 
such as African, Australasian, Amerindian, etc. In doing so I acknowledge the fact that there are 
different approaches and outlooks to comprehend the world around us (Jimoh and Thomas 
2015:117). However, my focus in the exploration of the IKS in this study will be mainly on the 
African Indigenous Knowledge Systems (AIKS). This is to ensure academic focus, and that room 




37 Please, refer to the fourth chapter of this study for an in-depth explanation of the term, Life-process. 
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“African Indigenous Knowledge Systems” will be employed in the plural form, in order that we 
might acknowledge the diversity of indigenous knowledge forms in Africa arising from the fact 
that although African people have many cultural practises and experiences in common, their varied 
cultures cannot be homogenised or reduced into one culture. Scholars like: Osman (2009); Owusu-
Ansah, F.E. & Mji (2013); Kaya, Hassan O. & Seleti (2013), (2014); Mubangizi, John and Kaya 
(2015); Kaya (2016); Jimoh (2018); and Velthuizen (2019), to mention but a few, have affirmed 
the plurality of AIKS with the justification that such plurality gives room for diversity of 
knowledge systems on the African continent. This implies that there are diverse epistemologies in 
Africa. 
 
The present author allies himself with Bunyan Bryant’s (2011:39) view that “epistemology is value 
laden”, i.e. that epistemic ideas are universally socially constructed. This view has also been 
corroborated by Owusu-Ansah and Mji (2013:2) as they argue that knowledge systems are 
valuative in nature as they are the lens through which cultural perception and interpretation of 
reality are made possible. In the same vein, Theophilus Okere as noted in the fourth chapter of this 
research work alluded to the value-laden stance of knowledge as a function of any local epistemic 
process. For him, all scientific knowledge is first local knowledge and accordingly it is justifiable 
to assume that for philosophy to be African, it must have some expressions of African life 
(2004:22). The value-laden stance of epistemology permits its consideration as that which is 
context driven and culturally based. This view is also in sync with the argument of Lesiba Teffo 
(2013:191) that, knowledge is best conceived as a social construct reflecting the culture of the 
proponent’s communities. In other words, cultural values and interests of a particular society 
inform how that society codifies its worldviews into knowledge. Thus, one could hold with 
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Owusu-Ansah and Mji (2013:1) that “knowledge or science, and its methods of investigation, 
cannot be divorced from a people’s history, cultural content and worldview”. Thus, social 
valuation and worldviews, could be termed as factors shaping that society’s consciousness. These 
factors would also form the bases for the theoretical framework within which knowledge is sought, 
critiqued and or understood. 
 
Indigenous knowledges are knowledges from particular cultural settings and are accumulated 
through a long series of observations transmitted from generation to generation (Gadgil, Berkes, 
and Folke 1993:151). These knowledges include perceptions of reality, making sense of reality, 
understanding of day to day lived experiences and codification of these into epistemic models. IKS 
could be exemplified in traditional food and medicinal plants, archaeological and associated styles 
and systems, traditional activities like folklores, plays, arts, music, proverbs, traditional rural 
administrative centres, etc. (Teffo 2013:194). IKS would better be appreciated if viewed as 
material and non-material values that form the traditional resources that are essential for the 
cultural survival of the indigenous people (Mauro and Hardison 2000:1263). The indigenous 
people are identified by frameworks that highlight the following elements: 
 
Self-identification as indigenous; descent from the occupants of a territory prior 
to an act of conquest; possession of a common history, language, and culture 
regulated by customary laws that are distinct from national cultures; possession 
of a common land; exclusion or marginalisation from political decision-making; 
and claims for collective and sovereign rights that are unrecognised by the 
dominating and governing group(s) of the state (2000:1264). 
 
It is clear that there are diverse elements that characterise a person as indigenous. The 
diversification of cultural practices that ensure survival of indigenous people allow for plurality of 
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knowledge systems (2002:1267). In such knowledge systems, superimposition of a particular 
cultural worldview is jettisoned, and complementary or integrated knowledge forms are allowed 
for growth and sustainable development. 
 
In the conception of Dennis Warren (1991:8), indigenous knowledge is “the local knowledge – 
knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society”. IKS could, thus, be seen as “the cumulative 
body of strategies, practices, techniques, tools, intellectual resources, explanations, beliefs and 
values accumulated over time in a particular locality, without the interference and impositions of 
external hegemonic forces” (Emeagwali 2014:2).  This coheres with the position of Gadgil, 
Berkes, and Folke (1993:152) that IKS is the aggregate of the body of knowledge and belief 
systems that are transmitted through cultural practices from one generation to another in a 
particular society. Implicit in Emeagwali’s conception of IKS is the recognition of the possibility 
of indigenous societies’ contacts with hegemonic forces, especially the Eurocentric worldview of 
objectifying other non-Western conceptual schemes and rendering them as illogical (2014:3-4). 
Her opinion is, therefore, that what will count as IKS are those epistemic processes of a society 
that are exclusively known and which belong to the society, without the overbearing interference 
of other cultural inclinations (2014:4). 
 
Additionally, IKS should not be reduced to a particularist opinion about reality. They transcend 
particularism as many of them are based on an objective understanding and experience of reality 





IKS is an appraisal of the sense of rationality by which a people make meaning 
out of reality and thereby foster a harmonious interaction among themselves. In 
this context, IK can be said to be the refusal to devalue or marginalise indigenous 
ways of acquiring, preserving, and transmitting knowledge.  
 
This is also evident in Emeagwali’s view of the social and practical utility of IKS for African 
societies. For her, in the context of the Africans, IKS is a “dynamic engagement with a people’s 
rationality that intends to decolonise the hegemony of colonialism and indoctrination” (2014:1).  
 
A caveat to be made here is that Emeagwali employs the term IKS as a tool for decolonisation 
projects, that is, the intellectual exercise of divesting Africa (or other colonised peoples) from all 
forms of colonialism vestiges. Therefore, the study of AIKS is one of the means at developing a 
platform for the epistemic panacea to the denigration of the African knowledge system by the 
Europeans. This explains why IKS would be viewed as a social phenomenon. As such, IKS 
becomes part of the everyday reality of indigenous peoples. The dynamism of AIKS as noted by 
Jimoh is that it is passed from one generation to another as tradition and heritage, and people in 
each era adapt and add to it. This dynamic nature makes AIKS understandable as the “totality of 
that which is meaningful, which provides the rational basis that undergirds the life of the natives 
[sic] of a particular place” (Jimoh 2018:8).  
 
On the part of Velthuizen (2019:190), the “[i]ndigenous knowledge system is embedded in an 
African knowledge system (AKS) as part of African culture”. African indigenous knowledge 
systems, thus, are a mode of understanding the values, ways of knowing and perception of events 




… [T]he totality of all knowledge and practices, whether explicit or implicit, used 
in the management of socio-economic, spiritual and ecological facets of life…it 
includes definition, classifications and concepts of the physical, natural, social, 
economic and ideational environments (2005:2–3). 
 
The emphasis upon practices, also enunciates the communitarian38 perspectives of the African 
society, as the communal nature of the people’s lives are exhibited in their understanding of reality, 
as well as in the epistemic process. The communal nature undergirds the humanistic values that 
are embedded in the rich traditional practices that form the indigenous knowledge systems of 
Africa (Velthuizen 2019:193). The communal nature of the African cultural orientations engenders 
humanistic values that serve as essential ingredients of IKS needed for the survival of African 
societies.  
 
As the humanistic values emerge from communal efforts, AIKS enhances healthy competition in 
the quest for innovation and development in society. A quick look at the etymology of the concept 
of ‘competition’ brings this to light. The word ‘competition’ in its original Latin derivation can be 
phrased as com-petěre, which means to seek or strive for something (petěre) together (com) 
(Donald 1874). Competing does not imply isolating, excluding or dominating others, rather it 
unearths unique peculiarities of the constituent members of the community for complementary 
engagement. Thus, even at the level of epistemology, Africans are able to forge partnerships of 
seeking together knowledge that will enable the survival of their societies. These partnerships are 
aided by the fact that African societies are essentially communalistic. Owusu-Ansah and Mji 
 
38 The discussion of the communitarian nature of African societies has been a major preoccupation of many scholars, 
i.e. (Mbiti 1969); (Menkiti 1984:171–81), (Menkiti 2004:311–24); (Gyekye 1992:101–22), to mention but a few. 
The communitarian nature of the African society informs the ways and manner in which African peoples understand, 
explain and communicate reality. Some examples of such worldviews were presented in the previous chapter of this 
work, on the idea of “African Environmental Orientations” (which forms part of Chapter Four of this study). There 
it was noted that the communitarian nature of African existence also informs the traditional African conceptions 
about the human-nature relationship.  
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captures the communalist characteristics of AIKS as that which is structured on the relational 
worldview of Africans (2013:1-2). This relational worldview includes the harmonised wholeness 
of the community – comprised of both humans and nonhumans. The communalist nature of 
African societies shows a sense of interrelatedness and interdependency of all beings in the domain 
of existence.39 This underscores the holistic nature of IKS, as it includes all aspects of life. IKS, 
therefore, involves the combination of practical knowledge, arts, technological innovation, natural 
cognition, spiritual considerations and religion, social history, agricultural endeavours, governance 
and socio-cultural appropriations, etc., of the indigenous people. The combination of these features 
of IKS provides the epistemic basis for understanding reality, adjudging between wrong and right 
and functional for the everyday living of a people.  
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the conceptualisation of IKS involves the unveiling of 
good practices from the lived experiences of the indigenous people. In other words, case studies 
of the material depicting the ethical, social, technological, architectural, educational and economic 
practices at the local level are often put forward in the conceptualisation of what indigenous 
knowledge is. Put in another way, attempts at conceptualising IKS often focus on practise, and, 
thus, assume the theoretical formation of the epistemic process (Briggs 2013b:231).  
 
Obtainable from conceptualising IKS from the practical contents is the method of prioritising the 
praxis of IKS over its exploration as an epistemological theory. The dependence on the praxis 
framework at the exclusion of theory thereof is identified by this study as a major gap in the 
 
39 Although the theory and practice of communalism refer to relationships between and among human beings and 
has nothing to do with nonhuman beings, however, scholars like Kevin Behrens (2010), (2014); and Chemhuru 




ideation of IKS. It should however be noted that while the praxis consideration of IKS helps in the 
utilitarian codification of the indigenous peoples’ cultural practices (Nadubere 2006:7–9), (Teffo 
2013:189), nevertheless, exclusively focus on the practical contents of the cultural materials in the 
ideation of IKS which can easily compromise the exploration of the theoretical framework of 
indigenous ways of knowing. Thus, the content formation of ideating IKS could be identified as 
one of the major reasons why the potentialities of IKS is yet to be fully matched with development 
theories in addressing contemporary issues in Africa.   This is in consideration of the views of 
Mcfarlane (2006); Sillitoe (2010); and Briggs (2005), Briggs (2013b); that the utilitarian 
projections of indigenous practices in comprehending IKS have resulted in an intellectual impasse 
having little help on development practice. The principal reason for this impasse is the possibility 
that exploring the practical content or unveiling the utilitarian stance of local content of IKS can 
easily lead to a glossing over of the theoretical formation for the development and deployment of 
IKS.  
 
Expanding IKS beyond local application and geographic specificity is, however, a challenge, as 
the content framework for conceiving IKS makes it remain at the periphery of local practice and 
not functional in the integration with knowledge formations in other regions of the world in 
addressing contemporary challenges. For instance, if the call of Lado (2004:281) for a synergy 
between IK and modern knowledge systems – to produce a more realistic and sensitive 
understanding and management of natural resources for sustainable development – will be of any 
help, a theoretical analysis and understanding of the formations and development of IKS remains 
imperative. The advantage of the theoretical formation approach is that it “reduces or dilutes, the 
location-specific nature of IK by drawing on the greater universality of formal scientific 
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knowledge” (Briggs 2013b:234). Reducing the location-specifics of IKS is essential for the 
development of IKS, as it makes IKS more acceptable both locally and internationally in building 
up solutions to contemporary challenges. This approach to IKS, wherein a synchronisation of the 
subjective (contextual stance of IKS) with the objective (general understanding of knowing) is 
effected, coheres with the complementarity perspectives employed in this thesis. John Briggs 
(2013b:237) notes the importance of employing IKS in a theory or process format, rather than a 
content format, when he argues that the process format becomes necessary as it is “essential that 
it [IKS] extends beyond the culturally and spatially bound restriction of geographical thinking”. 
Briggs’ viewpoint ties in with that of Fikret Berkes (2009:152–53) that IK should focus on process 
rather than on content. This is because ‘process’ emphasises the understanding of methods for 
analysing, questioning, observing, comprehending and rationalising, that is embedded in IKS. In 
other words, indigenous methods of knowing should be emphasised above the contents of 
indigenous knowledge. What this means is that attempts at comprehending IKS from the process 
stance, makes ideating IKS an “epistemology of indigenous knowledge systems” (Briggs 
2013b:237).  
 
Taking IKS as an epistemic study of the indigenous ways of knowing breaks the content 
constraints, as it extends the study of IKS beyond the spatial bound associated with the particular 
cultural context of local practices. While the content approach has helped in showcasing the value, 
significance and viability of IK as an alternative way of knowing, Berkes (2009:154) notes that 
“not taking knowledge out of its cultural context is one of the biggest challenges of indigenous 
knowledge research”. It is a challenge for widening the universal applicability of IKS in the age 
of globalisation. Overcoming the content limitation for IKS informs the approach of this study to 
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explore AIKS as an epistemic process of the African people. Thus, IKS in the process framework 
is seen as a way of knowing from within particular cultural context, with a wider applicability 
beyond the local context. Justification for the process sense will include the idea that, if IKS will 
be viable to make contributions to understanding and addressing contemporary challenges, its 
comprehension in the stance of process is imperative. The imperativeness inheres in perspectives 
that the process approach helps to unveil the contents for possible intercultural dialogue, 
international recognition and removes the esoteric nature that often characterises IKS. Thus, IKS 
could be made viable in providing possibilities for “new ways of knowing, new ways of thinking 
and new ways of making development intervention” (Briggs 2013b:238).  
 
The focus on the contents of IKS has essentially helped in demonstrating the significance of the 
repertoire and genre of IK that has been functional towards the sustenance of the local people. To 
this end, the content framework could be said to have been instrumental in establishing the 
legitimacy and authenticity of the IKS. However advantageous the content-focus might have been, 
it still limits the development of IKS by geographical and cultural bounds. Hence, this study’s 
focus on the process framework. Focusing on the process format in ideating IKS informs the 
unfettered grasp of IKS and allows for a wider impact in its applicability to contemporary 
existential challenges like poverty, political instability, pandemics, and particularly environmental 
crisis – the focus of this study. The imperativeness of the focus on process in ideating IKS is further 
argued for by Briggs. For him, the process format:  
 
… [O]ffer us a way forward, to develop our own knowledge about indigenous 
ways of knowing, to understand better the complex power relation associated 
with knowledge at the local level, to think about ways in which the power which 
currently exists, both implicitly and explicitly, in formal science and technology 
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knowledge [are] and how these can be negotiated, and how individuals at the 
community level can be involved in the process, where the emphasis is on 
empowerment without the naiveties of the participation era (2013b:240).  
 
It is, thus, the aim in this chapter to explore IKS as a way of knowing. The focus here is to show 
its significance, through the process frameworks, how it may be viable for effective solutions to 
complex ecological challenges, and, thus, be able to proffer frameworks for valuable management 
and sustainability of ecological sustenance practices. 
 
5.3. Epistemic injustice on African knowledge forms  
In this subsection, I critique the tendency of Western epistemology to superimpose itself over 
African Indigenous knowledge systems. I will show that the hegemony of the Eurocentric 
epistemic position is illogical, inaccurate and hence unjust to the IKS. Before that, I will discuss 
the Eurocentric epistemic position. Eurocentrism is the hierarchical worldview describing the 
practice and intellectual heritage of the Western orientation as superior to other segments of 
humanity. The Western intellectual heritage was examined in the third chapter of this study and 
the abasement of its attempts to universalise its ethnocentric views was highlighted. This 
hierarchical worldview as argued by Tsenay Serequeberhan (2002:64) is grounded in the 
metaphysical belief or idea that European existence is qualitatively superior to other forms of 
human life. Thus, for life to be adjudged meaningful or real, it must conform to the reality of 
European modernity.  
 
Emboldened by the idea of European superiority is the epistemic project of universalising the 
Western worldview as the yardstick for determining the viability, authenticity or validity of other 
cultural worldviews. In this light, the Eurocentric epistemic process can be seen as the epistemic 
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method that promotes Western epistemological systems as essential to be ascribed to by non-
European people. In other words, the Eurocentric epistemic process forcefully pushes Western 
thought as ‘the given’ epistemic heritage to which all other cultures must be validated by. Informed 
by the ethos of Eurocentrism, for instance, is the idea that the exclusive rights to justify, validate 
or screen the knowledge process, experience and truth about African Philosophy can only be held 
by Europeans (Ramose 2002b:2). The illogicality of such a line of reason undergirding Western 
thoughts has been argued by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007:45) and (2014:238), as “Western-
centric abyssal thinking”. 
 
This Western-centric epistemic position is described by De Sousa Santos (2014:6) as the 
epistemicide of indigenous knowledge – the killing or massive destruction of indigenous people’s 
knowledge. Isaac Ehaleoye Ukpokolo (2018:3) describes the same position as the “fracturing [of] 
African indigenous knowledge system[s]”. For Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the superimposition and 
suppression of African epistemology is a “long-term consequence of modernity, enslavement and 
colonialism, [which has made] African people [to] have been reproduced as [instruments40] in an 
Eurocentric history” (2018:1). This is largely in the bid to fit African conceptual schemes and 
intellectual engagements into the hegemonic and supposedly unitary episteme of the Western 
thought system. Such biased epistemic reasoning was further described by Anselm Jimoh as a 
“situation of distortion, which has broken and dismembered African IKS through systematic 
degradation and epistemological silencing” (2018:10). 
 
 
40 Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018:1) here employs the term ‘agents’ in denoting Africans. However, it should be noted that, 
the treatment of Africans through slavery and colonialism is such that Africans were not be regarded as agents of 
any history including their own. 
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On the whole the Eurocentric epistemic process, which is accompanied by the repression of IKS, 
brought about a systematic and systemic othering of non-Western epistemologies. The operation 
of this epistemic process rests on the denial of the rationality of Africans. The depiction of Africa, 
as a continent of persons without rational abilities for engaging with their existential realities is a 
“denial of humanity [that] automatically disqualified [Africa] from epistemic virtue” (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2018:3). To show the Western prejudicial thought that Africans are incapable of 
epistemic productions – which, it follows, is a direct denial of the Africans’ humanity – Ramose 
argues: 
 
The question whether or not African Philosophy is possible or exists… pertains 
more to the capability of the African to philosophise. In other words, it is 
doubtful that Africans can philosophise. If Africans were exposed to 
philosophy, they could not cope with its requirements. This is because by their 
nature, their very being what they are, it is impossible for Africans to do 
philosophy. In this way, the question assumes an ontological character: it calls 
into question the humanity of the Africans. The question is thus another way 
of saying that it is doubtful if Africans are wholly and truly human beings 
(2002b:4) 
 
The systematic othering of non-Western epistemologies, structured on the indefensible bias that 
European existence is the true human existence, became the legitimate right for the global conquest 
and colonisation of non-European indigenous cultures, including Africans (Ramose 2002b:1–3; 
Serequeberhan 2002:64–67).  As such, Africans were subjugated and degraded to a sub-human 
group that lacks epistemic capability and, thus, requires the tutelage of the ‘Western intellect’ to 
function. De Sousa Santos clearly captured this when he noted that “it is during the heydays of 
colonialism that Africa was re-invented as a site of darkness bereft of any knowledge beyond 
superstitions” (2014:19). Furthermore, the Eurocentric epistemic process also ensued as a systemic 
othering of IKS because – as an ideological system – it sets out to deform IKS through colonial 
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genocides, the theft of history, “epistemicide” (De Sousa Santos 2014:238), and linguicides (i.e. 
the killing of indigenous people’s languages) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018:3). This resulted into a 
systemic annihilation of IKS. In addition, the annihilation of AIKS could be seen as the death of 
the significant development of knowledge in the African continent.  
 
The theme of the rupturing of knowledge systems of cultures that are different to the Western 
conceptual scheme is also shared by Kwasi Wiredu when he noted that “Africans were not just 
colonised, [but that] colonialism made deep inroads into the psychology of most of us and 
formidably distorted our African identity” (2000:185). The identity distortion creates a colonial 
mentality in the African that eventually makes the African overvalue anything that originates from 
the colonial masters. The precarious state of Africa under the continuous suppression of its 
epistemic order which culminated in her colonisation, and subjected her to power and knowledge 
control, eventually placed the West at an advantage. In the view of the fact that power and 
knowledge are intertwined in the political-cum-economic control of the contemporary world, 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni further notes that “the control of the domain of knowledge generation and 
knowledge cultivation remain[s] very important for the maintenance of asymmetrical global power 
structures since the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity” (2018:8).  
 
Modernity, seen in Bhambra’s view, is “the dominant frame for social and political thought, not 
just in the West, but across the world” (2007:1). Modernity carries two essential notions: rupture 
(a temporal rupture that distinguishes a traditional, agrarian past from the modern, industrial 
present) and difference (a fundamental difference that distinguishes Europe from the rest of the 
world) (2007:1). Eurocentric epistemic processes can thus be seen to take root in the attempt to 
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globalise Eurocentric modernity through differentiating it from the rest, and through the rupturing 
of IKS.  
 
The assumption of difference and rupture creates a stance for the imperial reasoning of the West, 
wherein Europe is empowered with epistemic capabilities and is, thus, justified to rupture the 
‘other’ so-called sub-human category cultures of the world that are assumed to lack conceptual 
epistemic schemes.  Thus, even in the so-called post-colonial era, a series of attempts are being 
made to brand the indigenous cultures of African as uncivilised, irrational, undemocratic, illogical 
and erroneous (Biakolo 2002:10–18). While it could be said of the African colonised population 
that their AIKS – which existed before the advent of colonialism – was forcefully suppressed by 
the colonial masters imposing their way of life over the locals, the same cannot be completely said 
of contemporary post-colonial African societies. This is because the forceful distortion has been 
replaced by subtle and psychological processes that erode off the indigenous knowledge systems 
almost unnoticeably.  
 
Jimoh, making a historical assertion, notes that, “the people [contemporary African society] were 
socialised into believing that their indigenous practices and ways of doing things were wrong” 
(2018:16). The gradual process of distortion, suppression and breaking of AIKS started seamlessly 
by a series of veiled methods undervaluing Africans’ cultural heritages. The devaluation of African 
intellectual heritages is further promoted through globalisation and the universalisation of the 
Western way of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ as the ideal. Shizha (2013:4) accounts that the progressive 
technological changes in communication, political and economic power, institutionalisation of 
Western knowledge, skills and cultural values – as the idyllic – are the tools of globalisation. The 
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resultant effect of this subtle devaluation of the African indigenous heritage, is for Africans to see 
nothing worthwhile in their IKS.  
 
One of the reasons the expositions and exploring of AIKS is important, is the understanding that 
most developments in science and technology have their roots in indigenous knowledge (Maweu 
2011:35). Following on this view – that science and technology have their roots in indigenous 
knowledge – it will be very apt in considering Bryant (2011:39), Owusu-Ansah and Mji (2013:2), 
and Okere (2004:22) who concur that, cultural valuation of the knowing process enhances 
‘knowledge’ as that which originates from culturally domesticated thoughts. One may, thus, be 
inclined to argue that all knowledge is ‘indigenous’.  Maweu (2011:41-44) sustains the same 
position when she justifies the viability of AIKS as authentic knowledge forms. With the 
understanding that all forms of knowledge have roots in an indigenous knowledge system, and the 
consideration of the universal nature of knowing41, it is logically conclusive to hold that non-
Western epistemic worldviews are as essential to the peoples that hold them as the Westerners’ 
own is to the West. What is being reinforced here, is the fact that the art of knowing, or the 
knowledge forming capability is not unique to any society or segment of humanity, as knowing is 
a by-product of rationality, which is one of the essential features of being human. Hence, the 
superimposition of the Eurocentric epistemic process, and/or the destruction of indigenous ways 
of knowing is not only illogical, but needless. It will, thus, be correct to hold that every society has 
its conceptual schemes, cognitive categories, as well as affective domains of understanding reality. 
It is, therefore, proper to have an IKS of a particular society, and the validity or authenticity of 
such would not be subjected to the intellectual culture or conceptual frameworks outside that 
 
41  The universal nature of knowing as an epistemic function of all humanity regardless of race, colour and location 
is enunciated further in this chapter. 
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culture. On this, Jimoh argues: 
 
African indigenous epistemology is a distinctively African epistemic system; a 
social and communitarian epistemology that espouses a cultural and situated 
notion of knowledge, firmly established on the ontological notion of a 
continuum. It encompasses the experiential, rational, religious, intuitive, 
symbolic, mythical and emotional aspects of reality (Jimoh 2018:14). 
 
In the light of the epistemic injustice explored above, and the illogicality that attends the 
Eurocentric epistemic process, presentation of the indigenous African epistemic process becomes 
essential.  
 
One of the consequences of the hegemonic Eurocentric epistemic process is making the quest for 
African epistemic freedom a necessity. Thus, the bid to combat the Eurocentric epistemic process 
led to the struggle against the gradual and continual suppression of African knowledge systems. 
In other words, the need for epistemic freedom in Africa is a reaction to the existence of an 
unpleasant situation of epistemic suppression, characterised by a clampdown, an overpowering or 
a repression of AIKS.  This situation was captured by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018:3) as the politics of 
knowledge in the world, that is marked with “continuous gauging, and limiting the growth of 
knowledge in Africa through research management to which Africa is struggling for epistemic 
expression, liberty self-determination and independence”.  The quest for epistemic justice entails 
a state of struggle against the gradual and continual suppression of African knowledge systems.  
The “Western-centric abyssal thinking”, identified by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014:238) as 
a consequence of the hegemonic Eurocentric epistemic process, makes the African struggle for 
epistemic freedom imperative. The chief aim of this struggle is to combat the distortion of African 




As a people encumbered with the pains of Eurocentrism, wherein a continual re-emergence of 
colonialism is buried in the present idea of globalisation, Africans struggle to exercise the 
fundamental right to think, theorise, interpret the world, develop and write its own epistemic 
methodologies. Put in another way, the quest for epistemic justice is entrenched in the “reality of 
[the] continued entrapment of knowledge production in Africa within Euro-North American 
colonial matrices of power” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018:8). Epistemic freedom is for Africans, thus, 
an epistemological necessity that requires no special pleading (Ramose 2002:7). Thus, in justifying 
the African struggle for epistemic freedom, Ndlovu-Gatsheni is of the view that: 
 
Epistemic freedom is about democratising ‘knowledge’ from its current 
rendition in the singular into its plural known as ‘knowledges’. It is also ranged 
against overrepresentation of Eurocentric thought in knowledge, social theory 
and education. Epistemic freedom is foundational in the broader decolonisation 
struggle because it enables the emergence of the necessary critical decolonial 
consciousness…In the constitution of political, economic, cultural and 
epistemological decolonisation, epistemic freedom should form the base because 
it deals with the fundamental issues of critical consciousness building, which are 
essential pre-requisite for both political and economic freedom (2018:4–5). 
 
The need for epistemic freedom in Africa is thus evident in the need to combat ideological 
deformations resultant from the systemic and epistemic horror of colonialism.  
 
Such need also carries an epistemological concern that is essential for the repositioning of Africa 
as an independent and rational actor in the intellectual scheme of the world. The repositioning 
exercise is required to combat what Ndlovu-Gatsheni refers to as the “coloniality of knowledge”, 
which is “the invasion of the mental universe of the colonised world” (2018:3). As a panacea to 
the coloniality of knowledge, various forms of ideas advocating epistemic freedom for Africa have 
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been adduced: “Conceptual Decolonisation” Wiredu (1995), (2004);  “Decolonisation of the 
Mind” and “Globalectics” Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (1993), (2007), (2012); “Grammaticality of 
Language” Adeshina Afolayan (2006); “Conversational Philosophy” Jonathan Chimakonam 
(2015a), (2017); “Epistemological Decolonisation” Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) and “Struggle for 
Reason in Africa” and “Ubuntu” Mogobe Ramose (2002a), (2002b), (2009), (2020), to mention 
but a few. These scholars are on the frontline, battling the politics of epistemology by attempting 
to deal with the challenges and ensuing consequences of the epistemicides, linguicides, cultural 
imperialism, subjugation and alienation of AIKS. 
 
A fact to note here, is the importance and weight of burden required to combat the coloniality of 
knowledge and to air the epistemic voice of Africa in the intellectual conversation of the world. 
This often makes scholars polemic and aggressive in combating epistemic injustice in their 
response to the fracturing and suppression of IKS, because of the alienation emanating from the 
colonial experience.42 Considering the alienating process, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o was of the view 
that: 
 
The colonial process dislocates the traveller’s mind from the place he or she 
already knows to a foreign land. It is a process of continuous alienation from the 
base, a continuous process of looking at oneself from the outside of self or with 
the lenses of a stranger… this colonisation of the cognitive process was the 
everyday experience in a colonial classroom everywhere (2012:39). 
 
 
42 A popular example that comes to mind here on the Language Question in African literature and philosophy is 
ideological essentialism inherent in the rejectionist approach of Ngugi Wa Thiong’o. In the Decolonization of the 
Mind Ngugi wa Thiong’o was of the opinion that decolonization can only be meaningful if European languages are 
rejected in the African’s modes of intellectual engagement. See Decolonization of the Mind: The Politics of 
Language in African Literature (Thiong’o 1986) and Moving the centre: The struggle for cultural freedoms 
(Thiong’o 1993) for more information. 
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What such alienation carries is a form of intellectual-cum-social detachment from the self and a 
forceful confinement to the pseudo reality of a ‘given’ self.  Also, this alienation is made more 
worrisome for African scholars in the quest for epistemic freedom, due to the ensuing intellectual 
tension that is associated with it. This tension is founded in the ‘politics of knowledge’ ushered in 
by the West. As a result, the African academy became “a site of inculcation of Western knowledge, 
values, ways of knowing and worldviews that are often thought as universal values and scientific 
knowledge” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018:14). Thus, in the bid to combat epistemic injustice against 
AIKS, African scholars, by reason of epistemic alienation are challenged for the lack of 
independent construction of indigenous knowledge forms. This challenge poses a dilemma for 
Africans in the maintenance of indigenous epistemological paradigms in the quest for epistemic 
justice. In the next section, I explore the methodic crisis that this dilemma creates for AIKS. It is 
essential to make this exploration because doing so gives justification for the consideration of the 
African knowledge process that is free of the methodic crisis. 
 
5.4. The “Methodic Crisis” in conceptualising African Epistemology 
In this section I will discuss some of the ensuing challenges experienced by African philosophers 
in the attempt to conceptualise African Philosophy. These challenges will be referred to as the 
“Methodic Crisis”. Two methodic crises to be identified here are: (1) the validation of indigenous 
experience with the Western epistemological paradigm; and (2) the over-protection of the 
indigenous knowledge system from critical queries. These two methodic errors will be shown to 
be inimical to the success of conceptualising any African epistemic activity. It becomes important 
to enunciate these methodic challenges to lay the analytic platform that will avoid same in 
conceiving a working definition of African epistemology for this study. Since the crux of the 
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argument in this study is structured on the African epistemic process, conceptualising African 
epistemology without the burden of the Methodic Crisis becomes imperative. 
 
5.4.1. Methodic crisis one: Validating AIKS with Western paradigm    
The African scholar faces the dilemma of using the Western paradigm as the measurement for 
rationality and authenticity of African knowledge systems. In the bid to combat the intellectual 
denigration of African indigenous knowledge systems by the Eurocentric epistemic position, 
Western paradigms often get to be employed as gauge for such exercises. One of the reasons for 
this methodic challenge is the erroneous view that the African epistemic process can only be 
validated and seen as meaningful by being presented as being approximations to Western 
categories and thoughts (Jimoh 2018:6). The stance behind this method inheres in the idea that, to 
demonstrate the existence of rationality and the possibility of a functional knowledge system in 
Africa, is to display conceptual categorisations in similar schemes to Western ones. Ramose notes 
the apparent injustice that this type of methodic crisis promotes, when he argues that: 
 
[T]here is no moral basis nor pedagogical justification for the Western 
epistemological paradigm to retain primacy and dominance in decolonised 
Africa. The independent review and construction of knowledge in the light of 
the unfolding African experience is not only a vital goal – it is also an act of 
liberation (2002:4). 
 
This methodic crisis, traceable to the need to combat epistemic alienation and intellectual tension 
characterising the struggle for epistemic freedom, creates a dilemma for African scholars of 
speaking or writing from the defensive trajectory. In other words, arising from the struggle is an 
entailment of defensiveness, dissipation of bitterness or aggression in the responses and ideas put 
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forward to combat epistemic injustice. On the reasons for such emotional outpouring in African-
oriented researches, Toyin Falola is of the view that: 
 
Scholarship in Africa has been conditioned to respond to a reality and 
epistemology created for it by outsiders, a confrontation with imperialism, the 
power of capitalism and the knowledge that others have constructed for Africa. 
The African intelligentsia does not write in a vacuum but in a world saturated 
with others’ statements, usually negative about its members and their continent. 
Even when this intelligentsia seeks the means to intrude itself into the modern 
world, modernity has been defined for it and presented to it in a fragmented 
manner (2001:17). 
 
The entailment of defensive trajectories in African epistemic thought, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018:25) 
notes, accounts for the contextualising of Africa’s quest for the epistemic freedom in the sense of 
struggle.  A struggle that seeks to break and put an end to model of the world that the coloniser 
creates as well as the ensuing epistemology from such models. 
 
Unfortunately for the African scholar, the coloniser’s epistemic model has become such a ‘given’, 
that not to employ it renders his or her works as lacking in substance. Thus, the African scholar is 
ironically burdened with the methodological error of the employment of Western analytical 
categories in the epistemic decolonisation process. Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997:x) places this crisis 
in clearer perspective by noting that “Western conceptual schemes have become so widespread 
that almost all scholarship, even by Africans, utilises them unquestioningly.”  The dominant 
Western experience has been turned into an intellectual paradigm with a necessarily functional 
foundation that must be a basis for all meaningful research. To this end, Oyewumi further argued 
that “historically and currently, the creation, constitution and production of knowledge have 
remained the privilege of the west” (1997:87). According to her observation this is the case even 
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in African studies.  Thus, Ramose (2002:4) calls for a radical overhaul of the whole 
epistemological paradigm underlying the current educational system in Africa.   
 
The method of validating African worldviews through or with Western paradigm is erroneous for 
several reasons. One, is the fact that it re-enforces the deniability of reason in Africa. If the 
authenticity of African rationality will have to be predicated upon Western perceptual modes and 
concepts, then it subsists to hold that the ability to form or come-up with genuine ideas and 
concepts that would be entrenched in the indigenous conceptual scheme of the people is outrightly 
lacking. Secondly, rationality has been as enunciated in the previous chapter of this research 
work43 as one of the essential feature or expression of humanity – regardless of race, colour or 
geography. Thus, to make the viability and authenticity of African epistemology dependent on its 
proximity to Western epistemic processes is not only to deny rationality to Africans, but also to 
take away their humanity from Africans.  
 
Thirdly, validating AIKS by its measurement to the Western paradigm is a product of unequal 
comparison between Western and African epistemic processes, which amounts to a distortion of 
AIKS. One of the characteristics of such distortions is the denial of indigenously African logical 
reasoning. The errors of this lopsided comparison, wherein the present reality of existence in 
Europe is used as a yardstick in comparison with the contemporary life-situation of Africans, has 
been unravelled by a series of intellectual works, among which is Socrates and Orunmila: A 
comparative analysis (Oluwole 2015) and Ezumelu: A theory of African logic (Chimakonam 
2019). 
 




Fourthly, to impose the Western framework on the African indigenous knowledge system, in 
whatever manner or form, is to deny that African epistemic processes have their own distinctly 
African methodologies of inquiry. The possibility of inquiry methods that employ peculiar modes 
of African conceptual schemes in the validation of indigenous epistemic claims – as seen in various 
texts explored above – further enunciates the error of using the Western paradigm as a gauge for 
rational authenticity.  
 
Lastly, a Western-justified epistemic method for an African thought process is an attempt to 
reinforce the Eurocentric efforts at universalising Western thought processes unquestioningly. 
This researcher will thus opine that an unquestioned employment of foreign i.e. Western, Asian, 
etc, analytical categories or methods in the presentation of African conceptual schemes may be 
intellectually counterproductive. As such uncritical employment would inhibit the production of 
genuine ideas that are rooted in African intellectual heritage.  
 
5.4.2. Methodic crisis two: Treating AIKS as necessarily true 
A second methodic crisis is more worrisome. This crisis is dilemmatic, because it is committed in 
the bid to avoid the employment of Western conceptual schemes. In other words, the attempt to 
avoid the usage of Western categories or conceptual scheme in the presentation of the African 
epistemic processes often can result in the over-defence of the indigenous knowledge system from 
critical queries. The dilemma associated with this method is in its subtle nature of snaring 
credulous or unsuspecting theorists into its trap. This trap is the tendency to treat AIKS as that 
which is infallible, necessarily true and sufficient in logic.  Consequently, the idea of indigenous 
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knowledge systems is often regarded as that which is esoteric and un-opened to evaluation 
(Oluwole 2015:45-7).  
 
The reason this research is treating this method as a crisis is because AIKS – taken as necessarily 
true – could end up as a frontier for nativism and ethnocentrism, thereby making all efforts towards 
decolonising epistemology futile. In addition, this method can make AIKS lack the self-critical 
process for evaluation, improvement and sustainability. Furthermore, it may not only make AIKS 
unintelligible as an envisioned and appropriate epistemic process fit for engaging with 
contemporary issues, but could also render AIKS unattractive to outsiders. For this reason, the 
present author adopts the ‘process view’ of AIKS. 
 
Obtainable from the idea of AIKS is that for its uniqueness and also because of the familiarisation 
of the people with them as products of their culture, there is a danger that a state of undue 
attachment often takes place. With such a state of attachment with cultural realities, AIKS may be 
taken or seen as sacrosanct. Such an attachment is the reinvention of a hegemonic thought that is 
structured on the imaginary and weak scaffoldings of ethnocentric assumptions. Paulin J. 
Hountondji cautioned against this attachment when he argued that: 
 
To learn anew to be free intellectually and politically, that to me was the current 
requirement. This liberty presupposes the reassessment of the status that had 
been worked out, the paradigms that had been established, and the canons of 
thought that had been developed for us. Shutting ourselves up in our cultural past 
– a purely apologetic relation to our heritage – would respond exactly to what is 
expected of us. In this regard, nothing will be more Euro-centred than a feeble 
nationalism that would be content to hold up the treasures of African culture to 
the face of the world by congealing them, mummifying them, freezing them in 




Exceptionally noted here is the caution to be able ‘to learn anew’. That is, one ought to learn to be 
critical of known indigenous facts, so as to relearn new ideas about the culture for 
contemporaneous intellectual engagement and sustainable development. Implicit herein, is the 
warning not to get carried away with the frenzies of showcasing the epistemic worth of the 
Indigenous African epistemic order, thus, becoming uncritical and irrationally accommodating of 
all native thoughts as sacred and inviolable. Taking indigenous thought as untouchable would thus 
be a prelude to an ethnocentric orientation. 
 
What is instructive from the consideration of ethnocentrism in the postulations or presentations of 
AIKS, is the idea of intellectual caution. It must be noted that what Oyewumi queries was the 
‘unquestioned’ use of Western analytical categories (1997:45). Additionally, on the call for caution 
against the uncritical assimilation of Western categories into indigenous knowledge forms, 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni asserts that: 
 
What is needed is to take the struggle for decolonisation to a higher level, 
informed by a decolonial epistemology focused on unpacking the constitutive 
negative aspects of Western modernity as the broader terrain within which 
coloniality and Euro-American epistemologies were generated (2018:26). 
 
It is clear here that while it is required to be critical of indigenous ideas so as to divest them of 
undue deification and ethnocentric tendencies, the same must be done for Western epistemology. 
Informed from the consideration of epistemic injustice, i.e. the superimposition of Eurocentric 
epistemology on AIKS, is the need for intellectual caution in the struggle for epistemic freedom. 
Such caution, as will be shown in the next section of this chapter, is reinforced with the idea that 
knowing is a universal human activity. However, as shown above, the efforts at putting forward 
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an African epistemic system that would deconstruct Eurocentric ideology must not be grounded 
on ethnocentric hegemony, which is a recurrent intellectual challenge in combating epistemic 
injustice against AIKS.  This challenge is observable in the call for critical consideration of 
indigenous epistemic worldviews as well as cautious application of Western categories in 
describing the former. This call is, however, informed and made rational by the “strong conviction 
that all human beings are not only born into a knowledge system, but are legitimate knowers and 
producers of legitimate knowledge” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018:24).  
 
Suggestive herein, is that an appropriate epistemic process should be one that is not encumbered 
with the burden of native hegemony or ethnocentrism, as the Europeanisation of others’ epistemic 
thoughts is laden with. Neither would such appropriate epistemic processes for knowledge 
production be formed and validated through the prism of other cultures, as not even the quest for 
globalisation would make such validation appropriate. The idea for an appropriate epistemic 
process is well-driven home by Oyewumi, on her call for Africa in the quest for epistemic freedom, 
to be conscious that “all concepts come with their own cultural and philosophical baggage” 
(1997:78).  
 
Thus, the next section will attempt a conceptualisation of the African epistemic process that would 
be fit for the struggle of epistemic freedom. Ideating African epistemology is required to present 
an epistemic framework that will obviate the methodological dilemma identified above. The 
overall aim is to unearth the intellectual utility of African epistemic processes for grappling with 




5.5. On the idea of “African Epistemology” 
I commence the attempt at defining “African Epistemology” by an exposition of the concept of 
‘knowing.’ This exposition takes as its foundation Aristotle’s famous quote in Book I of the 
Metaphysics, that “all [humans] by nature desire to know” (1926). I place the accent on ‘all 
humans’ in this quotation. This implies that the quest for knowledge is open to every human being 
irrespective of race, colour, gender, religion or creed. But what is knowing? Ioanna Kucuradi 
(1995:xxvi) conceptualises knowing as a complex human activity. She further advises that:  
 
An inquiry into and analysis of the complex human activity of knowing [is] a 
prerequisite for framing a concept of knowledge more suitable to base ourselves 
on in dealing with problems in other disciplines, as well as with global and other 
practical problems (1995:xxvii). 
 
For an event of knowing to take place, there must be that which knows – a knower or a knowing 
subject, and that which is known – the object of knowing (Cauchy 1995:49). This is a necessary 
condition for knowledge. In other words, knowing is seen here as an attribute of every human 
species without prejudice to race, colour, economic development or location. Construing knowing 
as such, resonates with Kaphagawani and Malherbe (2003:261) that “to the extent that all human 
beings have the capacity to know, epistemology is universal regardless of culture, tribe or race” It 
is thus right to aver that Africans, just like any rational persons from any culture of the world, seek 
to know that something is the case, and why that thing is the way they perceive it (Guyo 2011:73). 
In addition, as a human activity, knowing underscores the relationship between the subject and the 
object, hence, Cauchy’s view that knowing “is essentially a relational act” (1995:49). Explaining 
further on the importance of the relationality between the knower and the known – subject and 




If knowing did not reach out to things and events distinct from or other than the 
subject as the knower, or more precisely if the things and events were not present 
as known to the subject, there would be no coherent sense in which knowledge 
could be said to occur…in order to know oneself as a functioning subject 
[knower], one has to be able to stand apart from oneself… to relate to oneself as 
an object of one’s own knowledge (1995:49–50).  
 
This relationship could be seen as an epistemic transaction between two independent entities: the 
knower and the known, the subject and the object, respectively.  It thus reveals knowing as a by-
product of the relational activities established between the knower and object known. The 
independence of the object of knowledge from the knowing subject helps among other things to 
distinguish the activity of knowing, as a relational activity, from other human activities. 
 
Knowing, an essential art of humanity is, thus, a means to acquire, justify, understand, and 
communicate human encounters with and grasping of existential reality. As such, the tendency to 
know what is the case or what is not, is a part of the life-process of any person regardless of colour, 
race, wealth and location. What accounts for difference in the art of knowing among the various 
people of the world is the process or method employable to acquire knowledge. As noted by 
Kuçuradi (1995:xxvii), “…skeptical and some other epistemological attitudes, have to do with 
given ‘acts of knowing’ of given individuals in given conditions, not with knowing as a human 
activity in general”. Put in another way, despite the acknowledged universality of knowing, the 
ways or methods of knowledge acquisition vary according to the life-process of a particular culture 




To these ends, knowing is taken by this study as an epistemic ground that is universal, but its 
processes are conveyed via different particularities. The different processes or methods of 
investigating and acquiring knowledge are the ‘knowledge systems’; ‘knowledge forms’; or 
‘knowledge modes’, which are distinctive of every culture and locality. While knowing is a feature 
displayable, or an attribute of all humans and of all ages, the methods or processes of knowing are 
a function of cultural inclinations and existential experiences. This suggests that an appropriate 
epistemic process should be one that is not encumbered with the burden of ethnocentrism, as the 
Europeanisation of others’ epistemic thoughts is laden with.  The reason for this is because the 
idea of a globalised knowledge is nothing but a sum of various cultures’ knowledges abstracted to 
the platform of the universal. 
 
The question possibly arising from this is: does the knowing process happen only through a 
particular (cultural) way (for instance, through European, Asian or African way of life)? Is 
epistemology an exclusive possession of a particular culture? Here, a negation is offered. This is 
because such an idea would not only be a product of hegemonic ethnocentrism but would also 
negate the functionality of an important human faculty: reason. This also further subsists into the 
confluence of both the objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy, as enunciated in the 
fourth chapter of this research work.44 Thus, an epistemic order could be viewed from an objective 
or universal prism, and at the same time from a particular cultural position. Succinctly put, the 
objective or universal nature of epistemology does not negate its particularities. It would thus be a 
sheer error to conceive of epistemology as uniquely exclusive to a certain culture and not to other 
cultures. This calls for caution in the presentation of an African idea of epistemology, as that which 
 
44  The idea of the objective and subjective dimension of philosophy examined in the fourth chapter of this research 
work, is explored here with respect to the epistemic conceptualisation in Africa. 
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is uniquely different from the epistemologies of other peoples. Such a worldview will 
automatically negate the universal nature of knowing. Furthermore, exclusivist epistemic attributes 
will foreclose intercultural communication between African and other world cultures. Moreover, 
such a view will be a function of ethnocentric ideology aimed at reproducing or imitating 
Eurocentric hegemony. As examined in the third chapter of this study, the idea of an epistemic 
process being an exclusive possession of a particular culture is the foundation of the Eurocentric 
epistemic position. To this end, I hold, alongside Guyo (2011:75), that the “Europeans must give 
up their historical and longstanding claims for universality which is nothing more than negation 
of philosophy and denial of others as well”. What is being enunciated here is the fact that it would 
be wrong to hold that there is a unique way through which Africans, or any other culture of the 
world, come to know. 
 
One may, thus, wonder wherein lies the ground to put forward a particular epistemological position 
as African, Asian or Western? The justification for such a description is in the life-process of the 
culture or people under consideration. As noted earlier in this study, life-process means the critical 
apprehension or grasp of encountering with one’s immediate environment and the universe as a 
whole. As a universal phenomenon that rests on rationality, life-process allows for the 
conceivability of epistemological conceptualisations that rest on the confluence of philosophy’s 
objective and subjective dimensions. To this end, one may describe an epistemology as “African”, 
based on the fact that the process of knowing inheres in the African life-process. An epistemic 
view described by a particular culture is not unique because that culture has a philosophical nature 
that is uniquely different from other cultures, rather because the process of knowing deals with 
and is foundationally grounded in the life-process of the people in the considered recognisable 
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geographical location. The epistemic system of any culture, while operational on a life-process 
which enhances the vivid canonisation of humanity’s confrontation with the existential realities, 
also bears the mark of the nature of knowing. Put in another way, construing epistemology in the 
objective-subjective dimension allows for contextualisation through particular processes, as well 
as for the non-contextual and objective construal of reality, i.e. knowing (Guyo 2011:74).  
 
One of the facts obtainable from the discussion so far, is that while epistemology as the study of 
knowledge is universal, knowledge acquisition varies from one culture to another. This 
observation syncs with Bryant (2011:8) that “epistemology is a value laden-social construct”. In 
other words, although there may be differences in the socio-cultural contexts within which 
knowledge claims are envisioned and formulated, knowing is an act of all humanity. However, a 
caveat must be noted here not to confuse the social-cultural contexts of the knowing process 
enunciated above as grounds for relativism. The epistemic order envisioned here is a critical 
structuring of philosophical thoughts that is grounded in the complementary relationship of the 
subjective and objective dimensions of philosophy.  
 
African epistemology can, thus, be viewed as the people’s constructs of their understanding of 
reality through their life-process. It is a rational system of grappling with existential realities of 
circumstantial and geographical situations from a universal ground. The argument here, is that the 
universal nature of knowing is a human activity devoid of any form of ethnocentric nuances, while 
the ways, methods or order of knowing is largely informed by the life-process that a particular 
culture subscribes to. This will make the culture in question validate knowledge production within 
their historical, cultural and social context. Dani Nabudere, however, is critical of the need for 
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such validation to be consistent with the abstraction from the particular to the universal, this is in 
the bid to ensure that validating knowledge production even within a particular cultural context 
does not preclude exporting such knowledge forms for application to issues outside the 
proponent’s culture (2011:105-112). The argument is basically that if epistemology is not an 
exclusive trait of a particular segment of humanity, then African epistemology qualifies to be an 
epistemology that should be taken seriously. Thus, African epistemology is the study of the 
knowledge process/system/order of the lived experience of the Africans, instituted on the objective 
ground of knowing without negating the life-process of the Africans.  It should be noted that, 
African epistemology construed along this line, would separate the understanding of the African 
epistemic order from any form of subjective tendency that could result into an ethnocentric 
description of the African epistemic order. 
 
African epistemology, employed in this thesis as “African Epistemic Order” is thus believed to be 
structured on the universal nature of knowing while expressing the life-process of the Africans. 
The Indigenous African Epistemic Order thus describes the way of perceiving and reacting to the 
world in a manner that is grounded in the universal epistemic stance of knowing and is indigenous 
to the African cultural worldview as informed by African people’s life-processes. As such, the 
term ‘epistemic order’ will represent a people’s doctrine concerning the nature of knowledge. It is 
employed to denote the process or manner by which “an African comes to know or claims to know 
that something is the case” (Kaphagawani and Malherbe 2003:260). This includes what it means 
to know something, the justification of knowledge claims, the how’s of knowledge acquisition and 
the determinants of knowledge validity in a cultural setting. The indigenous African epistemic 
order, while enunciating the universal/objective dimension of epistemology however, is not 
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oblivious to the fact that “there are different approaches and perspectives [that cultures employ] to 
understand the world around us” (Jimoh and Thomas 2015:117) However, such particularistic 
approaches must be grounded on the objective and universal epistemic nuances of knowing. 
 
With the ground laid for an African epistemic understanding divested of the methodic dilemmas 
of ethnocentric tendencies or undue reliance on Western epistemic schemes, the table is set to 
espouse the potency of African epistemology for combating not just epistemic injustice, but also 
the environmental crisis, environmental injustice, as well as for the formulation of environmental 
policies that would be fit to deal with the perennial environmental challenges of the contemporary 
world. However, a further exploration into the depth of the African Epistemic Order is required to 
enunciate the significance of epistemology in the quest for panacea to various existential 
challenges of life, and in particular, of the environmental nature. Hence, in the next section, efforts 
will be geared toward the examination of the conceptual framework that undergirds the African 
Epistemic Order. 
   
5.6. The conceptual framework for the African Epistemic Order (AEO) 
This section focuses on exploring the conceptual tool for conceiving the African Epistemic Order 
as intellectual thought. “Conceptual frameworks” here is taken as an intellectual path through 
which the vehicle of idea formation drives. This study argues that conceptual frameworks mark 
the fulcrum of rationalising the intellectual thoughts of a culture. Thus, examining conceptual 
frameworks is essential for the understanding of the method of forming indigenous epistemic 
thought processes. The essentiality of such an examination inheres in its viability to enunciate for 
clearer grasp, the cognitive modes, nature and value of knowledge formation and dissemination in 
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the African context. Having a grasp of the frameworks for knowledge formation from the African 
parlance, will enhance systematic explanation of how Africans articulate and evaluate knowledge 
(Nkulu-N’Sengha 2005:40). Hence, the imperativeness of examining the conceptual framework 
for African epistemic process to unearth the potentiality of African epistemology for addressing 
contemporary challenges of the environment. 
 
It must be noted, however, that the conceptual frameworks employable in a particular culture are 
consequent upon certain basic assumptions that inform the understanding of the people. In every 
culture there exists a basic assumption which holds for the design of the conceptual framework 
needed for intellectual thought engagement. The basic assumption thus serves as the gauge for 
validating a particular culture’s systemic process as rational. The basic assumption for the 
formation of the cultural intellectual stance could thus be seen as the received or given belief 
system that undergirds the creation of ideas in a culture. While there may be various paths available 
– in line with the metaphorical view of vehicular mobility employed above – for navigating the 
culture’s system of idea formation, the paths are structured in line with the basic principle of 
construction.  
 
Identifying the basic assumption of an African conceptual framework, within 
which African ideas, beliefs, principles and views hang together in a rational and 
intellectually sound continuum is pivotal to understanding how knowledge and 
logic are defined and accommodated within a particular cultural setting 
(Oluwole, 2015:128-134).  
 





The conceptual framework actually constitutes a fundamental idea which 
pervades all other intellectual activities; it gives thought its internal consistency, 
its wholeness, its originality, in such a way that to understand a thought is to 
grasp that unspoken principle which unifies and illuminates it… [W]e may 
conclude that our African Philosophy becomes truly African when this 
philosophy is finally thought through in a conceptual framework properly 
African, adapted to African realities (Maurier, 1984:30–31). 
 
Basic assumptions inform the understanding of a people’s engagement with their life-process. This 
strengthens the earlier caution raised about the methodic crisis in African epistemology; namely, 
the employment of Western conceptual schemes in articulating and validating the African 
epistemic process.  
 
To impress an alien cultural framework upon other cultural realities is to place “an iron collar” on 
the worldviews emanating from such a culture, to which explaining reality will lose the savour of 
the existential realities of the culture in consideration which give it grounding (Maurier 1984:31). 
Kwasi Wiredu’s conceptual decolonisation agenda, is of importance here. Although Wiredu’s 
argument on the essence of conceptual frameworks towards articulating indigenous philosophy for 
contemporary concerns dovetails on language, his view nevertheless emphasises the danger of the 
uncritical usage or application of foreign framework for indigenous thought process. He thus 
argues: 
 
…I mean avoiding or reversing through a critical conceptual self-awareness the 
unexamined assimilation in our thought of the conceptual frameworks embedded 
in the foreign philosophical traditions that have an impact on African life and 
thought (1995:22). 
 
Indeed, the superimposition of foreign conceptual frameworks on existing African ones is 
intellectual fraud, whereby African traditions are judged through Western perceptions (Oluwole 
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2015:125). The essential point for guarding African philosophical postulations within the platform 
of Africa’s conceptual framework is that it helps to avoid the uncritical assimilations that are 
embedded in foreign cultures. Failure to be circumspect of this would inhibit clear understanding 
of the intellectual foundations of African cultures (Oladipo 1995:7). A caveat is that the acceptance 
of African philosophical postulations must not be of a blind reception or the emergence of a kind 
of cultural nationalism; for that would result in the methodological crises of ethnocentrism (Wiredu 
1995:22; Oladipo 1995:8; Oluwole 2015:125). Rather, examining African traditional thoughts 
through African conceptual frameworks and logic must be entrenched upon critical and rational 
human experiences.  
 
The conceptual framework is intellectually significant as without the rational demonstration 
thereof, conceiving a culture’s worldview as critical philosophy may become logically impossible. 
This is because the conceptual framework is informed by a basic assumption that holds together 
the belief system, intellectual principles and socio-cultural worldviews in a rational continuum. 
Hence, the conceptual framework must be rationalised by the verdict of the basic assumption that 
informs such conceptual frameworks. For Oluwole, this basic assumption – characterised by 
spoken and unexpressed conceptions of reality – includes: 
 
[V]iews about the constituents of reality and the relationship between the 
apparently distinctive features (if the constituents are more than one) and the 
type of knowledge human beings can have of all these. It is a basic assumption 
presumably induced – not logically induced – from human experience. This is 
what makes a particular system of thought, scientific and rational. [Thus], it is 
only when… the basic assumption of a specific conceptual framework is defined, 
analysed and characterised that ideas, beliefs and propositions made within them 
can be critically examined as to whether or not they pass the scrutiny of logical 




Instructive herein, is the fact that the basic assumption that informs conceptual frameworks of any 
culture, is about the culture’s received understanding of features of reality – that is, the functional 
implications and the nature of knowledge that such culture makes out of its conceptions of reality.  
 
Does only one conceptual framework exist in a particular socio-cultural setting? No, as there may 
be more than one conceptual framework existing in the same socio-cultural setting, though these 
frameworks are engendered by the basic assumptions of that culture.  The reason for the 
multiplicity of conceptual frameworks is because of the dynamic patterns of human response to 
societal dictates, which further explains that different individuals, even within the same socio-
cultural environment perceive, understand and explain the basic features of reality, diversely. The 
reasonableness of a fundamental assumption behind the conceptual framework of a culture is 
appropriately analysed by Segun Gbadegesin: 
 
If there are such general ideas commonly or generally presupposed in a given 
culture, they would constitute the philosophy of the nation or culture… when 
criticising the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct attention to those 
intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary to defend. There will 
be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems 
within the epoch unconsciously presuppose… These assumptions, beliefs and 
sentiments do not always rise to the level of consciousness and they may not be 
formulated explicitly but, they nevertheless, exercise considerable influence in a 
culture. For they make it possible for the members of that society to 
communicate and exchange ideas and, to live in some agreed and common 
expectation of what is good and right or bad or wrong…With these assumptions, 
a certain limited number of types of philosophical systems are possible, and this 
group of systems constitutes their philosophy (1991:24–25). 
 
Herein, a difference between the philosophical ideas emanating from a culture and the basic 
assumptions engendering these philosophies is alluded to.  The critical test is in recognising, for 
critical enunciation and employment, the distinction between ideas and basic assumptions. Ideas 
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or worldviews “are important landmarks in the history of the development of a particular cultural 
tradition of philosophy” (Oluwole 2015:129). On the other hand, a basic assumption “is the very 
thin thread that runs, through the thought of several positions held by thinkers who work within 
the same tradition of thought” (2015:136). Therefore, it is possible to have a multiplicity of 
conceptual frameworks in the same socio-cultural setting.  
 
The significance of multiple conceptual frameworks in a culture is that multiplicity of conceptual 
frameworks could engender cross fertilisation of ideas for the emergence of novel and dynamic 
thoughts fit for the cultural needs. As such needs are expected to be growing, even in the advent 
of globalisation. Multiplicity of rationalising paths in a culture opens up such a culture to 
sustainable knowledge that are expected to birth rational innovations for growth and development 
(Bryant 2011:15). However, the various conceptual outlines in a cultural setting are expected to 
be informed by the fundamental assumptions of the particular culture about the nature of reality. 
Obtainable thereof is the idea that every conception of a culture’s postulation of what is and what 
is not, is structured on various conceptual frameworks employed by adherent thinkers in that 
culture. However, these intellectual postulations are engendered by the basic assumption of that 
particular culture. An exemplar of the basic assumption is the idea of the fundamental features of 
reality, their existence, interrelationships and functionality. To this, Oluwole argues: 
 
A philosophical worldview is appropriately defined as a conceptual framework, 
with a basic assumption about the nature of the existence and the relationship 





It could, thus, be held that identifying and defining, for rational reflection, the relationship between 
the features of reality, is the crux of intellectual engagement. This is a critical preoccupation for 
all rational human beings regardless of culture, race, colour or location. An essential preoccupation 
of critical reflection in all cultures of the world is formed or structured at grappling with the 
relationships existing between the oftentimes perceived features of reality: matter and mind. The 
conceptual framework is, therefore, identifiable by the position of its adherents based on their 
explanations of reality. In other words, various conceptual frameworks arose based on defining or 
identifying the interrelationship or the denial of such, between identified features of reality.  
 
Consequently, four conceptual frameworks were identified by Oluwole as products of the basic 
assumption of corresponding cultures perceptions of reality. Materialistic, Idealistic, Oppositional 
dualism and Complementary dualistic conceptual frameworks, respectively. While the first two 
are situated under monism, the last two are structured on a dualist scheme (2015:128). The basic 
assumption in the monistic scheme is that while matter and mind appear as two distinct features 
of reality, only one is fundamental. The other is just a phenomenon of the actual reality and is 
characterised by the main one.  Thus, the materialistic conceptual framework would identify 
‘matter’ as the real feature of reality and thus Idea (mind) as a phenomenal reflection of matter. 
On the other hand, still under the monistic scheme, the Idealists’ conceptual framework identified 
Idea as the fundamental feature of reality with matter as its phenomenal reflection. For idealists 
like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ([1714] 2007); George Berkeley ([1710] 2007); Immanuel Kant 
([1770 2012]), (1965) and many more, the only essential substance of reality is idea which is the 
foundation and composition of reality, and is taken to be ultimately immaterial. Each fundamental 
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feature, in the monistic assumption of reality, is all that is, both necessary and sufficient for the 
establishment and rational explanation of all existence (Oluwole 2015:128-130). 
 
The dualistic conceptual framework is of the philosophical conception that reality comprises two 
features, which exist independently and distinctively from each other. However, the two varying 
dualistic conceptual frameworks identified by Oluwole, differ with respect to how the two features 
of reality (matter and Idea) interrelate and function together. While the oppositional dualistic 
conceptual framework argues for the exclusiveness of Idea and matter despite their assumed 
interrelatedness in the lived experiences of humans, the complementary dualistic conceptual 
framework posits the interrelated functionality, as well as interdependency of these two distinctive 
features of reality (Oluwole 2015:131-133). Oluwole employs the term ‘Binary Complementarity’ 
to explain this framework which is operational in thought and philosophy of the Yoruba, Igbo, and 
several African cultures. For her, the predominant worldview which undergirds the Yoruba 
intellectual thought process, like any other African culture, is one that understands reality as 
containing unified fundamental elements and principles, that are functional as pairs of inter-
playing complementary parts (2015:134). According to this view everything, everybody, however 
apparently independent, depend upon something or/and somebody else. In addition, 
interdependency functions as reciprocity in the sustenance of life for the binary complementarity 
framework. This is in contrast to the Western worldview, which is identified and formulated within 
the oppositional dualistic conceptual framework, which is equivalent to Oluwole’s ‘Binary 




According to ‘binary complementarity’ framework, everything is intrinsically connected with one 
another in the environment. Thus, the Yoruba  epistemic system being operational with binary 
complementarity conceptual framework of thoughts is, poised for environmental understanding of 
the mutual dependency among the different beings of the ecosphere. This is because, when beings 
of nature are viewed in this manner, chances of objectifying and abusing different elements of 
nature (environment) are lessened or obviated. 
 
In emphasising the entrenchment of conceptual frameworks on the fundamental assumption 
pervading a particular culture and the possibility of diverse frameworks within a particular 
assumption, Oluwole argues that: 
 
Fundamental differences among the four conceptual frameworks analysed above 
show the sense in which particular traditions of philosophy differs from one 
another. It also shows how religion, philosophy, science and principles of the 
social sciences as well as knowledge and logic are defined and accumulated 
within different conceptual schemes. 
Difficulty in understanding the logic and rationality of philosophical expressions 
rendered in different cultural traditions, do not arise from differences of 
language… several traditions of philosophy may arise from different intuitive 
basic assumptions about the nature and relationship between matter and anti-
matter [idea]. 
The world exemplar is that the same Greek language used to formulate 
Democritus’ Materialism and Platonic Idealism was also used in formulating the 
so-called Mysticism of Pythagoras. Common experience shows that one 
particular conceptual framework (scheme) often predominates others that also 
exist in the same language culture of people. But they are either denied or treated 
as subservient (2015:134). 
 
Instructive from the foregoing is that the African Epistemic Order is defined and explainable 
within the conceptual framework as informed by the basic assumption of Africans on the features 




It thus appears rational to posit that critiquing a particular philosophical worldview dovetails much 
into reflecting on the consistency, logical and systematic coherence of such a worldview with the 
basic assumptions on the conception of reality that permeates the people’s understanding of reality. 
This shows, to a great extent, that a particular basic assumption underlies and defines the 
intellectual status of different systems of thought, each of which is referred to as a tradition of 
philosophy (Oluwole 2015:137). Pervading the African intellectual trajectories is the basic 
assumption that the two features of reality in the ‘Complimentary dualistic conceptual framework’ 
are “inseparable and complementary in nature and function” (Oluwole 2015:144). In other words, 
the Yoruba, and ditto other African cultures’ conception of reality is structured on the intuitive 
fundamental assumption that (1) acknowledges the existence of two distinctive features of reality 
(i.e. matter/idea, physical/non-physical, material/immaterial, corporeal/incorporeal), (2) the two 
distinctive features of reality are inseparably inter-dependent of another, and (3) the two features 
of reality function in a complementary mode and not in opposition to one another.   
 
Enunciating the process formation of the Yoruba indigenous knowledge system, Oluwole posits 
“complementary dualism” or “binary complementarity” (2015:123) as the basic assumption 
undergirding the conceptual framework that marks traditional African intellectual thought. Here, 
she employed the example of Yoruba culture, of the Western part of Nigeria, in West Africa, as a 
genre of African intellectual thought. This study also shares such presentation of particular cultural 
facts as a genus and common currency of intellectual phenomena among several cultures of 
Africans.45 According to Oluwole, complementary dualism as an indigenous conceptual 
 
45 This view has been presented in the introductory section on this study. 
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framework, has a logical and viable ontological scheme with which the Yoruba “formulate rational 
epistemic paradigms for understanding reality” (2015:146). This has also been given credence by 
Oyeronke Olademo in her argument regarding the explanatory mode of reality in the traditional 
Yoruba culture.  She argues for a “binary element, whose existence is inseparable, and the 
functions are interdependent” as the basic axiom of conceptualisation behind the traditional 
Yoruba’s view of reality (2009:25). More so, it is noted that this binary element is the fundamental 
principle that guides and informs the Yoruba’s practice of philosophy, mathematics, science and 
their social construct of lived reality (2009:37–45).  
 
Furthermore, Innocent Asouzu exemplifies the complementary reflection beneath the African 
philosophic conception of reality through the Igbo traditional intellectual heritage as 
Ibuanyidanda. Ibuanyidanda, a concept that is structured on the traditional Igbo system of thought, 
where reality is explainable via the mutual interrelations of entities (2011:40). Inherent in the basic 
assumption of Africans on reality, are the methods and principles for coalescing subject and object, 
the essential and accidental, the absolute and relative, consequential and inconsequential, the 
physical and spiritual into a system of mutual complementing units. For clarity on the concept: 
Ibuanyidanda, Asouzu argues: 
 
The concept Ibuanyidanda draws its inspiration from the teachings of traditional 
Igbo philosophers of the complementary system of thoughts… Danda are ants 
that have the capacity, in mutual dependence and interdependence, to carry loads 
that appears bigger and heavier than themselves. What this implies is that they 
can surmount very difficult challenges when they are mutually dependent on 
each other in the complementation of their efforts. Hence, traditional Igbo 
philosophers insist that : ibu anyi danda (no task is insurmountable for danda). 
It is from this synthetic idea “ibu anyi danda” that served a heuristic pre-
scientific function within the context of traditional Igbo experience that the 
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synthetic-analytic concept “Ibuanyidanda” is derived through abstraction 
(2007:11) 
 
The idea of Ibuanyidanda is an exemplar of the conceptual framework that gives birth to epistemic 
postulations from African perspectives. This is because Ibuanyidanda philosophy encapsulates the 
complementary relations between the mutual dependence between the subject and object of 
knowledge.  
 
Reality in the African conception from the indigenous Igbo point of view is thus seen as jointed, 
unified and integrative to the tune that such conceptions are evident in the non-polarisation of the 
practical, supernatural and paranormal in the quest for rational enquiry (Asouzou 2011:18). The 
complementarity framework of Ibuanyidanda philosophy explains the essence of knowledge 
acquisition from the African parlance, where neither the epistemic object nor epistemic subject of 
knowledge could singly account for knowledge claims without the other. Thus, within this 
framework, there is no epistemic tension between the subject and object, as the basic assumption 
of unified forms of reality necessarily hinders any form of polarisation or authenticating the 
subject’s autonomy outside the foundation of its unity (Asouzou 2011:38). Epistemologically, the 
subject in the African conceptual framework of thoughts could interact, communicate, and relate 
with the epistemic object in a mutually harmonised non-absolutistic mode (2011:38). A basic 
assumption of harmonised and unified reality informs the conceptual framework of 
complementarity, thus, obviating any form of bifurcation and polarity. 
 
For Oluwole, identifying this basic assumption, informs the conceptual framework, to give the 
explanatory stance for African epistemic worldviews as a rational and scientific system of thoughts 
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(2015:123). The rational and explanatory perspective of the African knowledge system, for 
instance, is measurable by its coherence with the people’s basic assumption on reality (2015:137).  
This assumption, as explored from the Yoruba and Igbo’s intellectual thought process examined 
above, forms the fulcrum of intellectual dispositions, socio-cultural orientations, economic and 
political inclinations, logical commitment as well as knowledge articulation and justification 
within African cultural settings.  It also informs the unitary ontological conception of reality at the 
root of the epistemic order of indigenous African societies.  
 
With a clear understanding of the basic assumption of unified form of reality that informs the 
conceptual framework of African epistemology, it is logical to hold that this basic assumption 
engenders the African epistemic process.  As argued by Nkulu-N’Sengha: 
 
 African epistemology is grounded in the fundamental belief that reality is one, 
that is, everything is interconnected in a web of relationships. There is a 
fundamental connection between the male and female, the living and dead, the 
visible and invisible realms, the spiritual and material spheres, the human and 
divine realms, humanity and the natural world, and so on. In this worldview, to 
understand or to know is to grasp the interconnectedness of all things (2005:43). 
 
The conceptual framework that operationalises the African indigenous knowing process is one that 
obviates any form of dichotomisation between the subject and object of knowledge. Rather, it 
ensues an interconnected relationship between the subject and object in the knowing process. Thus, 
as a relational act, the knowing process is complementary in nature. Knowledge is not solely a 
function of the subject or knower, rather, the subject and the object of knowledge play 





From the foregoing, the African Epistemic Order was explored. This was in the understanding that 
for an appropriate articulation of an African environmental epistemic discourse, examining the 
idea of African epistemology – which forms the basis for such articulation – is imperative. The 
chapter, thus, considered issues of epistemic injustice in Africa, where the rupturing or suppression 
of the African Indigenous Knowledge System (AIKS) was examined. Consequent upon the idea 
of epistemic injustice is the struggle to combat the distortion of African IKS via various intellectual 
engagements. This was recognised as the quest for epistemic freedom by the people whose 
indigenous epistemic processes had been crushed or fractured. However, it was observed that some 
methodic dilemmas make examining the idea of African epistemology necessary for this research 
work. Two methodic crises were identified, namely: (1) using the Western paradigm as the 
measurement for rational intellectualism and authenticity of indigenous knowledge forms; and (2) 
the tendency to canonise indigenous ideas as sacrosanct thought processes that are true and meant 
to be deified and employed automatically. While the former is the uncritical employment of 
Western epistemic categories within the indigenous thoughts, the latter is the tendency to condemn 
African IKS to the schemes of nativism and ethnocentric colouration. This informs the research’s 
attempt to put forward an African epistemic system that would not only de-epistemicide 
Eurocentric epistemological ideology, but would also not be grounded on ethnocentric hegemony.  
 
One major concern for such an epistemic stream of inquiry into environmental discourse is in the 
bid to move towards considering how human beings ought to conceive of knowledge. Such 
attempts for epistemic freedom in Africa are best thought out in a form that is divested of all undue 
influences emanating from colonial knowledge impositions and nativism or ethnocentrism. This 
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has been recognised by Bryant (2011:17) as “sustainable Knowledge”. For him, an epistemological 
process that is void of the methodic crisis is imperative for the growth and development of any 
society, as it has the potency to move the society collectively beyond the need to self-actualisation, 
beyond materialism and the over-exploitation of our resources (2011:17-18). Such sustainable 
knowledge is taken as a prototype of the African Epistemic Order.  
 
It is indeed an epistemic relational approach that would move us beyond the social and 
environmental crisis peculiar to post-colonial Africa. To this end the view is that the African 
Epistemic Order has the viability for the production of marginalised knowledge systems that would 
be apt for rationalisation, in the quest for panacea to the perennial challenges of the environment 
in Africa. The African Epistemic Order could engender an environmental philosophy of an African 
orientation that would offer a reconceptualisation of humanity: an AEE. The argument being put 
forward is that the idea of AEE has the intellectual viability to readjust humanity’s perceptual 













Towards an African Environmental Epistemology (AEE) 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
I have argued for the imperativeness of an alternative environmental perspective and have 
identified such an alternative perspective from the African epistemic process in chapters two and 
four of this study. In chapter five I have laid bare the major pillars of the African Epistemic Order, 
which I now seek to use to develop some key features of ‘African Environmental Epistemology 
(AEE). The purpose of this chapter is therefore an attempt to construct an African environmental 
philosophy that is hinged on the African Epistemic Order (AEO): African Environmental 
Epistemology (AEE). With this philosophy, I hope we will be able to address the contemporary 
environmental challenges of Africa, and the world at large. This chapter will show that African 
environmental epistemology is consistent with the ontology and relational holism inherent in 
African intellectual thought. Efforts will thus be made to explain the complementary stance of the 
African perception of reality. By employing the analytical stance of particular cultural epistemic 
views, i.e. Yoruba and Igbo of Nigeria, the chapter will present a model of epistemic understanding 
of reality that is common to most African societies. On the whole this chapter seeks to do two 
things: 1) to show that African indigenous epistemology is adequate for the discourse of 
environmental philosophy; 2) and accordingly, to fill-in the lacuna in the current studies of AEP, 
created by an overreliance on ethics as the theoretical framework for interrogating 
environmentalism within the African parlance, as well as by the under-exploration of the African 
epistemic process in environmentalism. Although this study recognises the significant role of 
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ethics in environmental discourse, however, such a role would be better understood in the context 
of African Environmental Epistemology. 
 
6.2. An African conception of reality from the platform of the African Epistemic Order 
(AEO) 
This section advances an African conception of reality from the lens of the envisioned African 
Epistemic Order. Having explored the nature of AEO in the fifth chapter of this study, this section 
aims at showing how AEO can influence our perception of reality, and by extension, nature (the 
natural environment).  In this section an attempt will therefore be made to appraise (1) the 
ontological and (2) the complementary cum logical perspectives that support such an African 
understanding of reality from an African epistemic stance, thereby providing us with the building 
blocks of an African environmental discourse. While the former perspective explains the 
underlying factors that inform the socio-cultural commitment to the communitarian worldview 
that is prevalent in African culture, the latter informs us of the logical system guiding the socio-
cultural commitment of people.  A synthesis of the two perspectives is, however, envisioned for 
the viability of African epistemology for understanding reality, and by extension, 
environmentalism. The synthesis is believed to strengthen the rationale to deconstruct traditional 
Western intellectual thought with its intellectual postulations for conceiving reality from a divide 
between body/soul, matter/spirit, nature/human, object/subject and natural/supernatural. It also 
makes AEO suitable for environmental discourse as it does not assimilate the other (nature) or 
reduce it into the space or identity of the subject. Lastly, the merger allows for the rationalisation 
of the normative cum descriptive stance of knowledge conceptualisation in Africa. The envisioned 
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normativity and prescriptive nature of the epistemic process, the present author argues, makes it a 
veritable tool for addressing the environmental crisis.   
 
6.2.1.  African ontological perspectives 
Given that the African epistemic order, as envisioned in the last chapter of this research work, can 
be understood as the “way the African conceptualises, interprets and apprehends reality within the 
context of African cultural or collective experience” (Anyanwu 1983: 60), there is clearly then a 
close interconnection between African epistemology and ontology. According to Udefi 
(2014:108), African epistemology or knowing process flows from African ontology.46 One cannot 
fully understand one without the other.  
 
This way of conceptualising the interrelation between epistemology and ontology in the African 
parlance is credited to Fr Placide Tempels’ ingenious work, Bantu Philosophy of 1959. True 
knowledge for the Africans, Tempels argues, is in the ontological grasps of forces or beings 
(1959:45).  The interconnectedness of the forces of existence is best enunciated through the 
epistemic grasps of the intelligence of forces that are in the hierarchical order, in perpetual 
cohesion and interaction (Tempels 1969:35). The ontological perspective of Tempels is also shared 
by Senghor in the idea of negritude as the total of the values of the civilisation of the African world 
(Senghor 1994:72). This idea was noted by Kwasi Wiredu (1998:98) as a combination of “a 
 
46 “Ontology” is the study or understanding of the composite nature of reality in all spheres of existence. In other 
words, the term is used to refer to the philosophical investigation of existence, or being. See Edward Craig 2005. The 
shorter Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy (eds.) Routledge: NY 10016. Alternatively, Donald M. Borchert. 
2005. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Macmillan Reference, USA.  Different beings from the African 





metaphysics of black identity, an African personality and a black soul with a kind of 
epistemological, anthropology, and political philosophy.  Senghor further enunciated his notion of 
the African method of knowing as distinct from the Western, as that which carries both a deep-
seated sensibility and emotional disposition (1994:90). This knowing mode is structured on an 
affective and cognitive domain of understanding, wherein synthesis of the subject and object of 
knowing is necessarily entailed.  In the knowing process, the African “does not hold it [the object] 
at a distance, nor does he merely look at it and analyse it as the European would do; rather he 
touches it, feels it, smells it” (Senghor 1964:72). This allows for a process of knowledge 
acquisition that recognises a symbiosis between the subject and the object, which culminates in 
the conscious apprehension of reality which Senghor refers to as African sensual participation in 
the object (1964:72). 
 
The Senghorian approach to the African epistemic order syncs with our earlier argued position in 
chapter five of this thesis regarding the universal nature of knowing and the subjective nature of 
the ways, or method of knowing. For Senghor, the epistemic process for Africans does not rely 
exclusively on their analytical powers with the exclusion of intuition, rather a holistic knowing 
method wherein the intuitive, analytical, and heuristic are made to complementarily demonstrate 
rational cogency for understanding reality (Lamola 2016:60–61). On the epistemic mode of 
Africans, Senghor famously argues: 
 
The life-surge of the African, his self-abandonment to the other is thus actuated 
by reason. But here, reason is not the eye-reason of the European, it is the reason 
by embrace which partakes more of the nature of logos than ratio… [whereas] 
classical European reason is analytical and makes use of the object, African 
reason is intuitive and participates in the object… In truth, every ethnic group 
possesses different aspects of reason and all virtues of man [sic] but each has 
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stressed only one aspect of reason, only certain virtues. No civilisation can be 
built without techniques. Negro African civilization is no exception to this rule 
(1965:33-34, 75).  
 
Senghor’s remarks above are often misunderstood to imply that Africans are incapable of 
analytical and discursive thought. While he laid emphasis on the intuitive nature of African reason, 
he did not claim that Africans lack analytical reason. His views reiterate the distinctive holistic 
nature of the African view of reality and the cultural stance that is dependent on the methods or 
modes of knowing in the African parlance. 
 
Emphasising the distinctive nature and inherent holism in African thought, Amaechi Udefi 
(2014:112) posits that “the dichotomy or lacuna that is said to exist between the epistemic subject 
and the object in the Western philosophy is absent in African thought”.  Indeed, the inherent holism 
permits the existence of a relational act between the knower and the known47 and explains the 
interconnectivity between the two ‘independent’ agents of knowledge, i.e. the subject and the 
object. Recognising this relational act between the knower and the known as the foundation for 
the AEO, Ruch and Anyanwu elaborates that: 
 
The self vivifies or animates the world or mind so that the soul, spirits, or mind 
of the self is also that of the world. The order of the world and that of the self are 
identical. What happens to the world, happens to the self (1981:87). 
 
Participation of the active, independent, yet relational entities is at play here. This relation is 
essential and deliberate for the understanding of the AEO because there is no division between the 
epistemic subject and epistemic object.  
 





As Anyanwu further explains, Africans hold a holistic view of knowledge, which presupposes a 
unity of experience in tune with African cultural assumptions (1983:60). This African way of 
viewing knowledge about everything including the natural environment, syncs well with the 
African view of reality, wherein the latter is seen as being integrated. This view of reality is 
referred to as ‘unitary ontology’. 48 Unitary ontology denotes the ontological commitments of the 
African traditional worldview, where the composite nature of reality is treated holistically. For 
Africans, as noted by Jimoh and Thomas (2015:117), “existence is sacredly united”. African 
epistemology in consonance with African ontology conceives the world as a basic unitary system 
where reality is taken as holistic, interwoven, and connected. In this unitary epistemic prism, 
humans and nature (environment) operate, participate, and function in the same locus with no room 
for polarisation (Asouzou 2005:113).  The holistic nature of the African ontology obviates 
bifurcation, as existential entities in the cosmos operate interdependently. Thus, the epistemic 
structure of Africans’ cognition signifies oneness with that which is to be known. Such ontological 
underpinnings reveal that all beings are independent, hierarchical, yet interdependent, as succinctly 
captured by Ruch and Anyanwu:  
 
… [B]ecause everything is a vital force or shares in this force, the African feels 
and thinks that all things are similar, share the same qualities and nature. 
[However] it does not mean that the African does not know the distinction 
between a tree and a goat, a bird, and a man (1984:90).   
 
 
48 For more on unitary ontology, see Jimoh, A. K. and Thomas, J. 2015. “An African Epistemological Approach to 
Epistemic Certitude and Scepticism”. In M. Igbafen and B. L. Agidigbi  (ed.) Exploration in African Philosophy: 





The idea-interdependency of all beings in the African ontological conception of reality carries the 
notions of equality and mutuality as important principle that underscore the African act of 
knowing. These notions allow for the complementary relationship between the epistemic subject 
and the epistemic object of knowledge in the knowing process.  
 
A caveat to be noted here, however, is that the exploration geared towards revealing the viability 
of African epistemology should not be confused for an epistemology uniquely for Africans. This 
is because such perception is informed, as noted in the last chapter, by nativism and ethnocentric 
colouration. In addition, such a position disallows room for intercultural communications and 
interaction with the rest of the world. Indeed, 
 
… [I]n every epistemological system or study, one is bound to find such core 
notions as knowledge, justification, truth, belief, ideas, intention, explanation, 
understanding, experience, and human action… [This] presupposes that certain 
values, experiences and characteristic features are common to all human beings, 
[and accordingly] a unique African epistemology [is] unattractive and 
unilluminating (Udefi 2014:114).  
 
The nature of knowing is illuminative of the rational and self-reflective attribute of humans, which 
is not bound to any race, geography, biological make-up, or economic development. It should, 
however, be noted that a naïve universalism is not advocated for, as we recognise that the ways, 
methods or processes of knowing differ from one culture to another and are informed by the life-
process of each culture or segment of humanity. From the African epistemic worldview, there is 
no dichotomy between the two epistemic agents – i.e. the subject and object – of perception.  As 
noted by Udefi, “there is some kind of interdependence and interpenetration of the self (human) 
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and the external world [object of knowledge], such that what happens to one, happens to the 
other” (2009:82). However, the independent nature of epistemic agents is still recognised.  
 
The interconnection of a human being with their natural environment in the African ontological 
perspective defines who a human being is. Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) captures this succinctly when 
he argues that “the African view of man denies that persons can be defined by focusing on this or 
that physical or psychological characteristics of the lone individual. Rather, man [sic] is defined 
by reference to the environing community” (1984:174). In other words, African philosophical 
anthropology (who or what a human being is) goes beyond the psychological or cognitive 
configuration of the epistemic subject (the human person), it must include the interplay of other 
entities in the environing community outside the human subject. While the human person is part 
and parcel of the ontological community around him/herself, he or she is at the same time an 
epistemic agent by virtue of his/her intellectual or rational prowess. In him or her, ontology and 
epistemology have a meeting point. 
 
We must however distinguish between the social and ontological conceptions of reality in African 
societies. While the sociality of a human being relates him or her with other human beings without 
which he or she cannot live, the ontological conception of reality broadens that sociality to include 
nonhuman entities. It is, thus, rational to hold then that understanding the ontology of the African 
informs the socio-cultural settings that encapsulate the idea of the AEO – the method, ways, and 
modes of knowing of African peoples. As Jimoh argues. “[a] theory of knowledge is about the way 
we come to understand [know] reality [which in the African context] rests on the African 
ontological notion of reality” (2017:121). Unlike the Western conception of reality, where reality 
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is explainable with recourse to empirical inquiry and mechanistic analysis, in their notion of what 
is real, Africans take cognisance of both the non-empirical factors and the empirical in the quest 
to have a full grasp of reality.  
 
[A] fundamental tenet of traditional [African] culture is that there is more to 
reality and to the realm of experience than that which is readily accessible 
through empirical inquiry and that one can acquire an understanding of natural 
phenomena by appealing to experiences whose characterisations are not 
empirically confirmable but are nonetheless warrantably assertible (Brown 
2004:160).  
 
For Jimoh, what constitutes this ‘more to reality’ is the idea of the “spiritual component of nature”, 
i.e., components of nature that are both incorporeal and of conscious status (2017:123). In the 
African conception of reality, the ‘natural’ world is beyond the empirical components which are 
usually explainable by the study of the physical configurations of nature. Thus, the phenomena 
that are unexplainable by empirical verification are subjected to the prism of the causal efficacy of 
nature’s spiritual component, which can still be meaningfully explained (2017:123). This is in 
contradistinction with the Western explanation of reality where, as shown in the third chapter of 
this study, what is meaningful or could be adjudged real is subject to the scientific method of 
inquiry alone. The explanatory modes of Africans are explainable through an interrelated system:  
 
[T]here are several elements in the mind of Africa that govern how humans 
behave with regard to reality: the practicability of wholism, the prevalence of 
poly-consciousness, the idea of inclusiveness, the unity of the worlds, and the 
value of personal relationships (Asante 2000:2). 
 
Herein is a recognition of the existence of various strata of being, the existence of which are both 
“independently real [and] intrinsically linked to form a whole” (Imafidon 2014:38). To perceive 
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reality in this unified ontological system is not to recognise any dichotomy in the epistemic process 
of justifying knowledge claims. From the understanding of the ontological commitments 
pervading African life-processes, an epistemic order that factors-in the synthesis of the epistemic 
subject and object in acquiring, articulating, and justifying knowledge claims is imperative. This 
explains how African epistemology operates within the rational framework of the African cultural 
context (Jimoh 2017:124).  (Jimoh 2017) 
 
One of the essential facts notable here is the idea that there is a non-severing correlation between 
ontology and epistemology in the African context. For Africans, ontology and epistemology are 
like the two wings of the same bird. To employ one without the other is to distort the intellectual 
heritage of African cultural settings. To this end, it would be rational to submit that African 
epistemology is ontologically driven. As Placide Tempels (1959:45) explained, “… [t]rue 
knowledge is to be found in ontological knowledge of forces or beings”. The interconnectedness 
of the forces of existence as one whole web in functionality and applicability makes African 
ontology a unitary one. Thus, African epistemology is better understood within the broader 
framework of African ontology. Ramose (2002a:40) corroborates this very point as he notes that 
African ontology and epistemology must be understood as two aspects of the same reality. This 
means that African reality is a knowable reality. Accordingly, an African Philosophy of the 
environment must be rooted primarily in the epistemology of the environment of the human 
subject, more than in the ethics of the same human subject. This is because to structure such 
environmentalist views without the epistemic stance of the African ontological commitment, is to 




The epistemic implication of the commitment to unitary ontology in the African culture is the 
devolution of complementarity between the epistemic subject and object in their relational act of 
knowing. In other words, the AEO enunciates a unitary ontology in which the different entities of 
the entire universe live harmoniously. 
 
In classical African Philosophy, there is a concrete existence of man and nature. 
African tradition talks about the two entities only in terms of conceptual 
numericality and not in terms of separate ontological existence. It is impossible 
for the Africans to separate man from nature. They are sacredly united. In this 
unity, they both participate in the same locus without being opposites (Jimoh 
2017:126). 
 
Functioning in a unitary world where all beings operate and relate in “one inseparable continuum 
of hierarchical order, African ontology does not allow dichotomy between the epistemic subject 
[human being] and the epistemic object [nonhuman environment]” (Ruch and Anyanwu 1984:87). 
This echoes Tempels’ view regarding the independent existence and interrelationship of the forces 
of beings within the ontological system, where there is an intelligence begging for articulation in 
the cohesion and interaction of these ontological beings that exist in various hierarchical strata 
(1969:73). 
 
The epistemic thought process of Africans bears an understanding that no knowledge claim of 
reality of any sort could be made from the detached position of the perceiving subject (the human 
perceiver) from the perceived object (the nonhuman aspect of nature). This is because “[t]he self 
of the subject and the objective world outside the self are united as one in a relationship in which 
the self of the subject vivifies and animates the objective world” (Jimoh 2017:127). This forms the 
basis for the distinctive nature of African epistemology and informs of the kinds of epistemic 
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challenges African people will have to grapple with. For instance, the internalism/externalism 
debate prevalent in the Western epistemic order is of no credence within the AEO. Thus, in the 
African epistemic model, a base for the internalism/externalism dichotomy collapses, and the 
stance of knowledge justification goes beyond the sole capability of the human thought process, 
to require the import of the external world. The non-consideration of the internalism/externalism 
debate in the African epistemic context is hinged upon the unitary conception of reality wherein 
neither the internal perspective of the subject nor the external world is given credence over the 
other, because both are considered—metaphorically—as two sides of a coin or the two wings of a 
flying bird, needed to complement each other in the enterprise of knowledge acquisition, 
justification, and dissemination.  
 
6.2.2.  Complementarity and logical perspectives 
To the extent that the ontological perspective is necessary for presenting the African conception 
of reality, it is, however, insufficient in the explanation or justification of the proposed African 
Environmental Epistemology. This study explores a fusion of the ontological with complementary 
and logical viewpoints to give a robust encapsulation of African Environmental Epistemology. To 
that effect, this section will focus on the complementarity and logical perspectives. A fusion of the 
ontological with the complementarity and logical perspectives will enable a systematic and 
complementary interrelation between the epistemic subject and object. The insufficiency of the 
ontological perspectives is also created by what Jonathan Chimakonam (2015b) refers to as 
supernaturality. According to him, while noting the import of ontology in the African perception 
of reality, he cautions against the tendency of African ontological systems to allude the source of 
knowledge to supernatural beings (ancestors and the gods). For him, undergirding the knowledge 
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process in African thought, entails “the belief, practice or perspective that the senses and the mind 
are means through which the gods reveal their wisdom to [humans]” (2015b:73). The gross 
implication of this is that the responsibility of an agent’s action or the reliability of her knowledge 
claim, rests solely on the endorsement of the supernatural. In other words, from such spiritistic-
imbued perceptions, humans are not just rendered “incapable of something on [their] own” (2015b: 
73), the practice of recognising individual feats is reduced to the minimal. This is so much that 
“heroic endeavours [or]… any individual accomplishment of the sort is readily credited to the 
community or simply as is always the case, to the people” (2015b:68). Such worldviews are 
inimical to growth, innovation, and development that could meet the contemporary challenges 
facing Africa.  
 
Munamato Chemhuru (2019) also notes the shortcomings of supernaturality in African knowledge 
systems. While focusing mainly on epistemic responsibility in the worldview of the African 
spiritistic-laden ontological framework, Chemhuru (2019:9–10) notes that within the African 
ontological conception, it is almost impossible to leave epistemic responsibility to the person 
without also taking into consideration other metaphysical beings such as the ancestors and the 
Supreme Being. This is because of the exalted position that the ancestors take in the scheme and 
order of things in the African system of thought. Additionally, the wrong implication of such spirit-
laden ontological reflection is the inability to hold people accountable for their actions or 
knowledge claims. Thus: 
 
… [I]ndividuals may be spared from blame and responsibility from actions which 
they might have done consciously and under their control. According to the 
African [ontological] view of responsibility rather, other metaphysical forces like 
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familial and ancestral spirits could be held accountable and responsible for such 
actions and not necessarily the person (Chemhuru 2015: 98-99). 
 
In line with such thought, it would seem as though individual epistemic responsibility is 
impossible.  
 
This study thus argues that, while the ontological commitment may be necessary for the 
presentation of African epistemic worldviews, it is not sufficient to explain the epistemic process 
that would be adjudged fit for socio-cultural, economic, political, and scientific technology needed 
to meet the existential challenges of contemporary African society. To rely only on the ontological 
explanations will, thus, only lead to the methodological crisis of nativism. Also embarking on such 
an explanatory path would amount to over-pricing indigenous conceptions and result in 
unfavourable excavations of traditional heritage, all in the name of showcasing what is indigenous 
to Africans (Chimakonam 2015b:70). However, this does not do away with the indigenous 
traditions of Africans, as doing that will make the whole project of exploring the indigenous 
African Epistemic Order for the environmental crisis, a futile effort. The researcher’s view, on the 
other hand, is that what must be explored from the indigenous heritage should fit the present-day 
challenges. This is in coherence with Paulin Hountondji’s call for the transformative renewal of 
the African traditional system of thought into modern systems that are viable, sustainable, and well 
structured philosophically (1996:178).  It is, thus, the quest for the value of an African Epistemic 
Order towards addressing the environmental crisis facing Africans in particular – and by extension 
the world – that gives this research work an essential footing. While it will not be rational to do 
away entirely with indigenous views – as that would deny any research of a viable starting point – 
there is the need to engage in critical and pragmatic terms with the past that will be deemed relevant 
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to meet contemporaneous challenges. In the advice of Chimakonam, “… in constructing an 
authentic and modern African philosophy, a momentary backward glance is inevitable. But it is a 
simple look behind only so we can effectively surge forward” (2015b:69-70).  
 
With the necessary condition of the indigenous African Epistemic Order, the need for a sufficient 
conceptualisation of an African knowledge system is dire. Such conceptualisation, as shown in the 
chapter five of this study, must aim to rationalise the African epistemic postulation wherein there 
is no room for the dichotomy between the object and the subject of perception. Jonathan 
Chimakonam effort at such ideation of African epistemic process comes to mind here, with his 
idea of  “cogno-normative epistemology” (2015b:67–81). This term is employed by Chimakonam 
to capture the epistemic order of the African people in a manner that shows that AEO with its 
indigenous roots is fitting for the sustainability of growth and development in Africa. Expressing 
the fact that knowledge is pivotal to the survival of any community, he notes that the idea of cogno-
normative is not just about holding uncritically to the indigenous epistemic heritages of Africa, but 
that we should sieve things that are or will be of positive worth to the development of the continent 
from the past (2015b:73). Arguing for the idea of cogno-normative epistemology, he posits: 
 
In building the theory of cogno-normative epistemology, we adopt the idea of 
complementarity because, in Africa’s precarious position, our knowledge needs 
cannot be assuaged by a lopsided perspective. Put differently, Africa does not 
need an episteme that is solely empirical or solely rational; or an episteme that 
is solely cognitive… As a result, we attempt to construct an episteme that is both 
cognitive and normative (2015b:74). 
 
The idea of cogno-normative is employed to describe the rational view of an African epistemic 
process where the empirical and the rational are united in a mutually interdependent and 
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complementary relationship. Cogno-normative epistemology thus stipulates the synthesis of the 
cognitive and normative as a functional epistemological tool.   
 
Observable from Chimakonam’s view is the underlying functionality of one of the essential 
ingredients that make indigenous African heritage fit for epistemic consideration: the ingredient 
in referent is “the idea of complementarity”.49 The concept of complementarity is significant to the 
analysis of the African epistemic view because it dovetails on the synthesis of the rational and the 
empirical (2015b:74). This is employed in the bid to take care of the intellectual divide that 
pervades Western epistemic thought. The Western epistemic heritage is a “charade of divided lines 
between two groups and opponents, characteristics of Aristotelian traditions which unequally 
halved ontology into essential substance and ephemeral accident” (2015b:80). This has been 
explored in the third chapter of this work under the consideration of traditional Western intellectual 
thoughts. It had also been noted then that the ontological divide thereof engenders a dichotomy 
between the subject and object of perception, which consequently provides the foundation for the 
entrenchment of the frontier mentality.   The significance of African epistemic thought is unveiled 
as it rests on the interconnectedness and inter-relatedness of realities. 
 
The cogno-normative follows a method of critical sifting of the traditional African ideas to unearth 
the logical structure inherent in African system of thoughts. The logical structure, for 
Chimakonam, inheres in the complementarity stance of the cognitive and empirical perspectives 
of knowledge (2015b:71-75). On the perception of the knowing process or knowledge acquisition 
 
49 The idea of complementarity has been explored in the fifth chapter of this study as the prevalent framework of 
thought in African intellectual postulations wherein every entity in existence functions in a reciprocity of 
interdependency for the sustenance of life. See Oluwole (2015) and Asouzu (2007).  
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processes, Chimakonam argues that it has been of a dual nature: “one is sensual [experiential, 
externalist, empirical] while another is rational [cognitive, internalist]” (2015b:73). The merit of 
the complementary nature of the African epistemic logical structure is that, to overlook or jettison 
it, is to reduce indigenous epistemic thought to a lopsided perspective. As such, neither does the 
African epistemic system allow for a solely empirical nor a completely rational theory of 
knowledge. Hence, his quest for a theory of knowledge that is both cognitive and normative: 
 
Cogno-normative epistemology seeks to prescribe both sensual and rational tools 
clearly divorced from spiritism as veritable sources of knowledge for the modern 
African philosopher. The complementarity of the two, call it “ratio-empiricism” 
is also prescribed (2015b:76). 
 
This cogno-normative epistemology could thus be seen as a by-product of the synthesis between 
rationalist and empiricist perceptions of knowledge that is inherent in the unitary thoughts that 
undergirds AEO. There is a clear divide between the rationalist and empiricist view of knowledge 
acquisition and justification. For the rationalists, knowledge acquisition and justification are 
bifurcated on the point of internal, mental, or rational cognition of the subject. While for the 
empiricists, the points for justifying knowledge claims are the external or empirical factors in the 
determinant of reliable conditions for knowledge. This synthesis thus allows for the presentation 
of the epistemic process of the Africans as a “complementary epistemology” (2015b:79).  
 
Implicit, therefore, in cogno-normative epistemology is the removal of the apparent divide between 
empiricist and rationalist’s mode of inquiry that is akin to the Kantian Copernicus revolution in his 
celebrated Critique to Pure Reason (Kant [1787]1998). Kant synthesises the empirical and the 
rational under his idea of synthetic a priori in his bid to show that the mind and the world, the 
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subject and object, are never alienated from one another but contribute simultaneously in the 
framing of our knowledge claims (Preston 2003:17). Chimakonam notes the efforts of Kant in 
forging a simultaneous functionality between reason and experience. However, Kant’s synthesis is 
seen as reconciliatory; but the cogno-normative epistemology goes beyond reconciling the rational 
and empirical. It brings out the normative stance of the synthesis. The normative outlook of the 
cogno-normative accounts for the applicability of the complementarity protocols of the empirical 
and rational inform other areas of human lives such as morality. Preston also notes the shortcoming 
of the Kantian synthesis. For him, Kant views the interaction between the subject and object, mind 
and the world, rational and empirical, from a limited lens of logical structure (2003:17). As such, 
the synthesis that would be adjudged necessary for knowledge, from the Kantian view is structured 
only on the logical laws determined by the knowing agents; thus, the epistemic object is of no 
significance in the account of knowledge. 
 
Concerning the underlying logic of the African epistemic view, this study opines that the 
relationship between the subject and object of perception is a matter analogous to logical 
subcontraries50, which is based on the unitary ontology, as well as the complementary reflection 
underlying the basic assumption to understanding reality in the African society. The opinion here 
is that the logical theory of subcontraries best explains the logical expression undergirding the 
epistemic order of Africans, as multiple features of reality are not seen as being in opposition. The 
logical relation that exists between the epistemic subject and epistemic object is not of 
contradictories, but subcontraries. Had it been as contradictories, the entities will have to be in 
“denial or negation of one another – that is, they cannot both be true and cannot both be false” 
 




(Copi 2014:180). Neither could the logical relations undergirding the principles of entailment 
within the African perception of reality pass for contraries; wherein two entities cannot both be 
true – the truth of one entails the falsity of the other – but both can be false. Rather, the 
complementary stance of the African intellectual thought process – and by extension – the African 
Epistemic Order could be explained by the dictates of logical subcontraries – wherein two entities 
cannot both be false in the interrelationship strata. By a stance of application, the African Epistemic 
Order wherein the fusion of both the subject and object is required on the platform of 
complementarity to achieve knowledge, is logically strengthened by the idea of logical 
subcontraries. Thus, both the object and subject of experience are taken as essential for knowledge 
claims. Thus, the natural environment, which is the object of our knowledge, and resides outside 
of the subject’s (i.e. the human being’s) internal faculties is essential and necessary for knowledge-
making. This understanding is explicated by my study to elicit a habit of respect and care for the 
external world – the environment. 
 
Oluwole, unearthing the logical basis for the African conception of reality and its ensuing 
knowledge process, observed that any basic assumption undergirding a culture’s perspectives or 
opinion necessarily comes with an inherent logic in its thought system. (2015:158). This explains 
why it is erroneous to validate or evaluate one’s perspective from the prism of another’s 
worldview. The conceptual framework for explaining reality and the epistemic process in Africa 
– i.e., the binary Complementary Conceptual Framework – is structured on the “either/or logic in 
the inclusive Sense” (2015:133). This conceptual framework is by its very nature inclusive. In the 
same vein, Chimakonam’s elucidation of the logical system undergirding the African thought 
processes corroborates that of Oluwole especially on the point of the inclusiveness of the 
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seemingly opposing ends. He identifies the principle of Sub-contrary Valuations as one of the 
defining structures of the African system of logic, which he termed “Ezumezu” (2019:97).  
 
The principle of sub-contrary valuation is a system wherein “two standard variables can 
complement each other without… contradiction in the simplest form” (2019:98).   
 
[This logic] does not keep two opposed systems from being true 
[simultaneously] at the same time, their fundamental presuppositions being 
different. These presuppositions point to the sub-contrary valuations of the two 
standard values (2019: 98). 
 
The principle of sub-contrary valuation is noted to be functional in the reasoning thought processes 
undergirding the basic assumption that informs the idea of unitary ontology in the African 
worldview. Thus, as a means of analysing experiences in the African worldview, sub-contrary 
valuation allows for an epistemic worldview that recognises the complementarity reflection on the 
interrelatedness of both the subject and object of perception. In the parlance of this principle, both 
subject and object, though of different value in the system and seemingly opposing to each other, 
function as two sides of a coin in the system of thought for the understanding of reality in the 
African perspective. Hence, the present researcher believes that African epistemology is a 
complementary epistemology. As a complementary epistemology, it presupposes that the rational 
must align with the empirical and that both must correspond to the normative. This is to ensure 
that the African epistemic process is essentially moralised. With a syllogistic argument in a 
hypothetical form, Chimakonam argues alongside Kwasi Wiredu that: “knowledge with positive 
moral content is necessary for action. Action with positive moral content is necessary for survival. 
Therefore, knowledge with positive moral content is necessary for survival” (Chimakonam 
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2015b:74 cf. Wiredu 2000:181). Complementarity of the rational and empirical tools of 
investigation, thus, appear to account for a sufficient paradigm of epistemic inquiry for African 
thought. Put in another way, for an epistemic paradigm to be complete, it is essential for both the 
empirical and the rational to be fully integrated into a mutually interdependent, complementary, 
and symbiotic relationship. This epistemic view expresses itself as the satisfactory angle of the 
ontological perspective as it recognises diversities of reality which may not all be captured or be 
given at the empirical or rational cognition. Hence, the need for the two tools of epistemic enquiry 
to be essentially complementary in acquisition, articulation, investigation, justification, and 
dissemination of knowledge.  
 
It must be noted that this study found a fusion of the ontological perception and the 
complementarity idea of the epistemological orientation in African intellectual thought appealing. 
It is believed that the quest for the usefulness and value of indigenous African knowledge systems 
that would be fit for growth, improvement, innovation, creativity, and development in Africa is 
achievable in this synergy. The reason is in the noted fact of the insufficiency of the ontological 
worldview, despite its necessity. The synergy resonates with the views of scholars like Keita 
(1991:139), Oruka (1983:392), Graness (1996:206), and Chimakonam (2015b:69), who argue for 
the relevance of traditional African thought in the construction of contemporary ideas and their 
application to modern challenges, albeit with caution on what to and what not to take. Thus, putting 
together the ontological, complementary, and logical perspectives of conceiving reality in the 
African parlance informs of a viable epistemic alternative to Western epistemology which is also 




An African Epistemic Order envisioned in the necessity of ontological reflection and the 
sufficiency of complementary epistemology proffers a ground for a philosophical query to the age-
long conflict of an intellectual divide between the empiricist and rationalist. It unveils the divide 
as artificial and uncalled-for in the quest for holistic perceptions of reality. The African Epistemic 
Order – which is rooted in the indigenous knowledge system – is one wherein the mode, method, 
process, or way of epistemic inquiry is unified, holistic, and normative, thus, its fitness for the 
discourse of environmentalism. This aligns with Scarfe (2008:98), who opines that epistemology 
is “both descriptive as well as prescriptive”. It is descriptive in engaging streams of inquiry into 
our knowledge system to determine the process that is or would be apt for sustainable development. 
For instance, in the instance of environmentalism, epistemology as a descriptive inquiry and a 
unified system would be able to identify what is problematic with the present assumptions 
concerning how humans and the natural world interrelate epistemologically. In addition, at the 
prescriptive stance, a complementary epistemic conception would be able to move towards 
considering how human beings ought to conceive of such knowledge, especially as it relates to the 
perennial environmental crisis of the contemporary world.  
 
Furthermore, the indigenous African Epistemic Order, couched in the stance of the ontologised 
complementarity framework, is seen not as an account of mere human cognition, nor as an 
empirical or rational conception of epistemology, but is also normative. To talk of just the synergy 
of the empirical and the rational without the normative aspect is to have the African epistemic 
process couched in the conceptual scheme of a West attempting to synthesise internalism and 
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externalism.51 The internalism/externalism synthesis is a logical consideration void of the 
normative consideration for epistemology. The consideration of the normative aspect of knowledge 
gave more credence to the AEO as a tool for addressing existential issues of epistemic 
communities. Little wonder then, that “knowledge is not just a given of the human cognition, it is 
also a given of the normative… What is knowledge is necessarily moralizable” (Chimakonam 
2015b:81). African Epistemology adjudged moralised is taken as an intellectual engagement about 
how people grapple with the realities in the circumference of their life-process. Hence, the strength 
of epistemology to serve as a framework for providing the foundation and the mental constructs 
used in experiencing and understanding reality in each culture (Bryant 2011:14). The African 
Epistemic Order is a value-laden prescriptive venture that provides the stance for knowledge to 
play a normative role in environmental discourse. Bryant captured this well, as he posits that “the 
value and social construction of epistemology inform our pedagogy, our scientific inquiry and our 
truth (2011:14). It could thus be argued alongside Bryant here, that epistemology – as a tool for 
constructing an understanding of reality – has a social inquiry ability and valuation to inform our 
ethics, morality, and modality for adjudging right and wrong. Hence, the African knowledge 
 
51
 Scholars who have recognised the errors of the internalism/externalism dichotomy pervading the Western 
intellectual tradition, have suggested various forms of hybrid-notions: Alston, W. P. 1988. “An Internalist 
Externalism", Synthese 74, 265-283; Sennett,J. F. 1992, in his “Toward a Compatibility Theory for Internalist and 
Externalist Epistemologies” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 641-655 refers to such 
a hybrid notion as IEC ("Internalist/Externalist Compatibility"). As a matter of fact, Gerhard Schurz, in his 2009 article 
“Meliorative Reliabilist Epistemology: Where Externalism and Internalism meet”, Acta Analytica 23, 9-28 employed 
the term: Meliorative Externalism: for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification. For him, it produces 
an inevitably true value for the social spread of knowledge. Additionally, in Akinpelu A. Oyekunle 2015, “Towards 
an Enlightened Externalism: A Demystification of the Internalism/Externalism Debate”, Socrates, vol. 3, June, pp. 
71-79, the author posits the idea of “enlightened externalism” as that which explicates better the import of synthesising 
the internalist and externalist concerns for epistemology. Enlightened externalism, it was argued, sets forth the ground 
for externalist theories of knowledge that permit some internalist constraints on the justification of knowledge claims 
and vice versa.  In other words, enlightened externalism points out that the externalist position about knowledge need 
not rule out all internalist input in a theory of knowledge. And an internalist position would not be singly sufficed for 
the enterprise of justification. All that is needed therefore is to understand that every case of knowledge has some 
necessary externalist condition, combined with sound internal reflection to make way for the achievability of the 
epistemic goal of truth maximisation in the quest for certainty. 
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system constructed on the indigenous epistemic order has with it both the descriptive and 
prescriptive outlook for an environmental philosophy that is African in orientation. We have 
enunciated the African conception of reality and the epistemic stance that engenders such a 
conception. To put the discourse of environmental epistemology in clearer perspective, there is a 
need to explore conceptions of nature from the African worldview. This will be the focus of 
discussion in the next section. 
 
6.3. Nature from the African parlance 
At the base of the African conception of nature is the basic assumption regarding understanding 
reality. Just as argued for in the previous section of this chapter, the African conception of reality 
undergirds the unitary ontological perception of life. This perception informs the conceptual 
frameworks that explain the African conception of nature. From the unitary ontological 
understanding of reality, stems the idea of the interconnectedness of all entities in reality. One 
basic fact from the interconnectivity of all beings for the African conception of nature is that it 
engenders the understanding that humans are not different or special, and thus not superior to other 
nonhuman members of the environment (Behrens 2014a:70). Thus, from the African view of 
nature, the sense of alienation and detachment from nature does not come into play, as all beings 
are taken as interconnected. One could, thus, be able to hold that with the idea of the 
interconnections of all entities as being part of one single whole, a basis is provided for 
understanding the human being’s place in the universe. Such an idea, thus, engenders respect and 
considerability for the natural environment. Obtainable from the African conception of nature is 
the idea that nature has its own independent existence. It is not simply the ‘the other’ of the human 
being with no essence of its own, as is the case in Western scientific thought wherein nature is 
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understood mainly as mechanical, linear, predictable, and thus controllable by humans (Berkes, et 
al. 1998:412–13). The Western perspective, which is informed by Cartesianism, is imbued with 
the philosophical assumption of a solipsist separation of the subject (the human being) from the 
object (the natural environment). With this assumption, humans are taken to be separate, and thus 
privileged above nature (Irwin 2015:116).   On the other hand, from the unitary ontological 
perspective that informs the African conception of nature, it is deducible that nature has its own 
rules, order, and needs ( Kanyfke 2018:1).   
 
Furthermore, implicit in the African conception of nature is the idea that all entities in the universe 
are one. Hence, nature could be seen as “comprising both the living and non-living things, the 
natural phenomena, land, rivers, bushes visible and invisible powers, forests, jungles, animals, 
birds, insects, minerals and whatever they knew had not originated from humans” (Kanyfke 
2018:2). Nature, thus, is seen as a partner in the quest for human survival, rather than as an object 
for usage. This conception informs how we should interact with nature, and more specifically it 
instructs us to see ourselves as being in a symbiotic relationship of mother-child with nature.  
 
This symbiotic relation, points to the fact that we have a complementary participation in the 
survival of all the living and non-living species of the universe. A knowledge of this relation 
ensures guidance towards understanding the fact that mis-using nature and its ensuing destruction 
necessarily creates the devastation of life. Further, viewing nature and human beings as being in a 
symbiotic relationship obviates any form of destructive alteration to nature. But instead it 
engenders the attitude of respect and conservationism to nature. In doing so, every member of the 
earth community will be protected. It could, thus, be concluded that the conception of nature from 
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the African parlance drives a vision of the universe as a constellation in which all elements’ 
survival relies on one another.  
 
Arguing against the destructive othering of nature, Ramose (2004:203) asserts that the earth is 
more than just inorganic matter. As matter (material) it is in its entirety, inclusive of all of its 
inhabitants, and as such constitutes a common element in all the entities of the earth. Employing 
the metaphor of ‘mother’ to refer to the earth, Ramose argues that the earth, not only gives life, 
but it also preserves the life of all beings in the universe.  
 
The earth is regarded as the preserver of life. Like the mother and her immediate 
relationship with the baby, the earth is seen as the direct and immediate resource 
from which to draw all the necessities of biological life (2004:205). 
 
Ramose’s reference to the earth as ‘mother’ is supported by the etymological considerations of the 
word ‘mother.’ According to Chambers’s Etymological Dictionary, ‘mother’ originated in the 
Latin word ‘mater’ which is the root word for ‘materia’ – matter, i.e., materia is rooted in mater – 
mother. In other words, materia which is translatable to ‘matter’ in English – signifying that out 
of which anything is made – originates from mother. If the earth is the ‘mother’ of everything, then 
all entities of the universe are intimately interrelated.  Obtainable from this metaphor, we can infer 
that the earth is sacred because the earth metaphorically, births the inhabitants. Thus, its inhabitants 
are expected to engage with her with respect and caution, so as not to injure mother-earth. Irwin 
(2015:119) notes that, unlike the dichotomisation inherent in the Western scientific conception of 
nature-human relationship, the Indigenous people abhor the separation of the subject (human) from 
the object (nature). Such separation is viewed as alienation, and is deemed to be dangerously 
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unnecessary. This study proposes that the complementary perspectives better encapsulate the 
interrelationship of the subject and the object as envisioned by the AEO. 
 
Observable from the African conception of nature is the common currency of such thought 
processes from other indigenous people’s ideas about nature and human relationships. For instance, 
the earth-mother metaphor is also entrenched in the understanding of the Pacific people in New 
Zealand regarding the human-nature relationship (Irwin 2015). Their conceptualisation of nature 
is captured through the term Whenua. Whenua is a concept used to reinforce the explanation of the 
relational process and life sustenance between the various existential individual entities in the web 
of existence, and by extension, humans and nonhuman parts of nature (Irwin 2015:119-122). 
Explaining the concept of Whenua, Irwin argues: 
 
People are always talked about in conjunction with the land. Tangata, the people, 
are rarely mentioned without Whenua:  tangata whenua. Whenua means both the 
land and also the placenta. The metaphor is significant, for the placenta enables 
the mother and foetus [the earth and its inhabitants], two separate beings to cohabit 
one body. It is a metaphor for nurture, connection, and difference… Traditionally, 
whenua has rich connotations of place, connectedness, and community. It is about 
people protecting and nurturing the land and the land protecting and nurturing 
people [a complementary and symbiotic relationship] (2015:120).  
 
The quote above reinforces the idea that one cannot refer to people without mention of the land. 
The two are connected together by an unbreakable umbilical cord. The valuation of the interrelation 
between nature and humans is better encapsulated via the complementary perspective. Implicit in 
the Indigenous peoples’ conceptions of nature is the entrenchment of the complementary and 
symbiotic relationship between human and nature, respectively. This view is also captured by the 
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Anchorage Declaration, a product of the 2009 Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate 
Change held in Alaska. The declaration states: 
 
We express our solidarity as Indigenous peoples living in the area that are the most 
vulnerable to the impact and root causes of climate change. We reaffirm the 
unbreakable and sacred connection between land, air, water, oceans, forests, sea 
ice, plants, animal, and our human communities as the material and spiritual basis 
for our existence… Mother Earth is no longer in a period of climate change, but 
in the climate crisis. We, therefore, insist on an immediate end to destruction and 
desecration of the elements of life ( 2009:1)  
 
Obtainable from the above is that the African conception of nature shares something in common 
with other Indigenous paradigms on nature.  Furthermore, it could be adduced that the preservation 
of the elements of life is made possible via the African conception of nature as that which is alive, 
self-sustaining, self-evolving, and on whom human existence is dependent. This is in coherence with 
the epistemic order of Africans as informed by the unitary ontological-cum-complementary 
perception of reality entrenched in African intellectual thought. The concept of Whenua as well as 
the earth-mother metaphor examined above, thus, support the idea of the unity of humans and nature. 
This idea informs the epistemic outlook of Africans about nature. Consequently, human actions are 
moderated in maintaining a healthy relationship with nature.  
 
The interconnectedness between human beings and physical nature is also affirmed in the 
philosophical concept of Ubuntu. Ubuntu reflects African indigenous thought processes that 
encapsulate a collective responsibility among humans to distribute the life force for the common 
benefit (Museka and Madondo 2012:259). In this sense, Ubuntu can be seen as a way of living that 
contributes meaningfully to the preservation of the life and well-being of all members of the 
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ecosphere. In other words, Ubuntu is not confined to relations between and among human beings. 
Ramose expresses this succinctly: 
 
The principle of wholeness [Ubuntu] applies also with regard to the relation 
between human beings and physical or objective nature. To care for one another, 
therefore, implies caring for physical nature as well. Without such care, the 
interdependence between human beings and physical nature would be 
undermined. Moreover, human beings are indeed part and parcel of physical 
nature, even though they might be a privileged part at that. Accordingly, caring 
for one another is the fulfilment of the natural duty to care for physical nature as 
well. It is thus the constant strife to strike and then maintain a balance between 
human beings and physical nature. The concept of balance in African thought is 
comprehensive in the sense that it conceives of balance in terms of the totality of 
the relations that can be maintained between human beings amongst themselves 
as well as between human beings and physical nature (2002a:124). 
  
The African conception of nature instils harmonious coexistence of all members of the earth 
community. In this conception, human beings are decentred from the destructive role of being 
masters and manipulators of the nonhuman part of nature (Museka and Madondo 2012:262).  
Eliciting adaptive attitudes towards nature and other nonhuman entities in the universe is possible 
from the broad sense of Ubuntu as a cosmological consideration. Such consideration is fitting for 
the environmental discourse. This is because the African conception of nature could engenders an 
attitude or mentality of stewardship towards nature, and thus obviates the frontier mentality of 
consumerism. 
 
It has been shown that one rational way to understanding reality from the African perspective is to 
grasp the unitary ontological outlook through the epistemic complementarity frameworks it 
operates with. Conceiving reality in this manner enhances a rational explanation of the indigenous 
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African Epistemic Order. The next section of this chapter shall be engaging with the potency of 
the explored Indigenous epistemic order for the environmental crises. 
 
6.4. The epistemic implication for African Environmental Philosophy (AEP) 
Having enunciated the stance of the indigenous epistemic order as a normative and prescriptive 
tool for engaging existential issues, the ground is set for its direct application to environmentalism. 
The aim of this section is thus, to explore the African epistemic process as a framework for 
addressing environmental crisis. Thereafter, the ethical entailment of the African epistemic order 
will be examined. This is aimed at presenting the moral outlook of the envisioned AEO for 
environmental philosophy. 
 
6.4.1. Imperatives for an African Environmental Epistemology (AEE) 
The indigenous epistemic order, in the manner it was construed in this study especially in the fifth 
chapter while enunciating the conceptual framework for the epistemic stance of the Yoruba, Igbo, 
and ditto other African cultures, has implications for the discourse of environmentalism in Africa. 
Presenting the significance of the African epistemic worldview, Sophie Oluwole alluded to the 
ontological-cum-logical assumptions pervading Africans’ (but more particularly, the Yoruba’s) 
conception of reality, its articulation, and dissemination (2015:156-159). She recognises the 
intellectual assumption wherein reality is perceived as one whole web of interrelationships that are 
operative in a unitary and complementary ontology. Making the worldview of Orunmila, a 
Pantheon ancestor of the Yoruba race as an archetype of indigenous African thought, especially 




Orunmila held the view that matter and idea constitute an inseparable pair – both 
in nature and in functioning. He was neither a materialist nor an idealist, but held 
a complementary dualistic view of reality (2015:80-81). 
 
This view is also echoed by Innocent Asouzu in presenting the Igbo’s view of reality. He averred 
that the complementarity framework is essential to understanding and explaining reality 
systematically and scientifically, in a comprehensive manner (2007:15). It appears that for Asouzu, 
the complementarity view is out to aid critical understanding and practical outlooks towards issues 
relating to contemporary African life.  
 
The practical standpoint of the interconnectedness within which African epistemic worldviews 
operate is further enunciated by Oluwole as she argues that “development based on the African 
world view of ‘binary complementarity’ is what most scholars now see as the solution to the 
various forms of intellectual and social upheavals across the world” (2015:181). In addition, this 
is by extension the epochal challenge in environmentalism. The epistemological framework that 
operates in the African parlance would best be appreciated in Asouzu’s view as one wherein every 
notion requiring understanding is grasped from the preceding condition of its intrinsic 
interrelatedness devoid of polarisation and exclusiveness (2007:10). This shows that the 
conceptual analysis of knowledge is meaningless outside the unitary ontologico-epistemological 
framework. In this unitary ontologised epistemic thought, there is an entailment of 
complementarity between the epistemic subject and the epistemic object. As noted by Jimoh and 
Thomas: 
 
The epistemic subject which experiences the epistemic object and the epistemic 
object which is experienced are joined together, such that the epistemic subject 
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experiences the epistemic object in a sensuous, emotive, intuitive, and abstractive 
understanding (2015:120).   
 
I note the term ‘epistemic’ in the above, is used for both the subject and the object, as both are 
seen as agents of epistemic reality in the parlance of African epistemic thought. The researcher 
thus opines that an epistemological view, as enunciated above, is one that helps us to “know in 
nature rather than know of nature” (Bryant 2011:26). As an epistemology that aids our knowing in 
nature, the African epistemic worldview underscores enlightenment to respect and have reverence 
for nature and its laws. It also serves as a framework to reflect or work out a sustainable attitude 
or ethical principle, in the quest for survival and understanding of reality.  
 
One begins to wonder how intelligible the fusion of the subject and object of epistemic agencies 
could be without distortion of the existential status of each agent? To this question, it should be 
noted that the unitary ontological nature of African conception of reality, though, grants the 
independent existence of the constituent entities of existence, yet such existence is recognizable in 
the complementary stance of interrelatedness of these entities as one whole web of reality. This is 
because all forces of being, to which the human is part, are subsumed in the wholeness of 
ontological existence. There is no room for any sort of detachment between any of the forces of 
existence; the subject is subsumed in the object and vice versa. Consequently, it is inferable that 
humans are subsumed in nature. In the same vein, the African epistemological worldview, 
entrenched in the African conception of reality, regards both the subject and object of epistemic 
experience as essential in the interconnectedness of the life web. To this end, there is neither sharp 
distinction nor detachment between the self or ego that is engaged in theorising and the world 
wherein the theory takes place. Put differently, both the subject and the object are bound together 
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in a unitary ontological worldview. The epistemic implication of this is that justification of 
knowledge claims in the context of African holistic and unified ontological thought presupposes 
the synergy of the subject and the object. In this epistemic order, neither the subject nor the object 
could singly be sufficient for the justification of knowledge claim.   
 
Thus, from the perspective of Indigenous African epistemic thought processes, a motivation to 
preserve the environment naturally emerges. Moreover, the environmentalist’s urge to reach out 
and protect the environment becomes another way of reaching out to entities that humans are part 
of – the environment. The research, indeed, holds that the African orientation in environmental 
philosophy offers a re-conceptualisation of humanity that has the potential to change human 
knowledge and the perceptual mode in the quest for a sound, harmonious, and symbiotic 
interrelationship between humans and the environment. Obtainable thereof, is the existence of a 
kind of nature-people transaction that ensures that how we think about the world has a way of 
affecting the way we relate and live with nature. Put in another way, the understanding of ourselves 
as being a part of the gamut of the nature-human whole, has a coefficient of correlation with how 
we relate with every other part of this whole. When we see ourselves as eco-cognitive beings – 
beings who are cognitively grounded in the world wherein they are situated (Preston 2003:xi) – 
the nature-human transaction is seamless, sustainable, and of high economic importance. With the 
operationality of the African Epistemic Order, the universe is perceived and conceived with a 
unitary lens that does not promote any form of dichotomisation, and, as such, enhances this nature-
human transaction. As rightly noted by Emeife Ikenga-Metu, 
 
The main objective of an African is to live a life of harmony with humanity and 
with nature… [the African] feels [the] self in intimate rapports and tries to 
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maintain a harmonious relationship with the animal, vegetation, and other 
elements and phenomenon in the universe. For [the African], the first evil is 
disintegration, [dichotomy], for this would spell disaster for [humans] and [their] 
immediate world. The ideal thing is integration, communion, and harmony 
(1985:51).  
 
It could thus be noted that, despite the apparent diversity of various forms of beings and entities 
making up the universe, the operationality of AEO ensures the conceivability of such, as one reality 
with inter-relationality or complementarity linkages between the seemingly diverse forms. To this 
extent, human lives could be seen to be inseparably bound to that of nature. Thus, objectifying 
nature as an insignificant ‘other’ is a farce in the African epistemic operation.  Objectifying nature 
as ‘the other’ with only instrumental value, therefore, does not come into play on any angle in the 
stance of AEO, because it does not permit a dichotomy in the perception of reality or mechanistic 
of nature. The synergistic recognition of matter and non-matter, physical and nonphysical, body 
and mind, the visible and invisible parts of reality as one, is thus unveiled herein to be fit for an 
eco-critical52 analysis of the human-nature relationship.  
 
Beyond its relevance to human-nature relations, though beyond the scope of this present research 
work, AEO also informs sound humanistic understanding for the ethical consideration of ‘the 
others’. Thus, it would be fit for a conceptual framework in the discourse of gender-based violence, 
racism, consideration of distant people and future generation, inter-continental migration, to 
mention but a few. These areas of discourses are presently not the focus of our study; however, it 
points to the intellectual utility of the AEO as a conceptual framework to deal with contemporary 
 
52 That which is related to analysis on how literary texts and other works of arts portrays or projects environmental 
concerns. Thus, to be eco-critical is to involve in the “scrutiny of ecological implications in any literary text” (Slovic 
1999:1102) For more on ecocriticism, see S. Slovic, 2009.  “Ecocriticism” In J. B. Callicott and R. Frodeman.(eds.) 




existential issues. The crux of the discussion here, with regard to environmentalism, is that people 
that are endowed with the knowledge of their environment, are ecologically placed in a vantage 
point to relate well with the natural environment. This is because the epistemic embeddedness of 
their existential experiences affords them the understanding and application of such knowledge 
towards the sustainable use of nature. A healthy conception of the human-nature relation is, thus, 
engendered from the epistemic unification of object and subject, nature and humans, body and 
mind. 
 
The pertinent question at this point is: what will the role of ethics in the envisioned African 
environmental philosophy be? In other words, granted that the research attempts to ground the 
African orientation in environmental discourse on epistemology, does this mean that such an 
epistemic perspective is devoid of ethical and/or moral injunctions? We opine that there is a role 
for ethics in the idea of Environmental epistemology. However, such a role is informed by the 
cognitive and affective grounding of the epistemic agents. Put differently, ethical perspectives and 
moral dispositions to physical nature – this research posits – is largely informed by the epistemic 
realities of the agents in question. The AEO, as enunciated above, allows for the ethical agent to 
act in environmentally friendly ways. This position is strengthened by Preston’s view that 
“organisms that know things about the world are situated beings, beings cognitively grounded in 
the world from which they speak” (2003:xi).  The African epistemic order, thus, offers a 
framework for understanding the place of humans in the scheme of existence, recognising the 
environment as an integral part of life to which humans also belong, and thus engenders sustainable 
relationship with the environment. With its epistemic process devoid of dichotomisation of the 
subject and object of perception, the AEO casts light upon the importance of the physical 
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environment to human activities and also its effect in decision making. Thus, AEO necessarily has 
ethical implications; as it informs a more environmentally inclined way of considering humans as 
part of the broader environment. The next section will, thus, be focused on the ethical positions as 
well as moral outlooks that are informed by the African Epistemic Order. 
 
6.4.2.  The ethical scheme in African Environmental Epistemology (AEE) 
This section explores the role of ethics, as principles of moral dictates guiding actions in the 
envisioned African epistemic driven environmentalism. This research views the ethical 
considerability of any being as being the consequence of the African conception of reality, which 
contains two differing and yet interrelated entities: the material and immaterial. Thus, the 
envisioned African orientation in Environmental Philosophy remains the basis for ethical 
consideration. The ethical perspective for which we argue is termed ‘Complementarity Ethics’ 
(CE) or Complementarity Environmental Ethics (CEE). This is in line with the complementarity 
reflection espoused earlier in this chapter. The present researcher opines that the ontological and 
logical perspectives to understanding reality in an African worldview requires an ethical 
conceptualisation that considers the interrelation of the various units of existents.  
 
It is thus expected that this ethical idea will, among other things, recognise the independence of 
the various entities, incorporates the interdependency of these various beings in the existential 
space of the society, and foster the development as well as the sustenance of harmonious 
relationships between the varying independent and interdependent units of existence. What the 
ethical consideration that would be appropriate for the African environmental epistemology also 
holds is that each existing entity, in line with the African epistemic order, is seen as an important 
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agent that has its individuality – which is authenticated by its interrelationship with others – and 
as such serves as a connecting link for the complementarity process in the unitary ontology of 
Africans. While critics could argue that the CEE is akin to ethical perspectives that are based on 
African communitarian philosophy, this study argues that there are significant differences between 
CEE and communitarian ethical perspective. The differences, which will be highlighted below, are 
significant in the application of these two perspectives to environmental discourse.  
 
As opined by various African philosophers, communitarian philosophy focuses on conceiving a 
person in reference to the community. This is proposed by Mbiti (1969:106), Menkiti (1984:171–
81), (2004:324–311), and Gyekye (1992:101–22). Even with the distinction of moderate and 
radical stance as the two shades of African communitarianism, the crux of their arguments is that 
the human person exists in consideration of its relations with the community. For Mbiti, “I am 
because we are” (169:106) is the guiding principle for thinking about the status of a person. 
Menkiti’s popular view on the idea of communitarianism is that “…man is defined by reference to 
the environing community” (1984:171). Gyekye considers: 
 
Communitarianism sees the human person as an inherently communal being, 
embedded in a context of social relationships and interdependence, never 
isolated atomic individuals. Consequently, it sees the community not as a mere 
association of individual persons whose interest and ends are contingently 
congruent, but as a group of a person linked by interpersonal bonds, biological 
and or non-biological, who consider themselves primarily as members of the 
group and who have common interest, goals, and values (1992:104) 
 
The socio-cultural setting of the African community negates the atomic existence of the individual 
person. As noted earlier in this chapter, the ontological perspective of the African culture explains 
the conceptual framework informing this socio-cultural understanding of a person. For the 
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essentiality of the communitarian view for ethics, Gyekye posits that “the communal or 
communitarian aspects of African socio-ethical thought are reflected in the communitarian features 
of the African societies” (1992:102). Communitarian thinking, thus, could be taken as a defining 
element of the social, ethical, and cultural setting of African society.  
 
Some scholars also employed this communitarian thinking to enunciate ethical principles or 
features of African society, among them are Thaddeus Metz (2007a), (2007b), (2007c), (2011), 
(2012a), (2012b), (2013), and  (2017a). In his interpretation, Metz opines:  
 
… Sub-Saharan ethical thought at least as philosophically interpreted maintains 
that self-realisation is exhausted through other persons, that is through 
community alone. It is typical for African theorists to maintain, or at least 
suggest, that the only comprehensive way of life is by communing, or sometimes 
being in harmony with the other people (2012b:102). 
 
From Metz’s perspectives, it is obvious that the defining elements of communitarianism 
underscore the African ethical principles. Hence, the Metzian ethical view that “the greater a 
being’s capacity to be part of a communal relationship… the greater its moral status” (2012a:387).  
Put in another form, beings are morally considerable and adjudged appropriate or otherwise by 
virtue of their capability for causal or intentional connection with other beings in the community 
(Metz 2011:537–39. This study takes an exception to the Metzian ethical view because of its 
presupposed assumption that moral status follows on from “capacity” to belong to a community 
and engage in a relationship. The limitation of the capacity stance of Metzian ethical view has also 
been noted by Samuel and Fayemi (2020:40), as they question its adequacy in determining 
relationship proprieties of mentally incapacitated human beings. A person who suffers from 
autism, for instance, is not able to communicate, and cannot establish relationships, particularly in 
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the physical sense. Does that mean that the moral status of that person is less because of an inability 
to form meaningful bonds within the context of community?  The communitarian ethical 
perspective has also been explored in the discourse of environmentalism by focusing on how 
communitarian thinking can engender African environmental ethics. Such applications are 
apparent in the works of Murove (2004:195–215) and Behrens (2010:465–84), (2012:140–45) 
(2014a:63–82), and (2018:42–57). These scholars enlarge the relational idea, engendered by 
communitarian thinking to posit relational environmental ethics. For Behrens, “the African 
relational environmentalism is a promising African environmentalism that [is] found in a belief in 
fundamental interrelatedness between natural object” (2014a:63). Furthermore, Munyaradzi Felix 
Murove, exploring the Shona cultural communitarianism for environmental ethics notes that 
communitarian thinking “provides the ethical anchorage for human social, spiritual and ecological 
togetherness” (2004:197).  
 
A critique of the exploration of communitarian thinking for environmentalism, especially on the 
relational idea, has however been done by Munamato Chemhuru (2016:41–51), (2017a:505–14), 
and (2017b:1–272). Chemhuru, recognising the import of communitarian thinking to 
environmentalism, argues for an “African Communitarian Environmental Ethics” (2017b:211–
31). He argues that “the African understanding of the community and the individual could 
positively inform environmental ethical thinking” (2017b:211). For Chemhuru, previous 
communitarian environmental ethics anchored on relational ideas are inadequate because the 
relational view rests on the biological interconnection between human beings and does not explore 
the teleological and ontological dimensions inherent in the communitarian view (2017b:223). 
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Chemhuru attempts to fill this gap by examining the ontological and teleological interconnection 
between various beings in the natural environment (2017b:224-229). He argues: 
 
The teleological dimension which I interpret from this communitarian dictum is 
that, if all living and inanimate objects are related to human beings, then it is 
reasonable to admit that there must be some common ontological connections 
between them. At the same time… there must be some teleological ends for 
which all these things exist” (Chemhuru 2017b:224).  
 
Thus, Chemhuru rests the position for his African environmental thinking on the ontological stance 
of African communitarian thinking.  
 
I note some issues against Chemhuru’s ontological reflection for African environmentalism. The 
first is the overreliance on ethics in the discourse. Needless to repeat the adverse effect of such an 
approach at undermining the graveness of the crisis of environmentalism, especially in Africa as 
it has been espoused in chapters two, four, and early parts of chapter six of this study. Furthermore, 
in his African communitarian environmental ethics, Chemhuru advanced an argument for 
extending moral consideration to nature through communitarian thinking. He employs an 
expansionary process to the idea of community by arguing that: 
 
 The notion of the community ought to be conceptualised as having an 
expandable view in African Philosophy such that the community must be 
understood to include human persons, and their surrounding environment that 
constitutes other being with vital force (2017b:220).  
 
Chemhuru’s method of expanding the idea of community to include nonhuman nature not only 
subsumes the human category on nature but is also suggestive of the dichotomisation undergirding 
the communitarian thinking. Kai Horsthemke has argued that communitarianism entrenches 
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“alliance and proximity to questionable anthropocentric practices and traditions” (2015:25). 
Horsthemke’s observation appears germane here because the idea of communitarianism enunciates 
the socio-cultural relationship between humans in the human community.  Communitarian 
environmental ethics, in the expandable method of Chemhuru, justifies or gives moral 
considerability to nature, not as something nature inherently has, but as that which was thought 
out as good for nature from the human perspective. Again, subtle anthropocentrism raises its head 
here. The expandable view of communitarian thinking for environmentalism reinforces the 
Western conceptual framework of “oppositional dualism”; as it engenders detaching humans from 
nature. This Western framework operates with the “Either/Or Logic in the Exclusive Sense” 
(Oluwole 2015:132), as a strengthened paradigm of disembodiment, de-contextualisation, and 
isolation of ideas and entities. Imposing dichotomisation on the environment via the expansionary 
view is a reduction of the holistic complexity that the AEO would of necessity be opposed to. 
Thus, by opting for the expansion of the human category of communal relations to nonhumans, 
the expansionary view necessarily smacks of bivalent dichotomisation and individuation of 
varying components of reality.  
 
The unitary ontological commitment of the African thought process is one wherein the various 
entities of existence function as one. Here, an argument for expanding the categories of one 
segment of reality/existence to the other does not arise. To propose an idea that is contrary to the 
unitary ontological commitment is to adjudicate from a standpoint of subtle anthropocentrism, 
where there is a dichotomy between nature and humans. Lastly, the communitarian environmental 
ethics, as well as other relational ethical views for environmentalism rest on the ontological 
strength of the African worldview. To advance this ontological perspective of Africans without its 
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corresponding epistemic perspective, is to distort the African intellectual thought process. As noted 
by some scholars, like Tempels (1969) and Ramose (2002a), it is illogical, in African thought, to 
talk of an ontology without epistemology and vice versa. In the same vein, this study has shown 
earlier that African epistemology and ontology are like the two wings of a flying bird, it will be 
impracticable for a bird to fly with one wing. In addition, both epistemology and ontology in the 
African perspectives are like two sides of a coin, one cannot be spent without the other. 
 
Although the communitarian or relational environmental ethicists may argue that their view, being 
structured upon African ethical principles, encapsulates the orientation of African perspectives in 
the discourse of environmentalism, such views appear inadequate for an environmental project. In 
other words, granted that the communitarian or relational perspectives are adequate for a human-
to-human interrelationship, its adequacy for human-nature relationship is questionable. At best, it 
can be expanded to apply to the environment. Olusegun Samuel and Ademola Fayemi (2020:38-
40) also noted this limitation by querying how relational views frame the obligations of beings 
based on the hierarchical ranking stance that undergirds the idea of relationship capacity. The 
moral considerability of beings that is placed upon relationship capacity introduces a hierarchical 
prioritisation of some beings above the other. This cannot be sustainable enough for a sound 
human-nature relationship, as it has a high tendency to lead to the denigrations of nonhumans as 
objects of human usage. It should however be noted that, the ranking of beings and entities, as well 
as the obligation-framing strategy of the communitarian/relational environmental view, could be 
argued to be akin to the hierarchical recognition of beings permeating the African ontology. 
Nevertheless, the insufficiency of such supernatural presentations of African ontology has been 




Obtainable from the foregoing is the identification of two major errors in the arrays of the argument 
put forward for the orientation of African perspectives in environmental philosophy. One is the 
overreliance on ethics in the discourse of environmentalism, and the other is the neglect or under-
exploration of epistemology in conceptualising African environmental philosophy. There are other 
scholars who noted the significance of epistemology to environmental philosophy. For instance, 
Chigbo J. Ekwealo (2011:10–11) passively notes the need for an epistemological consideration as 
he argued that functionality of African Environmental Philosophy as a consistent and coherent 
global ethical platform is mainly achievable through the consideration of African epistemology 
which is rooted in the ontology of complementary dualism. Ronald O. Badru (2018:198–202) also 
notes that African epistemology proffers a coherent framework for advancing sustainable 
environmental democracy. Arguing for the development of a functional environmental policy in 
Africa, Workineh Kelbessa (2018:309, 312, 323) advises that we pay attention to epistemological 
dimensions of African intellectual thought to get a grasp of attitudes, values, and emergent 
environmental concerns. However, these scholars did not commit to the exploration of Indigenous 
African epistemic processes for advancing their African environmental positions. My study fills 
these gaps as it attempts to make-up for the shortcomings of communitarian or relational 
environmental ethics.  
 
This study adopts an ethical view that is engendered by the epistemic process of Africans, i.e. 
‘Complementary Environmental Ethics’ (CEE). The CEE, resting on the epistemic order of 
Africans, acknowledges the complementary and ontological stance of African culture wherein 
every entity functions as one in the one-whole web of existence. As such, the interrelationship 
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between varying units or members in the web of existence would not be a matter of communing. 
Rather, it will be through a complementary process. As complementary to one another in the 
relatedness of the whole web of existence, each differing part, while maintaining its ontological 
status, exists and operates interdependently with one another.  
 
As an epistemologically induced ethical view, the CEE understands the individuality of each 
member of the environment. Thus, the varying individual entity is not subsumed or overshadowed 
in the relationship. Rather, each exists as a complement to the other.  Furthermore, as 
complementing variables, each varying member of the whole web of existence is recognised to 
have intrinsic value, hence the interrelationship does not require expanding the category of one 
segment of existence to another. Also, the present researcher observes that the idea of CEE better 
proffers guides to respect the right of each member of the existing web of life. Doing this, on the 
other hand, necessitates an ethics of duty to keep the complementarity flow. Under the 
complementary nature among ontological beings of this relation, no part loses its quality, viability, 
vital-force, and individuality. Hence, innovation, discovery, and development can flourish. This is 
a variant of sustainable knowledge advocated by Bryant (2011) and noted earlier in this chapter. 
Unlike communitarian environmental ethics that regresses into subtle anthropocentrism, CEE 
excludes anthropocentrism in the moral considerability of nature and is structured on the 
interrelation of the two features of reality: the physical and the non-physical, material and 
immaterial, mind and body, human and nature. 
 
This research concedes that communitarian environmental ethics and its relational ethical thinking 
are appealing concepts and theories that function well as human concepts, to the extent that these 
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ethical ideas, aim at the continual socio-cultural wellbeing of the human person in the community. 
This explains the charge of anthropocentrism against the idea of communitarianism. However, to 
attempt to extend communitarian African ethical thinking to the discourse of environmentalism is 
to present African environmental philosophy as largely or subtly anthropocentric. Furthermore, 
relating to something outside oneself requires an epistemic awareness of ‘others’ existence. Such 
awareness, I argue, is engendered by the epistemic embeddedness of AEO where the subject and 
object of experience are unified in the account of reality or knowledge justification. The 
communitarian/relational environmental perspective – with its inherent hierarchical prioritisation 
of the human being – thus, opens-up grounds for subtle partiality or dichotomy. This is obviated 
by the epistemic-induced CEE. The necessity of all beings and entities of existence to have value 
inherently in them is consistent with the African epistemic process of a unified subject and object. 
Thus, the epistemic process at the core of CEE necessarily permits the independent existence and 
valuation of all beings, while acknowledging the operational interdependency of all entities in the 
schema of things. It should, however, be noted on the contrary, that the necessity of inherent value 
in all beings is limitedly granted in the hierarchical prioritisation of the relational approach; as seen 
in the expansionary perspectives underlying the communitarian environmental view observed 
above. The CEE on the other hand avoids this limitation, as the complementarity operations of 
both the subject and object of perception – humans and nonhumans – are imperative for not just 
understanding reality but engaging with the other members of the earth community.  
 
A possible query, especially from  the views of  (Horsthemke 2015), (Hsiao 2015), (Etieyibo 
2017), etc., that could be levelled against the CEE is that it neglects the importance of the human 
agency in the quest for environmental solution. It should however be noted that the CEE does not 
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discounts the significance of the human activities in the achievement of possible solutions to the 
perennial environmental challenges of the contemporary world. Rather, the CEE agues for an 
epistemic orientation in environmental philosophy that is in line with the African intellectual 
thought. The African conception of reality as shown in the study recognises the independent 
existence of each entity of life. At the same time, the CEE accounts logically for the operationality 
of these entities through the complementarity stance undergirding the interdependency and 
interrelatedness of these entities. As such a human agent armed with the epistemic reality of their 
place in life, as a part of nature, is better placed to respect nature, protect nature, and will strive to 
engage in activities that would engender ecosystem restoration.  This further shows the plausibility 
of the African environmental epistemology as an approach that is not only aligns with the 
intellectual heritage of African culture, but also obviates the subtle anthropocentrism limiting other 
African environmental philosophic positions examined.  
 
Furthermore, against the possible query that the proposed African environmental epistemology is 
mere ideated, I argue that the African epistemic order proffers a basis which AEE as a viable 
framework for environmentalism is built upon. The operational practicability of the AEE as 
enunciated in this study is capable of inciting meaningful solutions, at different level of human-
nature engagements, to the contemporaneous environmental challenges. For instance, the 
individual persons that has the knowledge of her/is place in nature will be able to form an 
environmentally friendly habits, thus preventing hurting nature. This is exemplified in Willa 
Boezak (2017) presentation of  the indigenous people of Khoisan of Southern African 
environmental outlook as a product of their knowledge of a green cosmology that is established 
on harmonious and complementary interrelatedness between all beings (2017:255). Also, the 
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enlightenment inherent in the AEO also has an insightful ability to better equip government and 
policy makers at the local, national and international level to make, and be committed to nature 
protecting and restoration laws. The practicability of the AEE enhances the sound understanding 
about living in proximity to nature. This is because, such enlightenment enhances our 
understanding that protecting nature from damages, is also protecting the welfare of humans. Thus, 
the AEE could facilitate clear goals around nature restoration, tree replanting for biodiversity, 
protection of engendered species, enacting of gratification policies to encourage mass 
environmental protection acts, etc. In essence, the AEE becomes a key ingredient in mapping out 
proper action towards being a steward of nature, rather than a consumer. 
 
The Complementary Environmental Ethics that this research argues for is suitable for the 
sustenance of harmonic relationships between the varying independent and yet interdependent 
beings/entities in society. This is because it allows for each differing unit to hold to its individuality 
– which is authenticated by their interrelation with the other – and at the same time being 
complementary to one another. The CEE is also put forward as a framework for intergenerational 
ethical guidance and justice for interrogating the past, adjudicating the present, and prescribing for 
future events as well as future generations. With the epistemic knowledge of one’s place in society, 
humans are more equipped to live and act ethically in the relational existence. As such, in relation 
to human-nature relationship, the human as one of the interrelating agents is better positioned to 
make peace with nature. Making peace with nature is essential in the establishment of human 
defining relationship with nature. A human agent, that recognises the epistemic significance of 
‘the other’ parts of nature, which s/he is just a part of, will not ignore protecting nature, but will 
see nature restoration as an essential action for solution to the myriads of ecological crisis of the 
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world. This is because the African epistemic order gives a robust capturing of the human person 
as a part of the two features of reality, whose existence is authenticated and strengthened by its 
complementary relationship with other members of the environment. Thus, a natural motivation 
to protect nature and positively live in a complementary manner with other independent members 
of the environment/society – humans, nonhuman; animate and inanimate objects – is sustained. 
Such motivation, the research suggests, will not only enlarge the conservatory attitude but also be 
able to engender practical and systematic policies for enhancing environmental justice for the 
present, and future generation of the African society and world at large.   
 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter presented African Environmental Epistemology. As such, the exploration of the 
potency of the Indigenous African Epistemic Order to reveal its adequacy for environmental 
discourse was undertaken. Exploring the conceptual formation of the AEO, wherein “to know” 
reveals a relationship between the known and the knower; brought about examining the 
ontological, complementary, and logical perspectives to conceptualising reality in African terms. 
Hence, the examination of the African conception of nature. It was further noted that neither the 
African ontologised nor the African complementary-cum-logical conceptions of reality would be 
singly enough for conceptualising reality, thus the argument was made for conceiving nature from 
an African epistemic viewpoint. It was further nuanced in this chapter’s argument for a fusion of 
the two modes. This is to put forward a rational explanation for an epistemic process wherein the 
mode, method, process, or way of epistemic inquiry is unified, holistic, and normative. The fusion, 
it has been observed, allows for the rationalisation of the normative and descriptive stance of the 
AEO. It was submitted that the normativity and prescriptivism of the Indigenous epistemic process 
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make it desirable as a framework for addressing salient existential issues, especially the 
environmental crisis. Hence, “Complementary Environmental Ethics” became our standard.  
 
The CEE, it was argued, rests on the complementarity stance that is best captured in the epistemic 
embeddedness inherent in African intellectual thought. This argument showed that the AEO has a 
significant insight to inform sound moral relativity between all beings and entities of existence 
without prioritising one being above the other. It should be noted that for coherency and viability, 
an African environmental philosophical view must capture the necessity of all beings to have value 
inherently in them.  
 
This necessity is consistently catered for in the African epistemic process of a unified subject and 
object. Also, looking from a practical angle, conservatory actions and good environmental value 
decisions are essential for maintaining a viable environmental process. Such actions require 
agents’ responsibility and a responsive relationship with nature. The AEO, via its normative and 
descriptive nature, has the capacity to incite the relationship and responsibility needed for good 
actions that can engender viable environmental practices.  
 
One could, thus, hold that the death of progress, as well as poverty of effectiveness of African 
environmental theories, is essentially due to the neglect of the epistemic approach. An epistemic-
enabled African environmental view better encapsulates the understanding of the human’s place 
in the scheme of existence as a part of nature. Such understanding is essential for relating with 
oneself and others as it guides, motivates, and instils the necessity of solidarity in interrelation with 




Thus, IAEO has the potential to incite an ecological understanding that forms the basis for our 
habits, informs our ethics, prescribes our moral adjudications, and generally ensures the 























Summary and conclusion 
 
7.1.  Summary  
The study started with an examination of the concept of environmental philosophy (EP). It 
conceptualises EP from the ‘beyond the ethical perspectives’ stance. I noted in the second chapter 
that to reduce environmental concerns to ethics in the philosophic orientation is to undermine the 
vastness and peculiarities of issues in environmental discourse. Thus, to enunciate the part-whole 
relationship existing between environmental ethics and environmental philosophy, the thesis 
identified some contemporary challenges to environmental philosophy. The intellectual challenges 
examined include: the quest for alternative approaches, overcoming anthropocentrism, and 
environmental politics and justice. I also highlighted that the ‘frontier mentality’ that characterises 
the development of science and technology engendered anthropogenic causes of environmental 
degradation. This mentality entrenches the idea that nature is abundantly available for the endless 
use and satisfaction of humans, and that there are always more resources to consume regardless of 
the consumption rate of the existing ones. Exploring the root of the mentality that embolden 
anthropogenic cause of environmental destruction, the traditional Western epistemology and the 
ensuing enlightenment stance for the establishment of science and technology was identified. 
Hence, the study critiqued traditional Western intellectual thought to show that it tends to facilitate 
the “frontier mentality”. It noted that traditional Western epistemology engenders a perceptual 
mode that dichotomises nature from humans through the subject/object division in the epistemic 
account of reality. Thus, the study showed that the dogma of detaching the epistemic subject from 
the object in the epistemic process is at the root of the tendency to misuse nature – a tendency that 
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has led to the anthropogenic causes of environmental crises. This necessitated the need for an 
alternative framework that recognised the operational complementarity of the epistemic subject 
and epistemic object in understanding reality. 
 
I further examined the current African orientation in environmental philosophy. I argued that the 
arrays of studies examined fall short as they over rely on ethics and do not take cognisance of the 
“beyond the ethical” perspectives that best characterises environmental philosophy. Also, many of 
the studies hinge on the unitary African ontological perception of reality to argue for their 
environmental philosophical view, so neglecting an important aspect of the traditional intellectual 
heritage of African culture: the Epistemic Process. I argued that African epistemology and 
ontology are two sides of the same coin, hence, we cannot use either and neglect the other. Many 
of the African environmental philosophical studies neglect or under-explore African epistemic 
processes in their employment of African ontology for environmental discussions. I argued that it 
is imperative to fill this gap as it distorts the African intellectual heritage.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis explored the ‘African Indigenous Knowledge Systems’ (AIKS) which 
represents the African Epistemic Oder (AEO) rooted in AIKS. AEO is the process within which 
Africans understand reality. Since, for Africans, reality is perceived in a unitary ontological form, 
AEO becomes the systematic codification of knowledge forms for understanding reality. This 
emphasises the view that African ontology and epistemology are like two wings of a flying bird. 
In the epistemological stance of the African view, the epistemic subject and epistemic object are 
important for achieving epistemic justice, as they complement each other in the epistemic quest 




With the understanding garnered from the exploration of AEO, I argued that AEO is poised for 
contemporary environmental philosophy. This is because AEO unearths the significance of 
physical nature by yielding the knowledge forms that are engaged with it.  Also, AEO enhances 
the understanding that human beings’ place is intrinsically intertwined with nature.  Thus, the 
epistemic framework of AEO grounds an ethical agent in an ecologically enhanced position to 
relate amicably with the natural environment. The study argued that the AEO can incite the attitude 
of care, respect for nature, and thus, engenders environmental conservationism, and eco-critical 
habits. This argument emphasises the understanding that AEO obviates the polarisation or 
dichotomisation that characterises the basis for the misuse of nature. This is because in the 
operational stance of AEO, both the subject and object of perception are complementary 
ingredients or elements of sound epistemic justification. The research noted that the 
complementarity stance inherent in AEO makes the recognition of the ‘other’ very essential in the 
epistemic scheme of understanding reality. Thus, the AEO enhances the view that sees nature as 
significant in the process of knowledge justification. The complementary relations of the subject 
and the object of perception reveal the importance attached to nature inherent in the African 
intellectual heritage. The understanding of this complementarity stance can change our perception 
of nature and engenders respect for nature. Thus, making AEO suitable for environmentalism.  
 
Understanding the importance of nature in the epistemic process informs an ecological conscious 
relationship with nature, as it opens up the stance for a harmonious interrelationship between 
humans and nature. My study hinges such interrelationship on the symbiotic engagement inherent 
in the complementary operationality of the epistemic subject and epistemic object of perception. 
261 
 
Knowing how to relate with nature engenders ethical proprieties needed for a human-nature 
relationship that is environmentally informed. Thus, the exploration of the indigenous African 
epistemic worldview allows the study to unearth the intellectual and practical utility of the African 
epistemic process to addressing contemporary issues that have led to environmental crises. This 
also shows the relevance and contribution of the African intellectual heritage to addressing 
environmental challenges of a global magnitude. Although environmental challenges are the focus 
of this study, the intellectual and practical utility of AEO opens the vista of study in applying 
African epistemology to other areas beyond the focus of this study. 
 
7.2.   Conclusion 
This study has explored the indigenous African Epistemic process for the discourse of 
environmental philosophy. The research work had been able to enunciate an African orientation 
in environmental philosophy that is hinged on epistemology. The study has shown that the 
discourse of environmentalism requires the intervention of something more than ethics. The 
researcher observed – in agreement with Bryant (2011) – that Africa, and countries of colour, as 
well as those of low-income regions of the world, bear a higher impact of the ecological crisis in 
the world. The researcher further observed many of the attempts by scholars towards advancing 
an African perspective upon the environmental crisis have been of little success. This is owing, 
largely to the fact that these theories are either fashioned out in the cloak of Western perspectives, 
or overreliance on ethics, or neglect of the people’s epistemic orientation. The study granted that 
the need for an African perspective is strengthened by the quest for solutions that are equitable, 
inclusive, and in line with the need and peculiarities of the African society. The research 
highlighted the fact that some attempts at putting forward an African orientation in environmental 
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philosophy have been undermined by the weight of Western-centric methods and an overreliance 
on ethics. These observable deficits inform the quest for an alternative framework that would be 
both prescriptive and descriptive in its employment for the discourse of environmentalism, 
especially in Africa. This alternative framework was pinpointed out from the exploration of the 
Indigenous knowing process of the African people. 
 
One of the benefits of exploring the indigenous epistemic order for environmental discourse is that 
such a method allows for a deep-seated comprehension of the pre-colonial environmental culture 
in many African societies. This helps to appreciate the interjection of indigenous thought in the 
current approaches to an environmentally conscious society for present and future generations. 
The exploration strengthened the position of this study for the intellectual viability of alternative 
approaches to Western-centric perspectives in environmentalism. Furthermore, the idea of African 
environmental epistemology contributes another perspective to the studies on the nexus between 
the epistemic process of African origin and how it informs how Africans understand, engage with, 
live, and think about their environment.  How this epistemic process informed conservation 
strategies in African societies even before the importation and imposition of colonial ideas and 
subsequent adoption of the Western ideas by post-colonial governments in Africa, however, 
remains a subject of further discourse for this study. It must be noted that the employment of the 
word “Africa”, while particularly speaking of one or two specific cultures, is because the situation 
which different African countries encountered before, during colonialism and afterward are 
somehow similar, though different in degrees (Mawere 2014:xviii). What the indigenous approach, 
especially the epistemic alternative as opined by the present researcher also put forward, is that the 
low effectiveness or failure of environmental policies and conservation methods in post-colonial 
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Africa is largely due to the neglect of indigenous strategies used in pre-colonial periods. This syncs 
with Mawere’s idea that “the relegation of traditional conservation strategies as unscientific and 
backward has betrayed studies and in particular conservation projects in Africa as a whole” 
(2014:xix). Thus, exploring the epistemic conundrums of the African people for environmentalism 
allows for an ample platform to examine the environmental, cultural, and knowledge systems that 
engender norms, values, and traditions attached to the natural environment.  
 
What is obtainable from such exploration, as the focus of this study is, is that local environmental 
methods and strategies that are informed by the indigenous knowledge systems can be unearthed 
for contemporary deployment in the face of the perennial environmental challenges. Thus, post-
colonial African States, through their governments, could focus or give credence to traditional 
conservation strategies and epistemologies in addressing environmental degradation. This will 
largely follow the paths of looking inward for solutions to African problems, as solutions that are 
African based will be put forward for addressing African environmental problems. Another 
essential fact that is revealed by the exploration of an indigenous knowledge system for 
environmentalism is the understanding that contact with Western ideas and civilization in Africa, 
especially through colonialism brought about significant transformation to the daily practices, 
needs, prism of perception, value, and epistemic relationship with the environment. How 
significant either to the right or left – that is – for good or bad, as well as remedies to leftist-





This study affirms that, beyond the institutionalisation of the frontier mentality (as shown in the 
third chapter of this study that Western intellectual heritage engenders), the impact of Western-
centric ideas on environmental issues in non-Western countries and in particular, Africa, cannot 
be underestimated. The mentality of use and misuse of the environment that traditional Western 
intellectual thought proffers for its germination, growth, and sustainability, was extended to non-
Western countries of colour and low income through colonialism and globalisation. These 
countries were subjected to Western-oriented rule, distortion of the indigenous knowledge system, 
and the imposition of policies, methods, and strategies for environmental management that are 
Western biased. As such, ways in which the people live at peace, with every other being in the 
environment that is indigenous to the African people’s culture were replaced with Western 
environmental conservation methods that are based on epistemological thoughts alien to the 
African culture.  
 
Furthermore, with hindsight into the exploration of the indigenous epistemic order as discussed in 
the fifth chapter and the environmental utility of AEO in the sixth chapter of this study, it has been 
established that the basic assumption that undergirds the epistemic process of Africans is one 
wherein natural affinity with nature is imperative. In this conceptual perception of reality – wherein 
everything in existence co-exists in a complementary fashion – there is no ground open for 
dichotomous or dualistic views of reality. Thus, humans are able to give appropriate care to the 
environment as something that is part of their being. Although not explicitly highlighted by 
Ogungbemi (2001:268) and Tangwa (2004:389) in their discussion of the “ethics of nature-
relatedness” and “eco-bio-communitarianism,” respectively, the research notes that the 
presentation of environment-human relations that is Indigenous to African culture, that is guided 
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by a unified ontological perception of reality supports their view. One would thus be able to hold 
here that one of the reasons that the continent of Africa seems to be bearing the pangs of 
environmental degradation is largely due to the distortion, relegation, and classification as 
unscientific and illogical by colonial practices of indigenous environmental protection strategies. 
Worst still, the despising of Indigenous knowledge systems has continued in the post-colonial 
African states, as post-independent African leaders followed the path and method laid down by 
the colonial masters.  
 
It should however be noted here that, while it may not be wrong for contemporary African states 
to employ Western environmental policies and strategies – where such may be applicable – it 
would be inappropriate to reject Indigenous African environmental protection strategies due to 
their origin. In other words, to the extent that this research work recognises the positive effect of 
Western environmental conservation methods, for better and sustainable results, there is a need to 
complement these strategies with environmental protection models that are informed by 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems. This resonates well with the position of the UNCFC 2015 Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change examined in chapter two, that there is a need for the application of 
alternative methods in the quest to combat the environmental degradation facing the universe. By 
alternative approaches, it means non-Western and/or so-called ‘unscientific’ strategies. There 
abounds, in this vein, examinations of such complementary reflection on the discourse of 
Environmental philosophy. An example of such reasoning seeking a complementary approach 
between two or more cultural perspectives as shown in the introductory chapter of this study, is 
Callicott and Ames’ presentation of Asian traditions as a conceptual resource for environmental 
philosophy (1989).  A call for the complete revision of the human-nature relationship in Western 
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thought was made based on the metaphysical realities that the exploration of the Asian intellectual 
Tradition made available. Here, classical Taoism was put forward as an alternative understanding 
of the human-nature relationship that would engender order, protection for the environment, and 
possible reduction in the environmental crisis of the world (Callicott and Ames 1989:vii-xix). This 
study, thus, contributes to the employment of the African worldview as an alternative perspective 
on the environmental issues.  It has been shown that the justification for the exploration of African 
orientation in epistemology is not just because Africa is part of the global world that experiences 
environmental challenges, but essentially because Africa has “important theories that will help 
man [sic] conserve the environment” (Ifeakor 2019:169).  It has also been shown that the call for 
alternative approaches is justified because different philosophies will enrich the world’s 
environmental attitude from diverse contexts, thus, enhancing sound and functional perspectives 
for environmental thinking and the human-nature relationship.  
 
This study contributes to the advancement of evolving alternative approaches to environmentalism 
from the parlance of African epistemology. The study has examined past African efforts in 
environmental philosophy and the inherent gap in these approaches has been highlighted. 
However, the difference this study contributes to studies in the genre of the discourse of 
environmental philosophy, is the employment of the African epistemological process. This 
difference may be regarded as a wake-up call for scholars, environmental policymakers, 
protectionists and advocates/activists to examine our perceptual mode of reality and thus get 
informed on the viability, intellectual utility, and significance of the environment to sustaining life 
on the earth community. It has also been shown in the fifth and sixth chapters of this study that by 
understanding the complex process of knowing, and its subject-object relational dictates, an 
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appreciation of nature from the informed stance of epistemology, is obtained. Such epistemic 
understanding has a way of provoking ideas that would practically and/or naturally guide our 
actions, dispositions, considerability, and ethics of nature-human relationship. The epistemic-
oriented position for environmentalism is, thus, one that is fit for a “nature-focused virtue” 
(Mawere 2014:8).  
 
Furthermore, arguing for the Indigenous African Epistemic Order as an alternative approach in the 
discourse of environmentalism, would serve as a means towards achieving continual development 
and sustenance of IKS in post-colonial Africa. Continuous sustenance of IKS is a welcomed 
development for intellectualism in Africa, as it serves a significant purpose in the quest for 
epistemic justice against the superimposition and suppression of African epistemology. This 
situation of epistemic injustice, as highlighted in the fifth chapter of this study, is a long-term and 
continual phenomenon. A phenomenon that accounts for the reduction of non-Western cultures as 
participating agents in the episteme of Western thoughts and Eurocentric history. Thus, in addition 
to being an intellectual platform for addressing environmental crisis/degradation, exploring the 
idea of AEO envisioned in this study stands as a call for epistemic justice against situations of 
dismembering the IKS of the Africans through different forms of epistemological injustices as 
shown in the fifth chapter.  
 
 Against the background of traditional Western intellectual thought as envisioned in traditional 
Western epistemology, the ensuing Enlightenment and scientific development examined in the 
third chapter of this study, the environmental philosophic orientation that is informed by AEO 
necessarily becomes a critique.   In other words, this study also serves as the decolonial point of 
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deconstructing the Western modernistic division of nature and society, or what Mawere (2014:8) 
calls “unequal relationship between nature and culture”. The contribution of this research however 
goes beyond mere deconstructionism by attempting to reconstruct the conceptualisation of AEO 
to fit into the goal of decoloniality. The goal of decoloniality as envisioned by this research work 
is formed in light of Kwasi Wiredu’s idea of conceptual decolonisation (1995:22). One benefit, 
among others, of the Wireduan decolonial goal to this study, is that it not only helps to guard 
against the uncritical acceptance and inculcation of foreign culture and perspectives, but is also 
instructive on the carefulness of reductionism to cultural nationalism, nativism, or ethnocentrism. 
This view was exhaustively explored in the fifth chapter of this study and well captioned as the 
Methodic Crisis in African epistemology. 
 
Getting one’s thought guided by the decolonial goal is essential in the face of multicultural and 
multidisciplinary approaches that contemporary issues now require. With the perennial nature of 
global challenges like poverty, war, gender-based violence, environmental degradation, 
psychological endemics, insurgency, political instability, the decolonial goal appears more 
imperative for African emancipation. For Latour, getting out of these myriads of global challenges 
requires striving for a common world that is devoid of nature/culture or modern/premodern 
distinction (2007:12). The effectual thought process or worldview for such a common world would 
be one that permits alternative, multiple and divergent worldviews. In this kind of reasoning, there 
is no room for hegemonic tendencies or superimposition of ideas, as each converging culture is 
recognised as a locus of existence on its own. Furthermore, the enormous stance of issues to 
grapple with makes the complementarity stance a desideratum in this epistemic meeting-point. As 
such, interrelations between divergent views, ideas, culture, and being – humans and nature – is 
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encouraged. Indeed, the minimal success recorded so far in the quest for peace, cohesion and 
environmental sustainability that had hitherto been sought on Western-centric paradigm makes 
African Environmental Epistemology an imperative.  Again, the significance of the study to 
contemporary issues is revealing here.  
 
By exploring the African Indigenous Epistemic Order for environmental philosophy, the study fits 
in through apt contribution to studies “promoting holistic sustainable productive system” (Mawere 
2014:10). In this holistic sustainable productive system, dichotomising knowledge production and 
application is jettisoned; and a platform for interfacing various culture’s intellectual systems to 
enhance sustainable results, is attained. With this understanding, the study averred that the African 
Epistemic Order could be made applicable to contemporary life situations in Africa and beyond. 
In other words, in the view of the synthesis of the objective and subjective dimension of philosophy 
that AEO commits to, though the idea may be culturally specific in conceptualisation, it is however 
cross-boundary in application. This is because AEO reflects and applies to contemporary 
environmental challenges, as well as the models or approaches in addressing these challenges. It 
was, thus, argued in the fourth and sixth chapters that my study will be undermining the nature of 
environmental crises if it limits its focus on Africa alone. The cross-boundary applicability of AEO 
for environmentalism, thus, opens these frontiers of intellectual communications of values for 
sound environmental practices and conservation. It also allows for further research engagement 
where one may opine for a complementary approach between Indigenous African environmental 
thought-processes and foreign ones. Doing this will once again unveil the viability and praxis of 
the African epistemic system in environmental discourses as well as the sensibility of integrating 
diverse intellectual positions for sustainable results. The complementary reflection that AEO 
270 
 
unearths has been demonstrated in the sixth chapter to be germane in the quest for a panacea to 
contemporaneous challenges facing the world, and in particular, Africa. 
 
Consequently, it should be noted that the position of this research work, especially in the area of 
applying indigenous intellectual heritage to contemporary issues, takes an integrative stance on the 
intellectual utility and viability of African indigenous knowledge systems. In other words, the 
study has elicited the complementary functionality of revivalist positions – which argues for a total 
reawakening and embrace of Africa’s indigenous past heritages. Notwithstanding the revivalist 
position, the study also adopts a critical approach to Africa’s indigenous past – which places a 
question mark on the relevance of some indigenous past to contemporary African states, thus, 
calling for an abandonment of such past heritage. For the former, the work of Kwame Gyekye 
(1997) resonates here. He argues for “cultural revivalism” (1997:233) as an imperative for 
addressing contemporary challenges, dilemmas, and paradoxes bedevilling the post-colonial 
African states. Thus, it is expected of contemporary African philosophers to look back into the 
culture, and revive those values, ideas, ethos, and principles that the advent of colonialism had 
hitherto fractured, destroyed, marginalised, and suppressed. On the latter position, the earlier view 
of Hountondji and other Universalists come to bear here. In their view, it is unnecessary to return 
to some aspects of the past for a panacea to contemporary challenges in Africa, especially if such 
past aspects are no longer relevant and useful to be able to grapple with urgent demands and 
peculiarities of modernisation which requires commensurate intellectual capabilities. 
 
These two positions and other distinctive orientations have been shown in the fourth chapter, to be 
exclusive and mutually unaccommodating. Thus, I have argued alongside Chimakonam 
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(2015b:76) that it would amount to intellectual arrogance to reject the past, and close eyes to any 
benefits thereof, because of the alluringness of the present. In the same vein, it has been argued in 
this study that emerging realities of the contemporary world call for the inter-cultural exchange of 
ideas. This is because “a person who does not consult others is regarded as a sage only in a city of 
fools” (Oluwole 2015:55). However, caution was advised explicitly in the fifth chapter for 
indigenous scholars to be wary of what to take from other cultures. The act of not recognising the 
past and the uncritical importation of foreign views has thus been concluded to be unintelligent 
and an intellectual effort in futility to hold on to in the face of glaring and superior realities in the 
present time. The view here is that since culture is an ongoing phenomenon, that exists 
contemporaneously, it is wrong to either relegate its employment to the past, and wrong to reject 
its applicability for the present. Thus, the study recognises the viability and intellectual utility of 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems in addressing contemporary issues. However, it argues for a 
critical and analytic approach to explore African IKS before its employment. This approach along 
the Wireduan line of thought shown above also syncs with Ramose (2009:414), that African 
tradition and culture should serve as a fountain from which essential elements that are required for 
constructing authentic and emancipative paradigms, commensurate to present African historical 
conditions, will be extracted. In other words, in the attempt to effect epistemic emancipation of 
African IKS against all forms of Eurocentrism, effort must be made to ensure engaging culture or 
tradition rationally, critically, and systematically to elicit sound epistemological paradigms fit for 
contemporary African conditions. This approach informs the complementarity reflection of this 
research work. Exploring indigenous epistemic order for environmentalism, gives grounds for the 
integral participation of the local communities in the research process that seeks solutions to 
contemporary challenges. As noted earlier in the study, the environmental crisis in the world today 
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could be seen as a crisis of epistemology. This is because the chunk of anthropogenic 
environmental degradations ravaging the world today are consequences of the epistemic process 
that detaches the epistemic subject from the epistemic objects. Hence, AEO thus comes as a means 
to fashion out a framework of an epistemic process that recognises the complementarity stance of 
the subject and object of epistemology.  
 
As noted by Preston (2003:2), “[t]thought, knowledge, and belief are not products of mind alone 
but expressions of its integration and participation with the physical world that lies around the 
mind”. Preston’s argument syncs with the Indigenous African epistemic order that is structured on 
the ontological fusion of the subject and the object of knowledge in this study. In this African 
epistemic worldview, the physical world holds a significant position in enabling knowledge 
claims. Hence the position in chapters four, five, and six of the study that in the complementarity 
framework of AEO, the detachment of an abstract subject from a concrete object is done away 
with, as the complementary relationship of the twain in achieving sustainable knowledge is 
attained.  Achieving sustainable knowledge via the complementarity relationship of the subject 
and object of knowledge is essential to “bring human knowledge firmly back down to earth” 
(Preston 2003:2). That is to make epistemic processes touch on existential issues as structured by 
our lived experiences. On the imperativeness of such complementarity relations between the 
subject and object Bryant (2011:217) notes that: the world could be plunged into a future plagued 
with high level of crime and delinquency, sub-standard housing, unhealthy and polluted 




Thus, as a philosophical framework fit for contemporary environmental philosophy, addressing 
environmental crises from the standpoint of the African Epistemic Order bridges the gap between 
theory and praxis; and also seek the application of the envisioned African Epistemic order to 
challenges in Africa and other parts of the world. The viability of AEO to bridge the theory – gap 
lacunae was argued in the sixth chapter to rest of the idea that epistemology is both descriptive and 
prescriptive Scarfe (2008:98). Thus, AEO has the intellectual utility of questioning the present 
epistemic assumptions regarding the nature-human relationship, and at the same time to be able to 
prescribe the best means we ought to conceive such knowledge.  
 
The intellectual advantage and contribution to knowledge by the epistemic order of an African 
orientation are also that, it would be able to create “sustainable knowledge” (Bryant 2011:15). This 
is the knowledge system that is required for meeting the contemporaneous and perennial 
challenges facing Africa. These challenges range from political instability, environmental 
degradation, economic meltdown, migration crises, educational deficiency, etc. Having a 
knowledge forming process that informs our pedagogy, ethics, and adjudications of right and 
wrongs will have a positive impact in ameliorating the environmental crisis as it would engender 
enlightened decisions in choosing a social-economic, political and cultural path for 
environmentally concerned activities. The indigenous African Epistemic Order would thus operate 
as a sustainable knowledge aimed at addressing existential African environmental challenges.  
 
The complementarity framework is thus strengthened by the logical entailment that the unitary 
ontological conception of reality and by extension, nature, caries. It also, as argued above, makes 
the African epistemic order operational as sustainable knowledge forms for engaging perennial 
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environmental challenges. Although the envisioned African Epistemic Order could be employed 
to address other existential challenges, this study focus, even as a form of intellectual limitation of 
this work, on the environmental crisis bedevilling Africa and how or what role epistemology of 
African context could play in addressing these crises. This limitation however is overshadowed by 
the thought of the applicability of the AEO to other existential challenges in future planned 
research after this study. The crux of the practicability of AEO with regards to environmentalism 
is that people that are epistemically endowed with the knowledge of their environment, are 
ecologically placed in a vantage point of the nature-human transaction. This is because the 
epistemic embeddedness of their existential experiences would afford them the understanding and 
application of such knowledge towards the sustainable use of nature. A healthy concept of the 
human-nature relation is, thus, engendered from the epistemic unification of object and subject, 
nature and humans, body and mind. This epistemic understanding of nature has been argued in the 
sixth chapter to engenders the ‘Complementary Environmental Ethics’. We argued therein that the 
CEE is suitable for the sustenance of harmonic relationships between the varying independent and 
yet, interdependent beings/entities in the society. This is because it allows for each differing unit 
to hold to its individuality – which is authenticated by their interrelation with the other – and at the 
same time be complementary to one another.  
 
Thus, AEO becomes a veritable platform for intergenerational ethical guidance and justice for 
interrogating the past, adjudicating for the present, and prescribing for future events as well as the 
future generations. With the epistemic knowledge of one’s place in society, humans are more 
equipped to live and act ethically in the relational existence. This is because the African epistemic 
order gives a robust capturing of the human person as a part of the two features of reality, whose 
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existence is authenticated and strengthened by its complementary relationship with other members 
of the environment. Thus, a natural motivation to protect, and positively live in a complementary 
manner with other independent members of the environment/society – humans, nonhumans; 
animate and inanimate objects – is sustained. Such motivation, this study concludes, will not only 
enlarge the conservatory attitude but also be able to engender practical and systematic policies for 
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